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Chapter 1
Introduction
"Pleasure in the job puts perfection in the work." Aristotle
For most people, work is the primary source of income. Moreover, working is one
of the main activities in peoples’ lives. Given the importance of work for both indi-
viduals and for the economy as a whole, it is natural that economists study human
behaviour at the workplace. Economic models of behaviour at work traditionally
depict workers as opportunistic and lazy beings, who shirk at every occasion. The
promise of money is the only motive for going to work and for providing effort.
Only strictly necessary duties are being performed, and for every minute of overtime
workers demand financial compensation.
Few people will recognise themselves in this image. Surely, money plays a role,
but work is more than just a source of income. Many people take pride in their
job, care about the outcome of their efforts, or simply enjoy (some of) their tasks.
Work can lead to a better self-image and higher self-esteem, and provides a social
network of colleagues and clients. Indeed, survey respondents generally express that
money is not the sole reason for working. For instance, in a survey of the US labour
force half of the respondents agreed with the statement “what I do at work is more
important than the money I earn”, and more than 70 percent claimed that they
would continue working even if they would be financially comfortable for the rest
of their lives (Quinn and Staines, 1979).1 Minkler (2004) reports that 95% of US
1Glenn and Weaver (1982) even find that 25 percent of Americans enjoy time at work more
than time off work.
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employees said that they would provide high effort even when it would be almost
impossible for their boss to check up on them. One of the main explanations given by
the respondents was “I enjoy my work”. Surveys among managers in Sweden and
the US indicate that managers are aware that workers can be motivated by non-
pecuniary means (Agell and Lundborg, 1999, Bewley, 1998). Rather than financial
incentives, managers commend the inspiring effects of e.g. interesting tasks and
recognition of achievements. Echoing Aristotle, a Swedish manager stated that
“people work hard as long as they have fun”.
These observations suggest that standard economic models have a too narrow
view of work. Instead, psychologists and sociologists acknowledge that work has a
broad impact on peoples’ lives. For instance, Maslow’s well-known hierarchy of needs
theory asserts that after physiological and safety needs are met, individuals strive
for social acceptance, esteem, and self-development (Maslow, 1970). Work provides
individuals with the means to fulfil these needs. Furthermore, psychologists argue
that many activities arise from within individuals, without the presence of an ex-
ternal stimulus. ‘Intrinsic motivation’ is considered to be a major determinant of
behaviour (DeCharms, 1968). Workers differ substantially in their intrinsic motiva-
tion to put in effort at work (Caplan, 2003, Furnham, 1990, 1992). This implies that
employees who intrinsically value working will put in more effort than predicted by
standard economic models. Moreover, if workers differ in their intrinsic motivation
to work at a specific firm, then the performance of the firm depends on its ability
to recruit well-motivated workers.
In this thesis, workers’ valuation of non-monetary job aspects plays a central
role. Without abandoning the rigour of economic analysis, we allow workers to care
about the whole content of their job rather than about money alone. The thesis
revolves around two issues. First, we look at the implications of heterogeneity in
workers’ intrinsic valuation of (specific) jobs for the optimal provision of incentives
and for the recruitment and selection of employees, under various market structures.
Second, we empirically analyse how workers’ assessment of various (monetary and
non-monetary) aspects of their job affects both whether and where they would like
to obtain another job. These extensions of standard economic analysis provide new
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insight into firms’ incentive and selection practices and into patterns of job search
and job mobility.
The remainder of this Introduction discusses the key elements of the analysis,
and provides an overview of the chapters of this thesis.
1.1 Key elements
1.1.1 Intrinsic motivation at work
There are many reasons why people may enjoy exerting effort at work. Working
hard can give a sense of achievement and accomplishment. Helping out colleagues
and customers can be satisfying, and contributing to a worthy goal or mission of the
organisation can be inspiring. Whatever the reason, the result is that people who
intrinsically enjoy working will exert (some) effort, even in the absence of external
incentives.
In general, any job can evoke intrinsic motivation. Commonly used examples
of jobs that have intrinsic qualities are jobs in health care and education, where
employees directly affect the life and future prospects of patients and pupils. Still,
since preferences are not identical across people, the kind of jobs someone intrin-
sically values differs from person to person. People who are afraid of heights will
not enjoy working as a window-cleaner, and gardener is not the ideal profession for
someone with hayfever. For some students, doing a PhD in Economics is the ideal
job, whereas others see it as a mere stepping-stone to more favourable positions,
and yet others are simply horrified by the suggestion. Hence, the level of intrinsic
motivation generally depends on the match between a worker and a job.
The benefits of an intrinsically motivated workforce for firms are obvious. As
shown by Besley and Ghatak (2005), Francois (2000), and Glazer (2004) as well as
in Chapter 2 of this thesis, intrinsically motivated workers are more productive and
demand less financial compensation for exerting effort. However, if workers differ in
intrinsic motivation to work at a certain firm, then the firm first needs to recruit
the best-motivated workers in order to enjoy these benefits. As a job applicant’s
intrinsic motivation is not easily observable for firms, the level of motivation is
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private knowledge of the applicant. Moreover, in contrast to IQ and other abilities,
intrinsic motivation is hard to measure. Surely, firms may get an indication of
applicants’ motivation during the selection process. Huang and Cappelli (2006)
show that organisations that actively screen applicants for work ethic tend to hire
more productive personnel. Still, screening methods are never perfectly accurate,
and job candidates may successfully fake or hide their intrinsic motivation. This
implies that firms have an incentive to make sure that less motivated workers refrain
from applying in the first place, so as to increase the probability that the new hiree
is highly motivated.
1.1.2 Monetary incentives and selection
Ask an economist how the performance of employees can be improved, and the likely
answer is to use financial sticks and carrots. Piece-rates, bonuses, and other pay-
for-performance schemes are supposed to induce employees to increase their produc-
tivity. Similarly, the (implicit) threat of being fired after substandard performance
keeps employees from shirking. Tapping into employees’ desire for higher earnings,
these monetary incentive schemes ensure that exerting effort is in the interest of
the employees. Moreover, performance pay is particularly attractive to productive
employees, implying that it may facilitate the recruitment of skilled personnel.
There is a growing body of empirical evidence showing that financial incentives
affect employees’ behaviour. Lazear (2000) finds a sharp increase in productivity
after the introduction of piece-rate payment at a company installing windshields in
cars, which can be partially attributed to above average productivity of new hirees.
Bandeira et al. (2006) show that tying the salary of managers to the performance of
their subordinates also results in higher worker productivity. Several other studies
are discussed by Prendergast (1999).
Some anecdotal evidence on ill-designed incentive schemes also suggests that
workers react to financial incentives, albeit not always in the way the firm aims
to. Examples include workers who increase the quantity produced at the expense of
quality after the introduction of a piece-rate scheme, teachers who ‘teach to the test’
or even hand out answers before the test when their rewards depend on students’
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test scores, and typists who started tapping the same key over and over again during
lunchbreaks after their salary was linked to the number of keystrokes; see e.g. Kerr
(1975) and Holmström and Milgrom (1991). In short, financial incentives indeed af-
fect behaviour and, when properly designed, can increase productivity substantially.
1.1.3 Job satisfaction and turnover
A worker starts searching for another job when she feels that she might be able to
find a better job. A job change occurs when a new job opportunity indeed yields
higher expected utility. Clearly, any job aspect, both financial and non-financial,
can be a reason for searching or changing jobs. Using survey data, Akerlof et al.
(1988) show that more US employees change jobs for non-financial than for financial
reasons. A significant part of the workers who has non-financial motives takes a
wage cut. Still, almost all job movers report to be better off after the job change.
From a macro-perspective, labour mobility is necessary to accommodate growth
differences between firms, industries, and nations. For an individual firm, however,
turnover brings about recruitment cost and may reduce the incentive to invest in
firm-specific skills. Insight into workers’ reasons to search for another job or to quit
may help to reduce the cost arising from turnover. Similarly, insight into employees’
reasons to leave their industry may help to reduce industry-wide personnel shortages,
e.g. those expected in some parts of the public sector in the near future (OECD,
2001).
In the voluminous economics literature on the causes and consequences of job
mobility, much attention is paid to wages and other relatively easily measurable job
domains. The effects of intangible job domains such as job duties, relations with
colleagues and management, and autonomy are studied less often, due to the lack
of objective measures. As an alternative for objective measures, organisational psy-
chologists often use workers’ own assessment, by asking them about their attitude
towards their job and about their satisfaction with various job domains. Tradi-
tionally, economists have been suspicious of the subjective nature of this kind of
information, but recently a growing number of papers use subjective data (for a dis-
cussion see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). Various studies have convincingly
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shown that subjective data can help to explain job mobility. Freeman (1978) shows
that workers who are satisfied with their job are significantly less likely to quit in
the subsequent period than dissatisfied workers; see also Akerlof et al. (1988). Clark
(2001) shows that the probability of a quit not only increases with overall job dis-
satisfaction, but also with dissatisfaction with several job domains, both financial
and non-financial.
Whatever the reason for a worker’s desire to change jobs, the search for a new job
is unlikely to be a random process. Rather, the worker will look for job opportunities
at places where she expects to find a job that offers better conditions on the job
aspects she wants to improve upon. For instance, a civil servant who is fed up with
his Minister will not be looking for a position in another unit within the department.
Similarly, a PhD-student who realises that she dislikes doing research has little
to gain from moving to another university. Neal (1999) distinguishes between job
mobility and career mobility, where the latter is defined as a change in both industry
and occupation. Examining patterns of individual job mobility, he finds evidence
that workers first choose a suitable career and subsequently a suitable job within
their career. This suggests that there is a relation between workers’ reasons for
searching for another job and the direction of their search efforts.
1.2 Overview of the thesis
This thesis discusses the implications of workers’ valuation of non-monetary aspects
of jobs for their behaviour at work. The thesis comprises six articles, which broadly
deal with two subjects. In Chapters 2 to 5, we examine how heterogeneity in workers’
intrinsic motivation affects optimal monetary incentive schemes and the selection of
workers. Chapters 6 and 7 use survey data to link employees’ satisfaction with
various aspects of their (former) job to their job search and mobility behaviour.
Chapter 2 starts by examining the value of an intrinsically motivated worker to
a firm. In line with Besley and Ghatak (2005), Francois (2000), and Glazer (2004),
we show that intrinsically motivated workers are more productive and are willing
to provide a given level of effort in exchange for a lower wage than non-motivated
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workers. Hence, recruiting intrinsically motivated workers can yield both higher
productivity and lower wage cost. However, since motivated workers obviously rather
have a high wage, they have a incentive to hide their motivation from the firm. In
Chapter 2, we study how the firm can use the wage scheme to recruit well-motivated
workers when workers differ in their intrinsic motivation to work at the firm. We
also examine how the observability of applicants’ motivation affects the optimal
monetary incentive scheme.
In Chapter 3, we study the effects of liberalising a sector dominated by a public
agency when workers differ in their intrinsic motivation to work in the sector. In the
last decades, we have witnessed a worldwide wave of liberalisation and privatisation,
often prompted by the (perceived) inefficiency of public organisations. The empiri-
cal literature finds that liberalisation and privatisation lead to higher productivity
and wages, lower employment, and stronger monetary incentives (Kikeri and Nellis,
2002, Megginson and Netter, 2001). Relatedly, Burgess and Metcalfe (1999) find
that public organisations provide weaker incentives than comparable private firms,
and argue that this is a sign of inefficiency. In contrast, we argue in Chapter 3 that
weak incentives in public organisations may be cost-efficient. While firms in a com-
petitive market have to compete for the best-motivated workers, a monopsonistic
public agency is able to extract part of the motivational rents through clever design
of the wage scheme. We compare the levels of productivity, employment, wages, and
incentives chosen by a public monopsonist to the levels arising in a perfectly com-
petitive market, and look at total wage cost under both market structures. Chapter
3 also examines which workers benefit and which workers lose from liberalisation.
Chapter 4 studies the selection of workers by a public agency when workers not
only differ in their intrinsic motivation to work for the agency, but also differ in gen-
eral productivity. Thus, some workers are less productive than others, regardless of
where they work. This is particularly interesting in the light of the stereotype views
of civil servants. Besides the popular image of the dedicated physician, teacher, and
police officer, a common depiction of civil servants is that of the lazy, incompetent
bureaucrat. We study which workers are optimally attracted by the public agency,
and derive the optimal level of monetary incentives provided by the public agency to
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the various worker types. We also examine how the objectives of the public agency
affects the optimal incentive schemes and the selection of workers.
In Chapter 5, we zoom in on health care. In many countries, physicians have to
take an oath to act in their patients’ interest before entering the profession, and it is
likely that some physicians indeed have a genuine concern for patients’ wellbeing.2
In Chapter 5, some physicians intrinsically care about patient welfare and patients
differ in income. This allows us to examine how the system of health care provision
affects the allocation of patients to physicians. In particular, we examine which
patients benefit from allowing for private provision of health care parallel to public
provision, by deriving which patients opt for treatment in the private sector and
which physicians choose to work in the private sector. We also analyse the effect of
subsidising private provision and the effect of allowing physicians to operate in the
public and the private sector simultaneously.
Chapters 6 and 7 study the relation between workers’ perception of their own job
and their behaviour regarding job search and mobility. In Chapter 6, we investigate
how workers’ assessment of their job affects both whether and where they search
for another job, using data from a survey among employees in the Dutch public
sector. Following Freeman (1978) and Clark (2001), we examine the relation between
(domain) job satisfaction and job search intensity. Interestingly, the job seekers
in the survey had to indicate the importance of 19 different job domains in their
decision to start searching for another job. We use this information to analyse
the relation between workers’ self-proclaimed reasons to search and their decision to
search within their current organisation, within the industry, or outside the industry.
We argue that our findings provide a unique view on workers’ perception of the
relative heterogeneity of the conditions on various job domains across jobs within
organisations and industries.
Chapter 7 uses data from a similar survey among employees who entered or left
an organisation in the Dutch public sector in 2001. As in the survey used in Chapter
6, respondents had to indicate the importance of 19 job domains in their decision to
2See e.g. the account of the events after hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans as described
by several health professionals in the New England Journal of Medicine, Volume 353(15). More
examples are provided in Chapter 5.
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leave their former job. In Chapter 7, this information is used to examine the relation
between workers’ reasons to quit and their decision to take up another job within the
same industry, in another part of the public sector, or in the private sector. Chapter
7 also analyses the impact of workers’ reasons to quit on their wage growth.
Chapter 8 concludes by providing a summary of the main findings of the thesis
and discussing some directions for further research.

Chapter 2
Signaling and Screening of
Workers’ Motivation∗
Joint with Robert Dur
2.1 Introduction
Economic models of worker behaviour typically assume that people dislike working;
hence, in order to induce workers to exert effort, employers must provide exter-
nal incentives. Employers have different means to increase workers’ effort. For
instance, the introduction of pay-for-performance devices will induce employees to
work harder. Equivalently, closer monitoring of workers’ effort, accompanied by
sanctions (e.g. dismissal) in case of shirking, will also result in higher effort.
Empirical research suggests that the standard neoclassical view of worker beha-
viour is often too narrow. Agell and Lundborg (1999) report results of a survey
among managers in Swedish manufacturing and conclude (p. 25) that “much recent
theorizing about effort and incentives is potentially misplaced [because] most man-
agers appear to ascribe a more important motivational role to psychological and soci-
ological factors than to economic sticks and carrots”. Interviews with US managers
by Bewley (1998) yield corresponding results. Rather than monetary incentives,
∗A slightly adapted version of this chapter is forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization.
12 Signaling and Screening of Workers’ Motivation
managers emphasise that work should be interesting and stimulating, that workers
should feel involved in decision-making, and that workers’ achievements should be
noticed and appreciated.1 One Swedish manager responded that “people work hard
as long as they have fun”.
Surveys among employees also indicate that monetary rewards are of much less
importance for job satisfaction and workers’ effort than postulated in economic
analysis. For instance, in a 1977 survey of the US labour force, half of the re-
spondents agreed with the statement that “what I do at work is more important
to me than the money I earn”, and more than 90 percent stated that they put in
more effort into their job than required (Quinn and Staines, 1979). Even though we
should be cautious (or even suspicious) about stated preferences, the results of these
surveys suggest that a large part of the labour force is motivated at work by more
than just monetary rewards (Baron, 1988).
The observation that workers may provide effort for non-pecuniary reasons has
two important implications. First, monetary incentive schemes designed to motivate
a ‘standard neoclassical worker’ may be suboptimal. Second, when people differ in
their motivation, the performance of a firm may become dependent on its capability
to select the ‘most motivated’ candidate among job applicants.
This chapter relaxes the standard assumption in the economic literature that
people dislike working to study these issues. We develop a model in which workers
to a certain extent like to exert effort at the workplace. Hence, people like their
job, not only because they get paid, but also because they enjoy working. Whereas
this type of motivation has for long been virtually absent in mainstream economics,
psychologists have argued that people undertake many activities without expecting
an extrinsic reward. ‘Intrinsic motivation’ is considered to be of major importance
for human behaviour (see e.g. DeCharms, 1968, Deci, 1971, and Furnham, 1990).
Recently, a few papers in economics have studied wages and incentive schemes
when workers are intrinsically motivated (Benabou and Tirole, 2003, Besley and
1Bartram et al. (1995) asked 498 small businesses in the UK which qualities of young workers
they regard as important. The employers ranked ‘interest in the work’ third, just below ‘honesty an
integrity’ and ‘conscientiousness’, and just above ‘general personality’ and ‘motivation and drive’,
all with average ratings above 3.4 on a 4-point scale. General ability, educational qualifications,
and work experience were considered less important.
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Ghatak, 2005, Francois, 2000, and Glazer, 2004). The main distinguishing feature
of this chapter is that we allow workers’ motivation to be private knowledge. As a
result, the firm can not select the best-motivated worker among the job applicants.
Hence, an adverse selection problem arises. We show that it may be in the interest
of the firm to offer a low wage to discourage relatively low motivated workers from
applying. This comes at the cost of a higher probability of leaving the vacancy
unfilled. The optimal wage scheme entails a trade-off between the probability of
filling the vacancy, the rents left to the worker, and the expected motivation of the
selected worker.
People may be intrinsically motivated to work for different reasons. One might
simply like to undertake certain activities. The activities which are intrinsically
valued, and hence the evaluation of intrinsic qualities of different jobs, may vary
across people. A motivated veterinary surgeon is not likely to be motivated to work
as a butcher. Intrinsic motivation is not solely determined by persons, jobs, or firms,
but by combinations of certain people and certain jobs or firms.
Intrinsic motivation may also be related to ‘self-esteem’, broadly defined as how
people think about themselves. Thus, people may be intrinsically motivated to work
(or to refrain from shirking) because it makes them think better about themselves.
Self-esteem may be enhanced by working or refraining from shirking in general, but
it may also be related to particular kind of jobs. For instance, workers in hospitals
may feel that they contribute to a goal which is considered to be ‘good’. Dixit
(2002) notes that organisations that serve an idealistic or ethical purpose may be
particularly attractive for people who share these goals. Obviously, which goals are
considered to be ‘good’ may differ among individuals.
Regardless of the precise reason for the enjoyment of or satisfaction from work,
the baseline is that people can derive utility from working. The presence of intrin-
sically motivated workers has important implications for firms. Motivated people
probably work harder, which increases output, and because people derive utility
from the job, they may be willing to work for a lower wage. People will take job
satisfaction into account when deciding on whether to accept or reject a wage offer.
A higher wage at another job may not compensate for the loss of intrinsic qualities
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of the job.
We develop a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic mo-
tivation to work at a particular firm. Working at the firm has some unique trait
that is valued differently by different workers, giving the firm monopsony power.2
We study two issues. First, we examine the implications of workers’ intrinsic mo-
tivation for optimal monetary incentive schemes. We extend a standard incentive
wage model and show that, in line with Dixit (2002), motivated workers work harder
and, for a given level of effort, are willing to work for a lower wage. The higher the
firm’s bargaining power, the more it can extract the motivational rents from the
worker. When the firm has sufficient bargaining power, a more motivated worker
brings about higher output and, under a mild condition, lower wage cost. We also
show that when the firm has a decreasing returns to effort production technology,
then better motivated workers imply weaker monetary incentives.
Second, we examine how the firm can attract and select highly motivated workers
to fill a vacancy. We assume that each worker has positive probability of observing
the vacancy. The workers who observe the vacancy decide whether or not to apply,
taking application cost into account. We consider three cases that differ in the
assumption made about the observability of applicants’ motivation. We start with
the assumption that the firm can observe the motivation of applicants. Next, we
consider the case where the firm cannot observe the motivation of the applicants.
Lastly, we allow the applicants to signal their motivation to the firm credibly.
We will show that in all of these cases, it is optimal for the firm to commit to
a minimum wage offer either because commitment resolves the Diamond paradox
(Diamond, 1971) or because it avoids a lemons problem (Akerlof, 1970). When
motivation of applicants is observable to the firm, the firm hires the worker with
the best motivation among those who applied. The profit-maximising level of the
minimum wage is determined by the trade-off between wage cost and the probability
2Manning (2003, p. 4) argues that heterogeneity in workers’ preferences is one of the three
most plausible sources of frictions in the labour market, giving firms monopsonistic power. Monop-
sony power arises naturally when intrinsic motivation is firm-specific. Dixit argues that ‘company
spirit’ in private firms and the idealistic purpose served by a public agency may motivate agents.
When intrinsic motivation is related to an occupation rather than to working at a particular firm,
monopsony power arises only if there are no other firms (in the neighbourhood) offering similar
jobs.
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of filling the vacancy. When motivation is unobservable, there is an additional
selection effect. A higher minimum wage decreases the expected quality of job
applicants since it induces less motivated workers to apply for the job, decreasing
the probability that a highly motivated worker is selected. However, if applicants
can signal their motivation to the firm, a commitment to a minimum wage gives
them an incentive to reveal their motivation, eliminating the selection effect.
The different assumptions about the observability of applicants’ motivation may
reflect different screening technologies employed by firms, ranging from application
forms and job interviews to work trials and the use of assessment centres (see Keenan,
1995, and Bartram et al., 1995). The use of tests in the screening process has
increased substantially over the last decades (Jenkins, 2001). The ‘personality and
workstyle questionnaire’ has become one of the most widely used test types (Ryan et
al., 1999). While these findings may suggest that firms have ample opportunities to
determine applicants’ motivation, the performance of applicants in such tests may
be subject to their choice of effort and behaviour, implying that applicants may have
a choice whether or not to reveal their motivation to the firm.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the related literature.
Section 2.3 examines the implications of workers’ intrinsic motivation for optimal
monetary incentive schemes. In Section 2.4 we study how the firm can attract and
select highly motivated workers to fill a vacancy, assuming that the firm can only
offer a fixed wage. Section 2.5 generalises the results of Section 2.4 to the case of
optimal monetary incentive schemes, as studied in Section 2.3. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
Intrinsic motivation has, until recently, been largely ignored in economic analysis,
with the exception of the work by Bruno Frey (see among others Frey, 1993, 1997a,
and 1997b). We differ from his work in our focus on sorting and selection issues.
Moreover, we abstract from the possibility that external incentives crowd out a
worker’s intrinsic motivation. Therefore, in our model, it is always in the firm’s
interest to provide monetary incentives, even when a worker is highly motivated.
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However, high wages reduce the average intrinsic motivation among the pool of job
candidates and may thus reduce labour productivity unless the firm can fully observe
applicants’ intrinsic motivation.
The idea that, all else equal, workers are willing to work for a lower wage at jobs
with intrinsic qualities traces back to Adam Smith’sWealth of Nations. The theory
of equalising differences (Brown, 1980, Rosen, 1986) states that all (dis)amenities
of a job are reflected in its wage. Several studies suggest that the opportunity
to contribute to the goals of a non-profit organisation is valued by workers and
may explain the wage differential between non-profit and for-profit organisations
(see e.g. Hansmann, 1980, Preston, 1989, Frank, 1996, and Rose-Ackerman, 1996).
Recent empirical evidence is provided by Leete (2001) and Frey et al. (2001). This
chapter contributes to this literature by examining the effect of intrinsic motivation
on optimal pay-for-performance schemes and on recruitment and selection of job
applicants.
Most of our analysis focuses on the case where workers’ motivation is unob-
servable to the firm. Hence, our model is a principal-agent model where the agent
(the worker) has private information about his type. Benabou and Tirole (2003),
by contrast, focus on the case where the principal has private information about
the attractiveness of the job to workers. The choice of the wage scheme by the
principal may then signal his private knowledge to the worker. As a result, extrin-
sic rewards may either crowd in or crowd out intrinsic motivation. Several recent
papers study incentive provision to intrinsically motivated workers, among others
Besley and Ghatak (2005), Francois (2000), and Glazer (2004). In these papers, as
in this chapter, firms have all the bargaining power. In contrast to this chapter,
these papers assume that the firm can observe workers’ intrinsic motivation.3
Our analysis builds on signaling and screening models of the labour market. A
seminal paper in this field is Spence (1973), and Riley (2001) provides a recent survey
of the literature. Most studies focus on screening of workers’ abilities. The setup
of our model is closely related to the ability-models. As in our model, firms must
3The kind of intrinsic motivation that we focus on in this paper differs from an intrinsic mo-
tivation to behave reciprocally, as studied by Akerlof (1982) and Falk et al. (1999), or intrinsic
feelings of altruism towards one’s colleagues or boss, which is studied by Rotemberg (1994).
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commit to pay high wages to induce workers to signal their type. An important
difference between the ability-models and our model is that motivation not only
affects worker’s productivity, but also his willingness to work. Moreover, our model
departs from the standard screening model by assuming that the firm faces several
job applicants among which it chooses, as in Janssen (2002). The standard model
considers the case of one worker and two firms, see Cho and Kreps (1987).
Our work is also related to the job search literature, in particular to directed
search models (see e.g. Burdett et al., 2001, and Shi, 2002). Montgomery (1991)
argues that firms that face a high cost of leaving a vacancy unfilled offer higher
wages. The reason is that workers send an application with higher probability to
firms that offer higher wages. Hence, firms increase their probability of filling the
vacancy by posting a higher wage, as in our model. Another common element is
that workers base their application decision on the probability of getting the job,
which depends on the expected total number of applicants for this job.
Closest to this chapter is Handy and Katz (1998). They study a model in which
potential employees differ in both ability and motivation. While the firm can test
for an applicant’s ability, it cannot distinguish motivated from unmotivated workers.
Handy and Katz show that to promote self-selection among potential employees, the
firm has an incentive to commit itself to pay a low wage. By committing to pay a
low wage, the firm is certain that a job applicant is a motivated worker. Our analysis
differs from theirs in various respects. First, we assume that the firm cannot draw
on an infinitely large pool of applicants consisting of all types of workers. In our
model, the firm cannot be certain that the worker who is most motivated for the job
has observed the vacancy and, hence, is in the pool of job applicants. Therefore, a
commitment to pay the lowest possible wage (the wage that is acceptable only to the
most motivated worker in the economy) is in general not optimal for the firm, for it
precludes hiring a worker who is somewhat less motivated when the most motivated
worker in the economy is not available. Hence, the firm optimally sets a minimum
wage that attracts workers with different (albeit high) levels of motivation to apply
for the job. Second, Handy and Katz do not consider the decision of potential
employees to apply for a job. We show that their results depend on the assumption
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that application costs are zero. Positive application costs, however small, imply that
a maximum wage is of no avail, whereas a minimum wage helps to attract and select
highly motivated workers. Application costs are likely to be positive, given the time
and effort involved in writing an application, having job interviews, and possibly
performing tests, attending an assessment centre, or even undertaking a work trial.
Lastly, our analysis allows for signaling by workers and offering performance pay by
firms.
2.3 Optimal monetary incentive schemes for mo-
tivated workers
This section explores the implications of workers’ intrinsic motivation for the optimal
design of monetary incentive schemes. The literature (see e.g. Lazear, 1995) usually
assumes a worker’s utility function of the form:
U [w(e), e]
where utility is concave in income (U1 > 0, U11 < 0), income depends on effort
according to the wage scheme w(e), and the cost of exerting effort is convex (U2 <
0, U22 < 0). We introduce intrinsic motivation by adding a third argument to the
utility function:4
U [w(e), e, γie] (2.1)
where γi ∈ [0, γ¯]. γi measures the degree to which worker i is intrinsically motivated,
which varies between different kind of jobs. The positive utility derived from effort
is assumed to be concave in e (U3 > 0, U33 < 0).5 Hence, apart from an indirect
effect of effort on income through the wage scheme, utility first increases in effort
and then, starting from some level depending on the value of γi, starts decreasing;
4Without significant loss of generality, we introduce intrinsic motivation as a third argument
in the utility function, and not as a modification of the second argument, for ease of exposition.
5Constant or even increasing marginal positive utility from effort does not affect the results as
long as optimal effort is finite (i.e., we abstract from ’workaholics’). We also assume U3 > −eγU33,
a condition that will be discussed below.
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Figure 2.1: The effect of intrinsic motivation on the direct utility of effort
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see Figure 2.1. Depending on the level of e, total utility derived from exerting effort
may be positive or negative. For convenience, we assume that all cross-derivatives
are zero: Uij = 0 for all i 6= j.
The firm’s profit depends on the effort of the worker:
π = q(e)− w(e). (2.2)
Profit is the difference between the value of the output generated by the effort of the
worker, q (e), and the wage cost. The production function has decreasing returns to
worker’s effort, q0(e) > 0 and q00(e) < 0.
In this section, we assume that the firm observes the worker’s motivation γ and
has all the bargaining power. The firm sets wage cost as low as possible, but the
wage must meet the worker’s participation constraint:
U [w(e), e, γie] ≥ Uout ≡ U(b, 0, 0) (2.3)
where Uout is the outside option of the worker. We assume that the worker’s alter-
native to employment at this firm is living on an unemployment benefit b. More
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generally, the outside option of the worker would take into account expected job
opportunities at other firms. If other firms would offer jobs with the same kind of
intrinsic qualities, a worker’s outside option would depend on his motivation. This
would weaken our argument that motivated workers are willing to work for a lower
wage. In the next chapter, we analyse the effects of competition in the labour mar-
ket for intrinsically motivated workers and show that competition leads to higher
wages, stronger incentives, and higher productivity. Here, we abstract from out-
side job opportunities. We thus focus on situations where the firm has (sufficient)
monopsonistic power, either because workers’ intrinsic motivation is firm-specific or
because there are no other firms (in the neighbourhood) offering jobs with the same
intrinsic qualities.
The worker’s optimal amount of effort is found by maximising the utility function
(2.1) to e:
max U → w0(e)U1(·) + U2(·) + γiU3(·) = 0 (2.4)
In the optimum, the worker’s (financial and motivational) marginal benefits of effort
equal the marginal cost of effort.
The firm maximises profits. Since the firm has all the bargaining power, it sets
the worker’s total compensation such that it leaves no rents to the worker. Though
the firm does not directly control the worker’s effort e, it can design a monetary
incentive scheme that induces the worker to exert the optimal level of effort:6
max π s.t. U(·) ≥ Uout → q0(e)− w0(e) = 0 (2.5)
In the optimum, the marginal product equals marginal wage cost.
First-order conditions (2.4) and (2.5) imply that if the firm sets the wage scheme
optimally, the worker’s marginal utility of effort, apart from the effect of extra effort
on his income, is negative. Hence, people stating that they enjoy every aspect of
their work (“my work is my hobby”) are simply exerting too little effort (or, in other
words, their wage scheme is suboptimal). Note also that (2.4) and (2.5) imply that
6When neither effort nor production is verifiable, the firm cannot induce workers to provide
optimal effort. We deal with this case at the end of this section.
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if the worker is less motivated, then monetary incentives are stronger (i.e., the lower
γi is, the larger w0(e) is). Important for this result is our assumption that q00(e) < 0.
With constant returns to effort [q00(e) = 0], the optimal reward per unit of effort
w0(e) equals the marginal product of effort q0(e), which is constant when q00(e) = 0.
The firm sets total compensation to the worker such that it leaves no rents to the
worker. In the optimum, the firm creates a compensation scheme that induces the
worker to choose the level of effort defined by (2.4) and (2.5) at the lowest cost to
the firm, implying that the worker ends up with a total utility of U = Uout, defined
by (2.3).
Intrinsic motivation has two important effects. First, the higher γ, the higher
the maximum wage the firm is willing to offer. Stated differently, given the level of
the wage, it is more profitable to the firm to hire a worker who is more motivated.
The maximum wage the firm is willing to offer is the wage that would leave the firm
with zero profit:
w(e) = q(e) (2.6)
Since marginal productivity q0(e) is positive, we have to show that e increases in γ.
Applying the implicit function theorem to (2.4) results in:
de
dγ
=
U3(·) + eγU33(·)
−∂2U(·)/∂e2 (2.7)
where ∂2U(·)/∂e2 < 0 is the second-order condition to the worker’s optimisation
problem (2.4). Effort increases in a worker’s motivation if U3 > −eγU33. We assume
that this condition holds: it is unlikely that a more motivated worker works less hard
because he already enjoys working so much. More effort implies more output. Hence,
the maximum wage the firm is willing to offer increases in the worker’s motivation.
Second, given the level of effort, intrinsic motivation affects the wage the firm
needs to offer to meet the worker’s participation constraint. We show that for
constant e = eˆ, the minimum wage for which the worker is willing to work decreases
in γ. Applying the implicit function theorem to (2.3) results in:
dw(eˆ)
dγ
= − eˆU3(·)
U1(·) < 0 (2.8)
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The expression in (2.8) is always negative: given the level of effort, a worker who is
more motivated for the job needs to be compensated less.
In general, the effect of motivation on total wage compensation is ambiguous.
A more motivated worker needs to be compensated less for each unit of effort.
However, he exerts more effort than less motivated workers, implying that the total
wage may be increasing in motivation. In appendix 2.A.1 we prove that dw(e)dγ < 0 if
the following condition holds:
eU3(·) > −[U2(·) + γiU3(·)]
de
dγ
(2.9)
The right-hand side of this inequality denotes the net increase in disutility due to
the higher level of effort. The left-hand side is the increase in motivational utility
derived from all effort the worker exerts because of the higher motivation. If, in the
new optimum, the increased pleasure of working is higher than the burden of the
additional effort, highly motivated workers need less financial compensation than
less motivated workers.
Higher motivation thus has two effects: the firm is willing to offer a higher
wage while, given the level of effort, the worker is willing to accept a lower wage.
Motivation therefore increases the joint surplus of the worker and the firm. When
the firm has all the bargaining power, it can extract all rents from the motivation
of the worker by adjusting the compensation scheme. This implies that, if condition
(2.9) is satisfied, more motivated workers will be offered lower wages, even though
they are more productive.7 Hence, without a commitment of the firm not to extract
all motivational rents, job applicants may be reluctant to reveal their motivation to
the firm, or worse even, the firm may not be able to attract any applicant at all.
Section 2.4 addresses this problem.
Both effects of intrinsic motivation are also present in the case of a fixed wage.
When the firm is unable or unwilling to use incentive wages,8 the optimal level of
7Allowing for a more equal distribution of bargaining power between the firm and the workers
need not affect this result. As long as the firm has sufficient bargaining power, the wage of the
worker decreases in motivation, provided that condition (2.9) holds, see Appendix 2.A.2.
8One reason why firms may refrain from providing monetary incentives to motivated workers
is high monitoring cost; see Weiss (1990, pp. 73-76). In case of multiple tasks, monetary incentives
may crowd out facets of tasks that are hard to observe by facets of tasks that are more easily
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effort of the worker is given by (2.4) with w0(e) equal to zero. The effect of intrinsic
motivation on effort is still given by (2.7). Effort and thus output increase in the
worker’s motivation. This is also clear from Figure 2.1: a worker’s optimal effort
with a fixed wage is given by the top of the curve, which moves to the right when γ
becomes higher. Hence, the maximum fixed wage the firm is willing to offer increases
in the worker’s motivation. Moreover, the minimum fixed wage a worker is willing to
accept decreases in motivation. By using first-order condition (2.4), we can rewrite
condition (2.9) to:
eU3(·) > w0(e)U1(·)dedγ (2.10)
In case of a fixed wage, w0(e) = 0, condition (2.10) always holds. Therefore, if
motivation is higher, then the direct utility from effort is higher, and so the minimum
wage that satisfies the participation constraint of the worker is lower.
2.4 Attracting and selecting motivated workers
This section examines how a firm can attract and select highly motivated workers
to fill a vacancy. We consider three cases: one where the firm can observe the
motivation of the applicants, one where it cannot, and one where workers decide
whether or not to signal their motivation. To focus on the distributional conflict
between the firm and the worker, we abstract from monetary incentives and assume
that the firm offers a base salary only. Allowing for monetary incentives does not
affect the results qualitatively, which we show in Section 2.5, but it distracts attention
from our main results.
2.4.1 Setup of the model
A firm has one vacancy and posts a ‘help-wanted’ ad. As in the previous section, the
firm has all the bargaining power. However, we assume that the firm can credibly
commit to pay at least a certain wage by posting a base salary wmin in the ad.
Workers differ in their intrinsic motivation γ ∈ [0, γ¯] to work at this firm while their
observed (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). Alternatively, monetary incentives may crowd out
intrinsic motivation, see Frey (1997a) and Benabou and Tirole (2003).
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outside options are identical, Uout. There is a discrete number of worker types in the
economy, with nγi workers of type γi. Denote by Nγi the total number of workers
with motivation equal to or higher than γi:
Nγi =
X
γ≥γi
nγ (2.11)
Each worker has probability μ of observing the ad, 0 < μ < 1. One reason for μ < 1
could be that not all workers read the newspaper every day. As a result, the firm
is uncertain about the composition of the group of potential applicants. If a worker
decides to apply, she incurs application cost C.9
Following the results from the previous section, worker i’s indirect utility function
can be written as U(γi, w), with properties Uγ(·) > 0 and Uw(·) > 0, and profits of
the firm as π(γi, w), with properties πγ(·) > 0 and πw(·) < 0. Since condition (2.9) is
always satisfied in case of a fixed wage, the minimum wage offer a worker is willing to
accept decreases in motivation. That is, if γ > γ0, then U(γ,w) = U(γ0, w0) implies
that w < w0.
2.4.2 Observable motivation
Suppose the firm can observe the level of intrinsic motivation of each applicant
during the selection process. The sequence of events is as follows:
1. The firm posts a ‘help-wanted’ ad, in which it can credibly commit to a mini-
mum wage.
2. The workers who observe the ad decide whether or not to apply. If a worker
applies, she incurs cost C.
3. The firm observes the types of all applicants, selects one applicant, and makes
her a wage offer w.
4. The applicant accepts or rejects. Rejection results in zero profits.10
9Instead of μ < 1, we could also assume that C is a random variable that differs among workers.
Important for the results is that the firm faces some uncertainty about the composition of the group
of applicants.
10A more general set-up of the game would allow the firm to make a wage offer to another
applicant (or a better wage offer to the same worker) after a rejection. While this could reduce the
probability to end up with an unfilled vacancy, it may increase the rents that have to be left to the
2.4 Attracting and selecting motivated workers 25
We first consider the case where the firm has not committed to a minimum wage
at stage 1. We solve the model by backward induction. The optimal strategy of
each worker at stage 4 is simple: accept if and only if U(γi, w) ≥ Uout. Application
costs are sunk at this stage. As profits increase in the worker’s motivation, the firm
optimally selects the most motivated worker among the applicants. The optimal
wage offer is such that U(γ,w) = Uout. This strategy of the firm at stage 3 makes
that no worker applies at stage 2. Each worker anticipates that the firm extracts all
rents of her motivation, leaving the worker with the sunk application cost.11 This
result is known as the Diamond paradox (Diamond, 1971; see also Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1999).12
To give workers an incentive to apply, the firm must make a credible commitment
not to extract all rents from their motivation. It can do so by putting a minimum
wage wmin in the ad at stage 1.13 If the minimum wage is sufficiently high, some
worker types have positive expected benefits from applying. Since πγ(·) > 0, the
firm still selects the most motivated worker from the pool of applicants at stage
3. If the lowest wage that this worker would accept is below the minimum wage,
the minimum wage is binding. Otherwise, the firm offers the wage that makes the
worker indifferent between accepting and rejecting. However, as above, these workers
optimally do not apply. Hence, the firm always offers wmin.
At stage 2, worker i applies if the expected benefits from applying are positive.
Obviously, if a certain worker type has positive expected benefits from applying, all
workers with higher motivation also have positive expected benefits from applying.
A worker of type γi applies if and only if
f(γi)[U(γi, wmin)− Uout]− C ≥ 0 (2.12)
hired worker. Workers may wait for a next (higher) wage offer at the risk that an other applicant
accepts one of the firm’s next offers. Allowing for multiple wage offers will also affect the decision
to apply. We leave this for future research.
11The assumption that the firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it wage offer implies that even if there
is a single most motivated worker, nγ¯ = 1, this worker cannot capture any rents.
12If C = 0, all workers who observe the ad apply. The firm selects the most motivated worker
and offers the wage that exactly meets her participation constraint as described in Section 2.3.
13We assume that posting a range of wage offers conditional on a worker’s motivation is not
credible due to the unverifiability of the level of motivation. Thus, posting a single wage is the
best the firm can do.
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where f(γi) is the expected probability for a worker of type γi of being selected by
the firm and U(γi, wmin) is the utility that the worker obtains if she accepts offer
wmin. f(γi) is determined by the distribution of worker types:
f(γi) = (1− μ)Nγi−nγi
nγi−1X
x=0
∙
1
1 + x
µ
nγi − 1
x
¶
μx(1− μ)nγi−1−x
¸
(2.13)
where Nγi is given by (2.11). The first term is the probability that all workers with
γ > γi do not observe the ad. If any of these workers apply, then worker i will not be
selected by the firm. The second term gives the probability that worker i is selected
from all applicants of the same type. This probability is the function
1
1 + x
,where
x is the number of applicants with motivation γi besides worker i, which follows a
binomial distribution.
The firm sets the minimum wage such that expression (2.12) holds with equality
for the least motivated worker type that it wants to apply. Denote this worker type
by γmin. As argued above, if wmin < w0min, then γmin > γ0min. Expected profits are
given by:
E[π(γ, wmin)] =
X
γ≥γmin
F (γ)π(γ,wmin) (2.14)
where:
F (γ) = (1− μ)Nγ−nγ [1− (1− μ)nγ ] (2.15)
is the probability that γ is the highest level of motivation among the applicants
and π(γ,wmin) is the accompanying level of profit. Suppose the firm increases the
minimum wage from wmin to w0min such that γmin decreases by one worker type to
γ0min. This leads to the following change in expected profits:
∆E[π] = E[π(γ,w0min)]− E[π(γ,wmin)]
=
X
γ≥γ0min
F (γ)π(γ,w0min)−
X
γ≥γmin
F (γ)π(γ,wmin)
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which can be written as:
∆E[π] = F (γ0min)π(γ
0
min, w
0
min) +
X
γ≥γmin
F (γ)[π(γ,w0min)− π(γ,wmin)] (2.16)
Increasing the minimum wage leads to a higher probability of filling the vacancy as
an additional worker type, γ0min, has an incentive to apply after observing the ad.
This is reflected by the first term. However, if some worker with motivation higher
than γ0min observes the vacancy, the increase in the minimum wage only leads to
additional cost, as this worker would have applied at the lower minimum wage as
well. This is described by the second term.
The firm sets the minimum wage such that 0 ≤ γmin ≤ γ¯. A local optimum of
E[π(γ,wmin)] can be found by stepwise increasing the minimum wage until the sign
of ∆E[π] turns negative. Whether there is only one local (and thus global) optimum
is unsure given the general specification of the distribution of worker types and of
the profit function π(γ, wmin). More specifically, if, for a value of wmin above the
local optimum, a small increase in wmin results in a large increase in the probability
of filling the vacancy, then E[π(γ,wmin)] may not be concave in wmin, and hence,
there may be more than one local optimum. Restricting the distribution of worker
types such that nγ = n for all γ and π(γ, w0min) − π(γ,wmin) is constant in wmin
(that is, the increase in wmin necessary to attract one additional worker type is equal
for all worker types), both terms of (2.16) decrease with wmin. This implies that
E[π(γ,wmin)] is concave in wmin and, hence, there exists only one local and global
optimum. Corner solutions cannot be excluded: it is possible that the optimal γmin
is either 0 or γ¯.
2.4.3 Unobservable motivation
When the firm cannot observe the types of the applicants, it randomly selects one
applicant and makes her a wage offer. As in the previous subsection, we assume
that when the wage offer is rejected, the firm ends up with zero profits.
Consider first the case where the firm has not committed to a minimum wage.
The beliefs of the firm about the distribution of applicants’ types are crucial in
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determining the optimal wage offer. Suppose that the firm believes that there exists
some γl such that only workers with γi ≥ γl apply after observing the vacancy. Let
wl be the wage such that U(γl, wl) = Uout. Given the firm’s beliefs, its optimal wage
offer w is such that wγ¯ ≤ w ≤ wl. Hence, workers of type γl optimally decide not
to apply as the wage offer does not compensate them for the application cost. This,
in turn, reduces the firm’s optimal wage, which removes the incentives of workers
with slightly higher motivation to apply. As this holds for any γl (including γ¯), the
market collapses, as in Akerlof’s lemon market. In Akerlof’s model, the existence of
bad types drives the good types out of the market. Interestingly, in our model, it is
the withdrawal of the bad types from the market that drives out the good types.
Again, the firm needs to commit to a minimum wage in order to attract ap-
plicants. In Appendix 2.A.3, we derive the optimal minimum wage when workers’
motivation is unobservable. Compared to the case where motivation is observable,
there is an additional selection effect of raising the wage. As before, a higher min-
imum wage induces workers who are less motivated to apply. Hence, the average
level of intrinsic motivation of applicants goes down. If the firm can fully observe
applicants’ motivation, this reduction in average motivation of applicants does not
entail a cost since the firm simply chooses the best motivated worker among the
applicants. However, if applicants’ motivation is unobservable, the firm picks an
applicant randomly, and hence, higher wages reduce the expected level of motiva-
tion of the worker that is hired. The selection effect imposes an additional cost of
increasing the minimum wage compared to the case where motivation is observable,
so the optimal minimum wage is lower.14
2.4.4 Motivation can be signaled
Suppose that the firm cannot observe the motivation of the applicants, but appli-
cants can credibly signal their type to the firm.15 Obviously, when the firm does
14If C = 0, the firm need not commit to a minimum wage to attract applicants. However,
the selection effect indicates that the firm might want to commit to a maximum wage in order to
reduce the number of relatively less motivated workers in the pool of applicants, as in Handy and
Katz (1998). Note also that a maximum wage is of no use when C > 0.
15If signals are not credible, motivation remains unobservable, as all applicants would signal
that they have motivation γ¯.
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not commit to a minimum wage, none of the workers apply, as in the previous sub-
sections. Each applicant anticipates that when she signals her type, the firm fully
extracts all the rents of motivation, leaving the applicant with the sunk application
cost. Because no applicant reveals her type to the firm, motivation remains un-
observable. As we have seen in the previous subsection, this results in a complete
breakdown of the market.
When the firm posts a minimum wage wmin, each applicant signals her motiva-
tion to the firm. The intuition is that signaling increases a worker’s probability of
getting the job. Consider an applicant with motivation γ¯, and suppose that all other
applicants do not signal their motivation. If she signals, she is certain to get the job.
If she does not signal, she only gets the job if she is randomly selected. Hence, she
signals her type as signaling increases her probability of being selected by the firm.
This also holds when other workers signal. Next, consider workers of the highest
but one type of motivation, γh. Signaling is of no avail when a worker of type γ¯ is
in the pool of applicants. However, if none of the workers of type γ¯ apply, signaling
is beneficial, as the firm prefers to select a worker of type γh if there are no workers
of type γ¯ available. Since workers have no information about the other applicants
and signaling is costless, it is always in the interest of workers of type γh to signal
their type. Analogously, all applicants have an incentive to signal their type so as
to increase the probability of getting the job.
It follows that a worker only gets the job if she is the most motivated applicant,
as in Subsection 2.4.1 where the firm could observe the motivation of the applicants.
Hence, workers have the same incentives to apply as in Subsection 2.4.1, and the
firm optimally sets the minimum wage at the same level.
2.5 Signaling and screening with optimal mone-
tary incentive schemes
This section shows that the results derived in Section 2.4 under the assumption of
a fixed wage generalise to the case where the firm provides monetary incentives to
the worker, as in Section 2.3.
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Figure 2.2: Intrinsic motivation and the optimal monetary incentive scheme
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Suppose the firm wants only workers with motivation γ¯ to apply. Analogous
to the previous section, the firm needs to commit to a minimum wage scheme in
order to attract applicants, regardless of whether or not the firm can observe the
motivation of the applicants. The firm has to commit to a minimum wage scheme
that satisfies the following constraint:
p(γ¯)
©
U [w(e), e, γ¯e]− Uout
ª
− C ≥ 0
where p(γ¯) is the probability of getting the job for a worker of type γ¯, given by
(2.13) in case of observable motivation and by (2.A8) in case of unobservable moti-
vation, respectively. Optimal effort is again described by first-order conditions (2.4)
and (2.5), with γi = γ¯. Clearly, there exist many wage schemes that satisfy these
conditions. One of these is depicted in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2 depicts the marginal product of effort [q0(e)] and the marginal disutility
from effort for three different types of workers. The latter curves are obtained by
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rewriting the first-order condition for optimal effort of the worker (2.4) to
w0i(e) = −
U2(·) + γiU3(·)
U1(·) (2.17)
where i ∈ {m,h, γ¯}, γm < γh < γ¯. Equation (2.17) describes for each level of effort
the minimum reward the firm must provide to induce a worker of type γi to provide
an additional unit of effort. Notice that when the firm creates an incentive scheme
that follows (2.17) exactly, the worker is just compensated for his (net) disutility
from effort. In order to give workers an incentive to apply, the firm has to make sure
that a worker with motivation γmin = γ¯ ends up (in expected terms) with utility
Uout. Hence, the firm must offer a base salary Bγmin such that:
U(Bγmin , 0, 0) = U
out +
C
p(γmin)
(2.18)
An optimal minimum wage scheme that induces only workers with motivation γ¯
to apply thus consists of a base salary Bγmin, given by (2.18) with γmin = γ¯, and a
monetary incentive scheme that follows (2.17) up to the point where w0γ¯(e) = q0(e).
Denote the accompanying level of effort by eγ¯. The firm’s offer is:
Bγ¯ +
Z eγ¯
0
w0γ¯(e)de
This minimum wage offer is just sufficient to induce workers with motivation γ¯ to
apply. All other worker types have negative expected benefits from applying and,
hence, decide not to apply.
Now suppose the firm prefers to give the highest two types an incentive to apply,
types γ¯ and γh. As in the previous section, this implies that the firm has to leave a
rent to workers of type γ¯. The firm optimally trades off the rents it has to leave in
case the selected applicant appears to be a worker of type γ¯ and the effort exerted
by a worker of type γh. The profit maximising wage scheme that is acceptable to
32 Signaling and Screening of Workers’ Motivation
both types of workers is described by:
max
eh
P (γh)
£
q (eh)−Bγh − wh (eh)
¤
+ P (γ¯)
⎡
⎣q (eγ¯)−Bγh − wh (eh)−
eγ¯Z
eh
w0γ¯(e)de
⎤
⎦
(2.19)
where eh is the level of effort a worker of type γh is induced to exert by this profit
maximising scheme, and P (γh) and P (γ¯) are the probabilities that a worker of type
γh and a worker of type γ¯ are hired, given by (2.15) when motivation is observable
and by (2.A10) when motivation is unobservable, respectively. Base salary Bγh is
implicitly given by (2.18) with γmin = γh, and wh(·) and w0γ¯(·) are described by (2.17)
with γi = γh, γ¯, respectively. The first term in brackets is the firm’s profit in case a
worker of type γh is hired, which happens with probability P (γh). In expected terms,
the firm does not leave a rent to these workers. The first derivative with respect to
eh of this term equals zero when eh equals the optimal effort level of workers of type
γh under full information, described in Section 2.3. The second term in brackets is
the firm’s profit in case a worker of type γ¯ is hired, which happens with probability
P (γ¯). To meet this worker’s individual rationality constraint, the firm must provide
monetary incentives as if the worker is of type γh up to effort level eh. Hence, the
firm leaves a rent to workers of type γ¯. Starting from effort level eh, the firm just
compensates workers of type γ¯ for each additional unit of effort. The first derivative
with respect to eh of the second term is always negative since w0h(e) > w
0
γ¯(e) for
any e. Clearly, it is in the firm’s interest to set eh lower than the optimal effort
level under full information, as derived in Section 2.3. The profit maximising wage
scheme induces a worker of type γh to exert suboptimally low effort to reduce the
rents that the firm has to leave in case the offer is made to a worker of type γ¯.16
Workers of type γ¯ are induced to exert an efficient level of effort, as in Section 2.3.
The firm must, however, leave a rent to these workers. The optimal wage scheme
that gives types γ¯ and γh an incentive to apply is described by:
Bγh +
ehZ
0
w0h(e)de+
eγ¯Z
eh
w0γ¯(e)de (2.20)
16For a similar result in a more general context, see chapter 7 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1992).
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Along the same lines, we can derive the optimal wage scheme when the firm wants
to induce more worker types to apply. The lower γmin, the higher the base salary and
the higher the incentive wage up to eγmin to give workers with motivation γ ≥ γmin
an incentive to apply. The wage scheme is such that each worker type (except γ¯)
exerts a suboptimal level of effort to decrease the rents the firm has to leave to
higher types. As in Section 2.4, the optimal wage scheme entails a trade-off between
the probability of filling the vacancy, the rents left to workers, and, if motivation
is unobservable, the expected quality of the selected worker. It is straightforward
to show that the firm needs to commit to a sufficiently high base salary to attract
applicants and to give them an incentive to signal their motivation.
2.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we have studied a firm’s optimal recruitment, selection, and pay-
for-performance practices when workers differ in their intrinsic motivation to work
at the firm. We have shown that when intrinsic motivation cannot be observed by
the firm, posting a higher wage may increase the probability of filling a vacancy, but
at the same time decrease the expected motivation of the hired worker. Screening
technologies such as personality and workstyle tests, work trials, and the use of
assessment centres may help a firm to select the best motivated worker among the
applicants, but these may only help if the firm commits to pay at least a certain
wage. Otherwise, workers may have an incentive to conceal their motivation or, even
worse, to abstain from applying.
Our model predicts that when workers’ motivation is more easy to assess, workers’
productivity and wages will be higher. Productivity is higher since the firm is better
able to select the best-motivated applicant. Wages will also be higher as there is
less need to discourage low-motivated workers from applying by offering a low wage.
When workers’ employment history contains some information on workers’ motiva-
tion, older workers’ motivation may be more easy to assess than younger workers’
motivation. Adverse selection problems arising from heterogeneity in workers’ mo-
tivation may therefore increase the wage premium on labour market experience. A
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testable implication of our model therefore is that in sectors where workers’ intrinsic
motivation is important, wage-experience profiles are steeper.
Heterogeneity in workers’ motivation may also affect the effects of intensifying
competition in an industry. In the next chapter, we extend our model to examine the
consequences of creating a fully competitive market in a sector previously dominated
by a monopsonistic firm. We show that firms in a competitive market provide
stronger monetary incentives to workers, pay higher wages, and employ fewer workers
than a monopsonistic firm. These findings square well with the empirical evidence
on the effects of privatisation and liberalisation.
We have adopted a very simple concept of workers’ intrinsic motivation, namely
that workers to a certain extent enjoy exerting effort at work. We have assumed
that this enjoyment of effort is independent of the firm’s pay policies. Adopting
a more sophisticated concept of intrinsic motivation may reveal interesting effects
additional to the ones we discussed above. For instance, a higher wage may change
the public perception of how noble a task or job is, which in turn may reduce workers’
motivation to do the job. Seabright (2002) and Janssen and Mendys-Kamphorst
(2004) have recently developed models along these lines. Moreover, offering pay-
for-performance may undermine workers’ intrinsic motivation as they feel that their
intrinsic motivation is not acknowledged by the firm (see Frey, 1997a and Frey and
Jegen, 2001).
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2.A Appendices
2.A.1 Appendix 1
In this appendix we derive the condition under which the total wage compensation
decreases in motivation. For this purpose, it is convenient to write the wage scheme
as:
w(e) = q(e) +B (2.A1)
Hence, in line with first-order condition (2.5), workers get their full marginal product,
while the base salary B is such that the participation constraint of the worker is just
satisfied:
U(w(e), e, γe) = U(q(e) +B, e, γe) = Uout (2.A2)
By combining the optimal wage scheme (2.A1) and the first-order conditions for
effort (2.4) and profit (2.5), it follows that the optimal level of effort is implicitly
given by:
q0(e)U1(·) + U2(·) + γU3(·) = 0 (2.A3)
In Section 2.3, we derived the effect of a marginal change in γ on the optimal level
of effort:
de
dγ
=
U3(·) + eγU33(·)
−∂F/∂e
> 0 (2.A4)
where ∂F/∂e < 0 is the second-order condition to the worker’s optimisation problem
(2.A3). We are interested in the sign of dw(e)dγ . By using (2.A1), we can rewrite this
to:
dw(e)
dγ
=
dq(e)
dγ
+
dB
dγ
(2.A5)
The first term on the right-hand side of this equation is simply:
dq(e)
dγ
= q0(e)
de
dγ
where dedγ is given by (2.A4). The second term on the right-hand side of (2.A5)
can be found by using the participation constraint (2.A2) and applying the implicit
36 Signaling and Screening of Workers’ Motivation
function theorem:
dB
dγ
= −eU3
U1
+
[q0(e)U1(·) + U2(·) + γU3(·)]
U1(·)
de
dγ
= −eU3
U1
where the term in square brackets is zero by first-order condition (2.A3) (the envelop
theorem). Hence, we can rewrite (2.A5) as:
dw(e)
dγ
= q0(e)
de
dγ
− eU3(·)
U1(·) =
− [U2(·) + γU3(·)] dedγ − eU3(·)
U1(·)
where the second equality follows from (2.A3). Total wage compensation thus de-
creases in motivation if the following condition holds:
eU3(·) > − [U2(·) + γU3(·)] dedγ (2.A6)
which is identical to condition (2.9) in the main text.
2.A.2 Appendix 2
Suppose the wage results from a bargain between the firm and the worker, of which
the outcome is described by the generalised Nash bargaining function. The worker’s
bargaining power is denoted by χ, the firm has bargaining power 1−χ (0 ≤ χ ≤ 1).
Note that apart from the total compensation to the worker, the incentive scheme
derived in Section 2.3 is optimal for both the firm and the worker. Denote the
minimum wage for which the worker is willing to work by wmin(γ). The maximum
wage the firm is willing to offer is denoted by wmax(γ). The wage that results from
the bargaining is the minimum wage plus a proportion χ of the total rents (the
difference between the maximum and the minimum wage):
w = wmin(γ) + χ[wmax(γ)− wmin(γ)]
To examine the effect of γ on w, we differentiate this function with respect to γ:
dw
dγ
= χw0max(γ) + (1− χ)w0min(γ)
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In Section 2.3 we have shown that w0max(γ) > 0 and w0min(γ) < 0, provided that
condition (2.9) holds. The wage decreases in motivation if:
χ
χ− 1 <
w0min(γ)
w0max(γ)
Hence, as long as χ is sufficiently low, the wage decreases in the motivation of the
worker.
2.A.3 Appendix 3
Suppose the firm puts minimum wage wmin in its ad.17 When motivation is unob-
servable a worker of type γi applies if and only if:
g(γi)[U(γi, wmin)− Uout]− C ≥ 0 (2.A7)
where g(γi) is the expected probability for a worker with motivation γi of being
randomly selected by the firm after applying. This probability is
1
1 + v
, where v is
the number of applicants besides worker i. v is a random variable that follows a
binomial distribution. It is easily verified that:
g(γi) =
Nγmin−1X
v=0
∙
1
1 + v
µ
Nγmin − 1
v
¶
μv(1− μ)Nγmin−1−v
¸
(2.A8)
The firm sets the minimum wage such that expression (2.A7) holds with equality
for the least motivated worker type, γmin, that it wants to apply. Expected profits
of the firm are given by:
E[π(γ, wmin)] =
X
γ≥γmin
G(γ)π(γ,wmin) (2.A9)
where G(γ) is the probability that the firm selects an applicant with motivation γ.
17Clearly, this will also be the firm’s actual offer. Offering a wage that is higher than the wage
announced in the ad could only be optimal if the firm believed that the least motivated applicants
would reject offer wmin. However, these workers anticipate that they will not be compensated for
the application cost and, hence, optimally decide not to apply. As in the absence of a commitment,
the firm’s beliefs are unsustainable.
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This probability is
S
S + Z
, where S is the number of applicants of type γ and Z the
number of applicants with a different type of motivation. Both S and Z follow a
binomial distribution, and their joint distribution is given by:
P (S = s, Z = z) = P (S = s)P (Z = z)
=
µ
nγ
s
¶
μs(1− μ)nγ−s
µ
Nγmin − nγ
z
¶
μz(1− μ)Nγmin−nγ−z
where the first equality follows from the observation that the two random variables
S and Z are independently distributed. Hence, G(γ) is described by:
G(γ) =
nγX
s=1
Nγmin−nγX
z=0
s
s+ z
µ
nγ
s
¶
μs(1− μ)nγ−s
µ
Nγmin − nγ
z
¶
μz(1− μ)Nγmin−nγ−z
(2.A10)
The summation over s starts at s = 1, because G(γ) = 0 if none of the workers
with motivation γ observes the ad. Note that
P
γ≥γmin G(γ) < 1, as there may be
no applicant at all, which happens with probability (1− μ)Nγmin .
Suppose the firm increases the minimum wage from wmin to w0min, such that γmin
decreases by one worker type to γ0min. This reduces the probability of selecting an
applicant with motivation γ to:
G0(γ) =
nγX
s=1
Nγ0
min
−nγX
z=0
s
s+ z
µ
nγ
s
¶
μs(1− μ)nγ−s
µ
Nγ0min − nγ
z
¶
μz(1− μ)Nγ0min−nγ−z
(2.A11)
Since Nγ0min > Nγmin by definition, G
0(γ) < G(γ) for all γ ∈ [γmin, γ¯]. Intuitively,
the probability that a worker of a certain type is selected decreases if the number
of worker types that apply increases. This is the selection effect. As before, the
increase in the minimum wage decreases the probability that nobody applies, asP
γ≥γ0min
G0(γ) >
P
γ≥γmin G(γ).
The increase in the minimum wage from wmin to w0min leads to the following
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change in expected profits:
∆E[π] = E[π(γ,w0min)]−E[π(γ,wmin)]
=
X
γ≥γ0min
G0(γ)π(γ, w0min)−
X
γ≥γmin
G(γ)π(γ,wmin)
which can be rewritten as:
∆E[π] = G0(γ0min)π(γ
0
min, w
0
min)+
X
γ≥γmin
[G0(γ)π(γ, w0min)−G(γ)π(γ, wmin)] (2.A12)
The first term gives the probability of selecting a worker with motivation γ0min and
the accompanying profits. The second term indicates that by increasing wmin to
w0min, each worker type γ ≥ γmin has a lower probability of being selected, and
given a selected worker type, the profit of the firm is lower as a result of the wage
increase. This expression is negative since G0(γ) < G(γ) for all γ ∈ [γmin, γ¯] and
π(γ,w0min) < π(γ, wmin). As in Subsection 2.4.2, the optimal minimum wage is found
by stepwise increasing the minimum wage until the sign of ∆E[π] turns negative.
See the last paragraph of Subsection 2.4.2.

Chapter 3
From Public Monopsony to
Competitive Market: More
Efficiency but Higher Prices
Joint with Robert Dur
3.1 Introduction
The last decades have seen much debate about privatisation of public firms and
liberalisation of markets. During the seventies and eighties, people became more
and more sceptical about the performance of public companies. The lack of profit
motive and the absence of competition would give public firms insufficient incentive
to produce efficiently, resulting in too low productivity, too high employment, and,
hence, excessively high cost. This debate has led to an ongoing wave of privatisation
of public companies, usually accompanied by introducing or strengthening competi-
tion among firms in the market. The empirical literature by and large supports the
notion that privatisation and liberalisation may increase efficiency. Megginson and
Netter (2001) provide an extensive survey of the empirical literature and conclude
that privatisation leads to an increase in productivity. Employment usually falls,
unless the firm is able to increase its sales substantially. Another recent survey, by
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Kikeri and Nellis (2002), reaches similar conclusions.1
This chapter develops a model to examine the consequences of creating a fully
competitive market in a sector previously dominated by a cost-minimising public
firm. Our model implies that firms in a competitive environment provide stronger
monetary incentives for workers to exert effort than the public firm. Hence, produc-
tivity increases and the sector’s employment decreases after liberalising the sector.
Even though liberalisation thus improves allocative efficiency of the economy, prices
of the sector’s output rise. The reason is that liberalising the sector not only in-
tensifies competition between firms in the product market, but also in the labour
market.
An important element of our model is that workers in the economy have private
information about their intrinsic motivation to work in the sector. Thus, we assume
that working in this sector has some particular trait which is valued differently by
different workers. Better motivated workers work harder and are willing to work for
a lower wage. Besides intrinsic motivation, workers’ effort depends on the monetary
incentives provided by the firm. We show that the public firm can save on wage cost
per unit of output by providing weak monetary incentives for workers. This way,
the public firm extracts part of the rents from motivated workers. When the sector
is liberalised, competition among firms for the best-motivated employees leads to
an increase in the incentive wage up to the point where each worker is paid his full
marginal product. Wage cost per unit of output and, hence, prices increase after
liberalisation.
The model’s implications concerning productivity and employment are well in
line with the empirical findings mentioned above. Moreover, and consistent with
our model, the empirical literature often attributes the increase in productivity to
an increase in monetary incentives for workers (e.g., Megginson, Nash, and Van
Randenborgh, 1994). Kikeri and Nellis (2002) discuss several studies which find an
increase in performance-based incentives for workers in privatised firms. Martin and
1To what extent the mere change of ownership (privatisation) or the strengthening of competi-
tion (liberalisation) is responsible for efficiency gains is still unclear. As privatisation and liberali-
sation often take place simultaneously, it is hard to disentangle the effects empirically (Kikeri and
Nellis, 2002).
3.1 Introduction 43
Parker (1997) report similar evidence for several British firms. In line with these
studies, Burgess and Metcalfe (1999, 2000) find, using British data, that firms in
the private sector make far more use of incentive wages than in the public sector,
and that incentive schemes are more common in competitive establishments than in
non-competitive establishments, both for managers and non-managers. Moreover,
they conclude that it is difficult to rationalise the relatively weak incentives in the
public sector as being optimal on the basis of differences in the scope for performance
measurement or multitasking. We argue that weak incentives in public firms may
stem from exploitation of monopsonistic power, a power that firms in a competitive
environment lack.
Our result on the level of wages seems to square less well with common be-
lief. Indeed, it is often claimed that workers bear the burden of privatisation and
liberalisation through job losses and lower wages. The empirical literature, how-
ever, suggests otherwise as regards wages. Kikeri and Nellis (2002) observe that
“in many instances, and contrary to popular perception, those who retain their jobs
in privatised firms receive higher wages, sometimes substantially so” (p. 18). For
the UK, effects on wages appear to be mixed (Haskel and Szymanski, 1993, Martin
and Parker, 1997). The most comprehensive study is by La Porta and López-de-
Silanes (1999) for Mexico, where a massive process of privatisation and liberalisation
has taken place. They report large increases in real wages of the privatised firms
while overall real wages throughout Mexico stagnated.2 In addition, they asked
firms why they increased worker’s pay. Interestingly, “matching the conditions of-
fered by similar firms” was listed as an important reason for the increase in wages
after privatisation. La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) also examine the effect of
privatisation on prices. Prices tend to increase, albeit modestly. There is surpri-
singly little other evidence on how privatisation and liberalisation affect prices (cf.
Megginson and Netter, 2001).
Our study relates to a number of recent papers which stress the importance of
2The increase in wages is not confined to executive compensation: real wages of blue-collar
workers rose even more than those of white-collar workers. Moreover, only a small part of the
increase in wages can be attributed to composition effects. See Section V in La Porta and López-
de-Silanes (1999).
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workers’ intrinsic motivation for optimal incentive schemes and effort, particularly in
public service occupations (see, among others, Francois, 2000, Dixit, 2002, Benabou
and Tirole, 2003, Prendergast, 2004, Besley and Ghatak, 2005, Glazer, 2004). As
in these papers, we assume that workers’ effort choices are partly driven by non-
pecuniary benefits. More specifically, we assume that some of the economy’s workers
enjoy exerting effort or intrinsically value their contribution to output, if working in
a particular occupation.3 There is lots of evidence for such motivations. Marsden
and French (1998) find that intrinsic rewards are important for many public sector
workers in the UK across a wide range of types of occupational activity. For instance,
they report that many headteachers “derive a lot of satisfaction from the nature of
their activity” (p. 111) and that the staff of trust hospitals “appear highly motivated
in their work, find it intrinsically interesting and worthwhile” (p. 100). Other studies
include Antonazzo et al. (2003) on nursing workers, Edmonds et al. (2002) on
teachers, and Frank and Lewis (2004) on employees in these and several other areas
of the public sector. These studies also indicate that there exists substantial variation
in occupational preferences among workers (see also Daymont and Andrisani, 1984,
and Harper and Haq, 2001).
Commonly used examples of sectors where workers’ intrinsic motivation plays
an important role are health care and education (Besley and Ghatak, 2003). Our
model’s predictions are well in line with recent experiences in these sectors. For
instance, in Sweden, wages in the health-care sector have risen at three times the
earlier rate, and have become more closely tied to individual performance, since
private companies began competing with public units (Hjertqvist, 2001). Likewise,
Hoxby (1994), Merrifield (1999), and Vedder and Hall (2000) show that compe-
tition from private schools increases teacher salaries at public schools in the US.
Hoxby (2002) finds that school competition creates a more high-powered incentive
environment within the teaching profession and concludes that under increased com-
petition "less skilled or motivated incumbent teachers might find themselves earning
3This assumption corresponds to Dixit (2002), Benabou and Tirole (2003), Besley and Ghatak
(2005), and Glazer (2004). In contrast, Francois (2000) and Prendergast (2004) assume that workers
have an altruistic motivation, that is, workers care about the provision of public services, but do
not derive utility from their personal involvement in production.
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smaller salary increases than some of their peers" (p. 883).4 Empirical studies
also show that competition among schools raises school productivity substantially
(Hoxby, 1994 and 2000) and enhances the work effort of teachers (Rapp, 2000).
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses related literature. Next,
Section 3.3 presents the basic features of our model. In Section 3.4, we derive the
sector’s employment, the wage scheme, and the output price in the competitive equi-
librium. Next, we show in Section 3.5 that a public monopsony produces output at a
lower price by setting weaker work incentives and expanding employment compared
to the competitive equilibrium. We also discuss the distributional consequences of
moving from public monopsony to competitive market in Section 3.5. Section 3.6
generalises the model to a continuum of worker types. We show that our results
hold as long as workers in the neighbourhood of the marginal worker do not differ
too much in motivation. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related literature
Our setup and results deviate from other theoretical work on privatisation and li-
beralisation. There is a large literature on public versus private ownership given
the degree of competition. One strand focuses on incomplete contracting problems;
see in particular Laffont and Tirole (1991) and Hart, Schleifer, and Vishny (1997).
We abstract from these kind of problems: firm’s output and worker’s effort are fully
contractible in our model. This implies that ownership as such does not matter:
public ownership of the firm and public regulation of a private firm yield identical
outcomes. For convenience, we use the label ‘public firm’ in the monopsony case and
‘private firms’ in the competitive case, but it should be stressed that the monopsony
analysis applies to a regulated private firm as well.
Another group of studies emphasizes that the objectives of the management may
change after privatisation. Whereas private firms care only about profit, public
firms are supposed to be concerned also about wages, employment, and (sometimes)
4In line with our model, her interpretation of the evidence is based on heterogeneity in intrinsic
motivation to perform job-specific tasks, e.g. working with school-aged children. Unlike our model,
she assumes that competition affects a school’s production function.
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consumer surplus. In Boycko, Schleifer, and Vishny (1996), these concerns stem from
politicians’ desire to preserve jobs and keep wages high in public firms. Privatisation
raises the cost to politicians of influencing the firms’ decisions and, hence, results in
lower wages and lower employment. Corneo and Rob (2003) argue that public firms
set weaker work incentives than private firms, because a public firm incorporates
workers’ utility of socializing at the workplace into its own objective function. Haskel
and Szymanski (1993) model privatisation as a shift to more commercial objectives.
Privatisation affects production, employment, and wages negatively as a private
firm places less weight on consumer surplus and workers’ welfare than a public firm.
In contrast to these papers, we abstract from differences in managerial objectives
between public and private firms. In our model, both private firms and the public
firm maximise profits. In the competitive equilibrium, private firms’ profits are
driven to zero because of free entry and exit of firms. Under the public monopsony,
profits are zero because the government extracts all of the public firm’s rents by
designing an appropriate contract. As for the government’s objectives, we assume
that politicians represent the interest of consumers of the good produced in the
sector. Therefore, the government induces the manager of the public firm to minimise
cost. We also consider the case where the government is a social planner.
The paper by Haskel and Szymanski (1993) is the only theoretical study that
examines the consequences of both privatisation and liberalisation. It shows that
liberalisation decreases the output price and increases the sector’s employment, be-
cause firms can exploit product market power to a lesser extent. In the presence
of trade unions, liberalisation reduces wages, as trade unions find themselves with
less surplus to bargain over. Note that these results are exactly opposite to ours.
Whereas Haskel and Szymanski analyse the consequences of a decrease in power
of the firm in the product market, we focus on the effects of a decrease in firm’s
power in the labour market. In practise, liberalisation will affect employment and
wages through both channels. The empirical evidence discussed in the Introduction,
particularly the evidence on wages, suggests that the effects arising from a decrease
in monopsony power may dominate, at least in some important cases.
Lastly, this chapter closely relates to the literature on monopsonistic power of
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employers. It has long been recognised that employer’s power in wage determination
may drive wages below marginal productivity. Bhaskar, Manning, and To (2002) and
Manning (2003) review a number of intriguing implications of monopsonistic power
of employers, among others for interfirm wage dispersion, for employer’s incentive to
pay for general training, and for the effect of minimum wages on employment. We
contribute to this literature by examining the implications of monopsonistic power
for the optimal design of pay-for-performance schemes. In our model, monopsonistic
power arises because workers differ in the extent to which they intrinsically value
working in a particular sector. We could as well assume that workers differ in
an ability which is particularly valuable in one sector of the economy. Recently,
Booth and Zoega (2002) have developed a model along these lines and argue that
increased labour market competition may explain why wage inequality has risen in
some countries.5
3.3 The model
The model revolves around production in a particular sector of the economy. Produc-
tion takes place either in one public organisation or in private firms which compete
with each other. For convenience, we assume a very simple production technology
and very simple product demand characteristics. All firms in the sector, including
the public firm in case of public production, have the same technology and labour
is the only production factor. Output depends linearly on workers’ effort e. The
marginal product of effort is denoted by κ. Introducing (dis)economies of scale in
production does not affect the results as long as it does not preclude competition.
Demand for the sector’s product is assumed to be perfectly price inelastic and de-
noted by Qd. Assuming, instead, a downward-sloping demand curve does not affect
the results qualitatively.6
Workers in the economy differ in their intrinsic motivation to work in the sector,
5In Booth and Zoega’s model, workers’ effort is exogenous. For our results to hold in a model
where workers differ in ability instead of motivation, effort must be endogenous and complementary
to ability.
6Price elastic demand enlarges the real effects of liberalisation in the sector and reduces the
price effects.
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otherwise they are identical. Outside the sector, workers obtain utility Uo. If worker
i is employed in the sector, his utility is described by:
Ui = w (ei) + γiei −
1
2
θe2i (3.1)
where w is the wage, which depends on worker’s effort ei, γi measures the degree
to which worker i is intrinsically motivated to work in this sector, and θ measures
the cost of effort (the value of foregone leisure, tiredness). A worker with γ = 0 is
a ‘standard neoclassical worker’ who dislikes effort and only works to make a living,
see e.g. Lazear (1995). The higher is γ, the more a worker values exerting effort at
work and, therefore, the higher his effort given the power of the incentive scheme.
Equation (3.1) captures in a simple way the ideas that workers differ in the extent
to which they are motivated to work in the sector and that motivation matters for
workers’ effort. The sector-specificity of motivation is important for the results as it
gives the public firm monopsonistic power. In contrast, differences between workers’
general work motivation would not give the public firm monopsonistic power as
general motivation is valuable in many different jobs in the economy.
While workers’ motivation is private information, firms observe workers’ effort.
For simplicity, we assume a linear wage scheme:7
w(e) = αe+ β (3.2)
Substituting (3.2) into (3.1) and maximising with respect to e gives worker i’s opti-
mal level of effort, if employed in the sector:
e∗i =
α+ γi
θ
(3.3)
Clearly, optimal effort increases in the incentive wage and in intrinsic motivation,
and decreases in the cost of exerting effort.
7In Appendix 3.A.1, we allow firms to offer non-linear separating contracts.
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Worker i is willing to work in the sector if:
Ui ≥ Uo (3.4)
For simplicity, we initially assume that there are only two types of workers in the
economy, high-motivation workers (h) with γ = γh > 0 and low-motivation workers
(l) with γl normalised to 0. In Section 3.6, we generalise the model to allow for any
distribution of motivation over the work force. Substituting (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3)
into (3.4), it easily follows that for any combination of α and β, the participation
constraint of low-motivation workers is more binding than that of high-motivation
workers:
1
2
(α+ γi)
2
θ
+ β ≥ Uo (3.5)
Thus, for any given level of incentive wage α, high-motivation workers can be at-
tracted at a lower base salary β than low-motivation workers. Together with the
result that high-motivation workers exert more effort, this implies that when product
demand is low, the public firm optimally attracts only high-motivation workers by
setting α and β such that the participation constraint for high-motivation workers
binds. We assume that product demand Qd is sufficiently high (or that the number
of high-motivation workers in the economy is sufficiently low) such that the sector
also employs some low-motivation workers. Obviously, in the more general case of
a continuum of worker types, no restriction on demand is required, see Section 3.6.
Denoting the number of high-motivation workers in the economy by H and the num-
ber of low-motivation workers employed in the sector by L, total employment in the
sector is given by:
Qd = κ (e∗hH + e
∗
lL)⇔ H + L =
1
α
µ
θQd
κ
− γhH
¶
(3.6)
3.4 Competitive market
In the competitive equilibrium, firms compete in both the product market and the
labour market. Free entry and exit of firms guarantees zero profit. Given the linear
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production technology, profit on every single job is zero in equilibrium:
πi = pκe∗i − (αe∗i + β) = 0 for i = l, h (3.7)
where p is the equilibrium price of the sector’s output, which is an endogenous
variable. Using (3.3) with i = l and i = h respectively, it follows that:
α = pκ
β = 0
Hence, we obtain the familiar result that under perfect competition each worker
earns his full marginal product and does not receive a fixed wage.
The participation constraint of the low-motivation workers must bind in equi-
librium. If this is not the case, low-motivation workers who are employed outside
the sector underbid the insiders. Hence, condition (3.5) must hold with equality for
i = l. Substituting α = pκ and β = 0 into (3.5), we obtain the equilibrium price in
the competitive equilibrium:
p =
√
2θUo
κ
The price of the sector’s output increases in workers’ cost of effort and in workers’
outside opportunity, and decreases in the productivity of effort. Note that in the
competitive equilibrium, firms’ cost and the price of the sector’s output depend
neither on the degree to which high-motivation workers are motivated (γh) nor on
the number of high-motivation workers in the economy (H). The reason is that
high-motivation workers receive all of the rents of their motivation.
Lastly, employment is found by substituting the equilibrium value of α into (3.6):
H + L =
1√
2θUo
µ
θQd
κ
− γhH
¶
Employment increases in demand for the sector’s product and worker’s cost of ef-
fort, and decreases in productivity of effort and the workers’ outside option. While
motivation of the labour force does not affect the price, it does affect the level of
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employment: the higher the number of high-motivation workers and the better their
motivation, the lower is total employment.
Table 3.1 summarises the results for the competitive equilibrium.
Table 3.1: The competitive equilibrium
α
√
2θUo
β 0
p
√
2θUo
κ
H + L
1√
2θUo
µ
θQd
κ
− γhH
¶
3.5 Public monopsony
Let us now consider the case of a public firm (or regulated private firm) which is the
sole supplier of output Qd. Entry of firms is blocked by government regulation. The
government induces the public firm to minimise cost.8 The public firm’s optimisation
problem is:
min
α, β, L
α (e∗hH + e
∗
lL) + β (H + L) (3.8)
subject to the production constraint (3.6) and the low-motivation worker’s partici-
pation constraint (3.5), and where e∗i is given by (3.3). The solution is summarised
in Table 3.2. For ease of comparison with Table 3.1, we define μ as the share of
motivation-induced effort in total effort in the sector:
0 < μ =
κγhH
θQd
< 1
8In the absence of agency problems, the government can offer a contract to the manager of the
public firm to deliver Qd at the minimum price p, which is derived below. Profit maximisation by
the public firm then results in cost minimisation, as in (3.8).
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Table 3.2: Public monopsony
α
r
1− μ
1 + μ
√
2θUo
β
µ
2μ
1 + μ
¶
Uo
p
p
1− μ2
√
2θUo
κ
H + L
r
1 + μ
1− μ
1√
2θUo
µ
θQd
κ
− γhH
¶
The public firm sets weaker incentives for workers, pays a fixed wage, and em-
ploys more workers than private firms do in a competitive market. Yet, the public
firm supplies output at a lower price than results in a competitive market. The
intuition is straightforward. As the public firm reduces the incentive wage α, it has
to increase the fixed wage β so as to keep the low-motivation workers’ participation
constraint satisfied. Low-motivation workers need to be compensated for a reduction
in α to a relatively small extent because they exert little effort. High-motivation
workers, who exert more effort, therefore lose income. They face a reduction in their
performance-related pay which is only partly compensated for by the increase in the
fixed wage. Thus, by providing weak monetary incentives, the firm extracts part of
the motivational rents of high-motivation workers. The cost of reducing the incentive
wage is that workers reduce their effort, which necessitates an increase in employ-
ment so as to keep production at Qd. Starting from the competitive equilibrium, a
marginal increase in employment entails no additional cost because the fixed wage is
zero. However, as α decreases, the increase in employment becomes more and more
costly as the fixed wage β goes up along with the reduction in α. In the optimum,
the cost of employing an additional worker exactly equals the marginal benefit of
extracting rents from the high-motivation workers. Comparing Table 3.1 and Table
3.2, it is easy to see that the extent to which the wage scheme, employment, and
output price differ between competitive market and public monopsony depends only
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on μ, the share of motivation-induced effort in total effort.
Note that the opportunity to extract motivational rents stems from the monop-
sonistic power of the public firm. The positive fixed wage implies that total pay per
unit of effort is higher for low-motivation workers than for high-motivation workers.
Thus, the public firm makes a loss on the input of low-motivation workers, while it
makes a profit on the input of high-motivation workers. In a competitive environ-
ment, a competing firm would offer a slightly lower fixed wage and a higher incentive
wage so as to attract the profitable high-motivation workers. In equilibrium, com-
petitive firms pay the full marginal product and no fixed wage, as we have derived
in the previous section.9
The implications of the model square well with the empirical observations men-
tioned in the Introduction. Incentive wages and productivity are higher in a compe-
titive environment, while total employment is lower than under a public monopsony.
The wage of all retained workers increases after liberalisation. The wage of the low-
motivation workers is higher because stronger incentives induce them to work harder.
High-motivation workers’ pay increases even more, as their motivational rents are no
longer expropriated by the public firm. Hence, the relative wage of low-motivation
workers decreases after liberalisation.10 This is in line with empirical evidence that
wages are more compressed in the public sector than in the private sector (Gregory
and Borland, 1999, Borjas, 2003, Grout and Stevens, 2003).
The welfare consequences of liberalisation are straightforward in the two-type
case. Total production in the economy increases as a result of liberalisation because
more workers become available for other sectors of the economy. Social welfare also
increases, see Appendix 3.A.2. Low-motivation workers throughout the economy
nevertheless lose, as their job-related utility remains at Uo while they have to pay
a higher price for the sector’s output.11 High-motivation workers gain all of the
9None of the results changes if high-motivation workers also derive some constant intrinsic
benefits from working in the sector (e.g. stemming from pride to work in the sector). As both
high-motivation and low-motivation workers are needed in the sector, the participation constraint
of high-motivation workers is never binding, implying that neither the public firm nor the private
firms can extract any of these constant benefits from the high-motivation workers.
10The relative wage under the public monopsony is: wl/wh =
√
2θUo/(
√
2θUo + γh
p
1− μ2),
while in a competitive market: wl/wh =
√
2θUo/(
√
2θUo + γh).
11The low-motivation workers who remain employed in the sector earn a higher income but the
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surplus from liberalising the sector. As high-motivation workers in a particular
sector are a small group, the distributional consequences of liberalisation may well
hinder its political viability. Insofar as politicians want to please the public at large,
our analysis can thus be viewed as a positive theory of distortionary regulation.12
3.6 A continuum of worker types
This section relaxes the assumption that there are only two types of workers in the
economy. We assume that intrinsic motivation of workers is distributed according
to the cumulative distribution function F (γ), where F (0) = 0 and F (γ) = 1. The
upper boundary γ¯ is introduced to rule out the case that one worker produces all
output. The sector’s employment as a share of the economy’s labour force equals
F (γ) − F
¡
γ
¢
, where γ denotes the motivation of the least motivated employee in
the sector.
3.6.1 Competitive market
In the competitive equilibrium, the zero-profit condition (3.7) holds for all γ ∈
£
γ, γ
¤
.
Hence, as in the two-type model, competition between firms implies that all workers
earn their full marginal product: α = pκ, β = 0. The price of output is such that
the participation constraint of the sector’s least motivated employee is just satisfied:
¡
pκ+ γ
¢2
2θ
= U0 (3.9)
The production constraint reads:
Qd = κ
Z γ
γ
f(γ)e∗dγ = κ
Z γ
γ
f(γ)
pκ+ γ
θ
dγ (3.10)
utility gain from higher income is annuled by the utility loss of exerting more effort.
12In this respect, this chapter relates to the optimal taxation literature where the government
redistributes income from high-ability workers to low-ability workers at the cost of distortions in
work incentives (Mirrlees, 1971). In this chapter, the government abstains from liberalisation and
distorts work incentives in the public firm so as to extract rents from highly motivated workers. As
in the optimal taxation literature, we assume that the government can not identify workers’ types.
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Constraints (3.9) and (3.10) together implicitly define the equilibrium values of the
price p and employment F (γ)− F
¡
γ
¢
. The comparative static results are qualita-
tively the same as in the two-type case and are, therefore, not discussed here.
3.6.2 Public monopsony
Total cost of the public firm is:
C =
Z γ
γ
f(γ)(αe∗ + β)dγ
Substituting optimal effort (3.3) to eliminate e∗, and the least-motivated worker’s
participation constraint (3.5, with γ = γ) to eliminate β, yields after some rewriting:
C = α
Qd
κ
+
∙
Uo −
(α+ γ)2
2θ
¸
[F (γ)− F (γ)] (3.11)
where we have simplified the first term on the right-hand side by using the production
constraint:
Qd = κ
Z γ
γ
f(γ)e∗dγ (3.12)
The public firm’s optimisation problem is to minimise (3.11) with respect to α and
γ, subject to (3.12). Combining the first-order conditions results in:
−
α+ γ
θ
[F (γ)− F (γ)] +
Z γ
γ
α+ γ
θ
f(γ)dγ (3.13)
−
[F (γ)− F (γ)]
(α+ γ)f(γ)
½∙
Uo −
(α+ γ)2
2θ
¸
f(γ) +
α+ γ
θ
[F (γ)− F (γ)]
¾
= 0
We can not derive explicit solutions for the optimal values of α and γ. However, we
can characterise the properties of the optimal wage scheme by using the results for
the competitive equilibrium described in the previous subsection. Condition (3.13)
describes four effects of a change in the incentive wage α on total cost. The first
term is the increase in the fixed wage necessary to keep the least-motivated worker’s
participation constraint satisfied. This increase in β, by
α+ γ
θ
, must be paid to
all workers, [F (γ)− F (γ)]. The second term describes cost savings as a result of a
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decrease in α: all units of effort are rewarded less when the incentive wage decreases.
Because the average effort level is higher than the effort level of the least-motivated
worker, the first two terms are positive in sum. This is the cost-saving effect of
giving weaker incentives for workers.
The terms on the second line of (3.13) describe the marginal cost of reducing
the incentive wage. The term outside the brackets is the increase in employment
necessary to keep production at Qd. The first term inside the brackets describes
the increase in cost of enhancing employment as the new hirees need to be paid
the fixed wage. Starting from the competitive equilibrium outcome in which the
fixed wage is zero, this term is zero. The second term inside the brackets is the
increase in the fixed wage necessary to attract outsiders to work in the sector. The
increase in the fixed wage must be paid to all workers. This effect was absent in the
previous section. In the two-type model, the firm could hire additional employees
from the pool of equally motivated workers of type l. In the model with a continuum
of worker types, increasing employment necessitates to increase the wage because
outsiders are less motivated than insiders.
This additional cost implies that we can not be certain about whether the in-
centive wage under the public monopsony is higher or lower than in the competitive
market. The same holds for the level of employment and the fixed wage. Much
depends on the specific distribution of motivation over workers. When individuals
in the neighbourhood of the competitive sector’s marginal worker differ a lot in in-
trinsic motivation, the public firm may optimally give stronger monetary incentives
for workers than in a competitive market. The fixed wage then becomes negative,
and employment becomes lower. If, instead, workers close to the marginal worker
differ little in their intrinsic motivation, the increase in the wage cost to attract new
employees is small and dominated by the cost-saving effect described by the first line
of condition (3.13). Then, as in the two-type model, the public firm gives weaker
incentives, and hence liberalisation leads to lower employment and higher wages for
all retained workers. Obviously, if (3.13) implies that deviating from the competi-
tive market’s optimal incentive wage is optimal, the public firm is more cost-efficient
than firms in a competitive market.
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The welfare effects of liberalisation are more dispersed than in the two-type
model. The reason is that with a continuum of workers, all those employed in
the sector obtain a rent except for the marginal worker, who is just indifferent
between working inside and outside the sector. When liberalisation entails stronger
work incentives and less employment, the workers who are laid off lose this rent.
Also, some of those who remain employed in the sector (the ones with relatively
low motivation) lose as the increase in disutility from effort more than offsets the
increase in total wage. The other workers in the sector - those who are relatively
highly motivated - gain. Workers outside the sector lose as a consequence of the
price increase, as in the two-type model.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has developed a model which can explain the empirical observations
that firms in a competitive market provide stronger monetary incentives to workers,
reach higher productivity, employ less workers, and pay higher wages than a public
monopsony. We have argued that weak incentives for workers in public firms may
stem from exploitation of monopsonistic power, a power that firms in a competitive
environment lack. Our model implies that strengthening competition between firms
may raise wage cost and, thus, output prices. Hence, liberalisation of a sector may
particularly favour the workers who remain employed in the sector at the expense
of the public at large. Political support for liberalisation may therefore be limited,
even though liberalisation improves allocational efficiency of the economy.
We have compared two extreme cases, a competitive market without any market
failures and a publicly owned or regulated monopolist without any government fail-
ures. Clearly, allowing for market failures and government failures could alter the
results. For instance, if the government could not perfectly regulate the public firm,
e.g. due to information asymmetries, then the public firm may limit production
(and hence employment) so as to raise the price of output. Creating a competitive
market may then lead to lower prices and higher employment as the public firm can
no longer exploit its monopoly power. In practice, it seems likely that liberalisation
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of a sector reduces both the monopoly power and the monopsony power of the public
firm, implying that the effect of liberalisation on prices and employment is ambigu-
ous. Allowing for monopoly power of the public firm does not affect our conclusions
on incentive pay and wages, as it is also in the interest of a public monopolist to
exploit its monopsony power so as to reduce wage costs. This may explain why the
empirical evidence on the effect of liberalisation on wages and incentive pay is more
conclusive than the evidence on prices and employment.
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3.A Appendices
3.A.1 Separating contracts
This appendix relaxes the assumption that firms offer a single wage scheme. Ob-
viously, in the case of a competitive market, none of the results change: the par-
ticipation constraint of the low-motivation workers binds, and the high-motivation
workers receive all of the rents of their motivation as each worker is paid his full
marginal product in equilibrium. In the case of a public monopsony, the results are
in the same spirit as we will show now.
For convenience, assume that each contract specifies a fixed wage and an effort
level: (βl, el) and (βh, eh). We could as well assume that contracts consist of a fixed
and an effort-related component, as above, but this unnecessarily complicates the
analysis. The first contract must satisfy the low-motivation workers’ participation
constraint:
βl ≥ Uo +
1
2
θe2l
The second contract must satisfy the high-motivation workers’ revelation constraint:
βl + γhel −
1
2
θe2l ≤ βh + γheh −
1
2
θe2h
Using these two constraints and the production constraint [Qd = κ (Lel +Heh)], we
can write the cost of production as:
C = βlL+ βhH ⇐⇒
C =
µ
Uo +
1
2
θe2l
¶µ
Qd − κHeh
κel
¶
+
µ
Uo − γh (eh − el) +
1
2
θe2h
¶
H
Minimising C with respect to el and eh results in the following two first-order con-
ditions: µ
1
2
θ − U
o
e2l
¶
Qd − κHeh
κ
+ γhH = 0 (3.A1)
−
Uo + 1
2
θe2l
el
+ (−γh + θeh) = 0 (3.A2)
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We can not derive explicit solutions for the optimal values of el and eh. We can,
however, compare them with the effort levels in the competitive equilibrium. Recall
that the effort of low-motivation workers in the competitive equilibrium equals
√
2θUo
θ .
Substituting this into first-order condition (3.14), the first term becomes zero. Hence,
as the second term is positive, the public firm sets el below the competitive level so
as to increase the rents that can be extracted from the high-motivation workers, just
as in the case of a single wage scheme. Using this result, it follows from first-order
condition (3.14) that eh is larger than the effort level of high-motivation workers in
the competitive equilibrium. The intuition is straightforward. As the reduction in
el entails an increase in the cost of output that is produced by the marginal worker,
it is profitable to let the high-motivation workers work harder. Total employment
is higher and average productivity is lower in a public monopsony compared to the
competitive equilibrium if:
(θQ− κγhH)
∙³
θQ− κγhH − κH
√
2θU
´2
− κ2γhH2
√
2θU
¸
+ κ3γhH
3θU > 0
(3.A3)
This follows from rewriting and combining first-order conditions (3.14) and (3.14)
and using the results for the competitive case. A sufficient condition is that the term
in square brackets is positive, which can be rewritten as:
αcL2c > γhH
2
where αc and Lc are the incentive wage and the number of low-motivation workers
in the competitive equilibrium, respectively; see Table 3.1. Hence, when the public
firm can offer separating contracts, employment may be lower than in the competi-
tive equilibrium if the number of high-motivation workers and their motivation are
high relative to the contribution of low-motivation workers to production. Note,
however, that if γhH becomes sufficiently high, only high-motivation workers will
be employed in the sector, both in the competitive equilibrium and in the case of a
public monopsony. Then, competition and monopsony yield identical outcomes. A
numerical analysis suggests that if both low-motivation and high-motivation work-
ers are hired, condition (3.A3) is almost always satisfied and, hence, employment
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is lower in the competitive equilibrium. Finally, prices are always lower in the case
of a public monopsony. If this would not be the case, the public monopsony would
offer the same contracts as those that result in the competitive equilibrium.
3.A.2 Maximising social welfare
Suppose the public firm maximises the sum of utilities of all workers in the economy.
Since utility is linear in income, we can write the social welfare function as:
Ψ = (K − L)Uo + LUl +HUh − C (3.A4)
where K is the total number of low-motivation workers in the economy, C is the cost
of production of the sector’s output, and we have imposed thatQd is sufficiently large
such that it is optimal for the public firm to hire also low-motivation workers, as
in the main text. Our assumption of price-inelastic demand implies that the utility
from the sector’s output is a constant, so we can safely ignore it. Substituting total
cost C, described in (3.8), and the workers’ utility function (2.1) with i = l and
i = h, respectively, into (3.A4) gives after some rewriting:
Ψ = (K − L)Uo − L
µ
1
2
θe∗2l
¶
+H
µ
γhe
∗
h −
1
2
θe∗2h
¶
(3.A5)
Note that the fixed wage β paid by the public firm does not affect social welfare, but
must satisfy the low-motivation workers’ participation constraint (3.5). Substituting
optimal effort (3.3) into (3.A5) and maximising with respect to α and L, subject to
the production constraint (3.6), yields after some rewriting that optimal α =
√
2θUo,
the same as in the competitive equilibrium. Consequently, the level of employment
is also the same and the fixed wage β = 0.

Chapter 4
Incentives and Workers’
Motivation in the Public Sector
Joint with Robert Dur
"Citizens and taxpayers have their own global view of bureaucracy. To
them, bureaucrats are lethargic, incompetent hacks who spend their days
spinning out reels of red tape and reams of paperwork, all the while going
to great lengths to avoid doing the job they were hired to do."
James Q. Wilson (1989), p. x.
4.1 Introduction
Bureaucrats have a bad reputation. Jokes about bureaucrats’ laziness and stories on
bureaucratic errors abound. The lack of monetary incentives at public organisations
is supposed to attract workers who are most averse to exerting effort. This pes-
simistic view is also prominent in the economics literature. For several decades, the
literature has identified bureaucrats as pursuing their narrow self-interest, usually
being at odds with the interest of society (see Tullock, 1965, Downs, 1967, Niskanen,
1971, and Buchanan, 1978).
However, when citizens are asked about recent personal experience with civil ser-
vants, many tend to be satisfied with their performance (Katz et al., 1975, Goodsell,
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1985). Surveys of workers and managers in the public sector also suggest that quite
a few civil servants do not fit the stereotype. Instead, even when external incentives
are weak or nonexistent, quite some civil servants appear to be highly motivated
to provide a service to the community.1 Such ‘public service motivation’ of civil
servants is also a central theme of a number of recent economic studies of public
agencies (Francois, 2000, Dixit, 2002, Prendergast, 2004, Glazer, 2004, and Besley
and Ghatak, 2005).
How to reconcile these seemingly opposing points of view? This chapter develops
a model with three types of workers: regular, motivated, and lazy workers. Com-
pared to regular workers, lazy workers have higher cost of effort in both the private
and the public sector. Motivated workers, to some extent, enjoy exerting effort in a
public sector job, but are otherwise identical to regular workers. This public service
motivation gives monopsony power to the government. We show that it is in the in-
terest of a cost-minimising government to recruit, in addition to motivated workers,
lazy workers rather than regular workers.
Whereas we model the private sector as a competitive market in which workers
are paid their full marginal product, the public sector is assumed to be a single
organisation whose objective is to produce a certain amount of public goods at
minimum cost. This organisation, which we refer to as the public agency, attracts
workers by offering one or more contracts specifying the wage and, if verifiable,
required effort. The public agency can not observe the workers’ type and, hence,
can not make the contracts contingent on worker type. Workers choose the contract
that yields them the highest utility, provided that the private sector is not a better
option.
We consider two cases: verifiable and unverifiable effort. When effort is unveri-
fiable, the public agency prefers to hire either motivated or lazy workers. We show
that it may occur that the public agency prefers to attract only motivated workers,
but that it can not avoid hiring lazy workers as well. However, if desired public
1See chapter 2 in Le Grand (2003) for a review of the empirical literature on workers’ motivation
in the public sector. Other recent studies include Antonazzo et al. (2003) on nursing workers,
Edmonds et al. (2002) on teachers, and Frank and Lewis (2004) on employees in these and several
other areas of the public sector.
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production is sufficiently large, the public agency wants to attract both motivated
and lazy workers, implying that the problem of nonexcludability of lazy workers is
less severe.
When effort is verifiable and desired production in the public sector is sufficiently
small, the public agency hires only motivated workers, and extracts all motivational
rents from these workers. This full rent extraction may not be possible if a second
worker type is needed. Any rents motivated workers obtain when they would choose
the other type’s contract can not be extracted by the public agency. Since a contract
satisfying a lazy worker’s participation constraint has lower wage and lower required
effort than a regular worker’s contract, a lazy worker’s contract is less appealing to
the motivated workers. Therefore, the public agency can extract more motivational
rents, and hence attracts motivated workers at lower cost, if it attracts lazy workers
rather than regular workers.
The public agency distorts both contracts in order to extract even more motiva-
tional rents. It offers lower-powered incentives to lazy workers than do private firms.
This way, the lazy worker’s contract becomes even less appealing to the motivated
workers. However, to keep production at the desired level, the public agency has to
hire additional lazy workers, which is costly. These costs can be reduced by giving
motivated workers higher-powered incentives, above the level private firms would
offer.
These contract distortions are cost-efficient, but reduce social welfare. If we im-
pose that the public agency maximises social welfare rather than minimises cost,
it does not distort the contracts of the workers. The public agency still prefers to
attract motivated workers, but if a second worker type is needed, it is indifferent
between lazy and regular workers. Compared to a cost-minimising public agency,
social welfare is higher. However, total cost of public goods production and, hence,
taxes are also higher when the public agency maximises social welfare. Only moti-
vated workers benefit, whereas the utility of lazy and regular workers decreases as a
result of higher taxes. When motivated workers are a minority in society, politicians
are likely to strive for cost-minimisation rather than for social welfare maximisation,
so as to please the public at large.
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While there exists quite some empirical evidence showing that a significant part
of the civil work force has a public service motivation (see the references in footnote
1), there exists little evidence confirming the stereotype view that civil servants are
lazy. It is important to note that our model does not necessarily imply that workers
in the public sector are on average more lazy than workers in the private sector; nor
does it imply that lazy workers are always more numerous in the public sector than
in the private sector.2 Therefore, rather than comparing sectoral averages of workers’
characteristics, Table 4.1 presents data on workers who have moved from one sector
to the other. Following Johnson (1978)’s model of ‘job shopping’ and Jovanovic
(1979)’s model of turnover, we expect a worker to move in case of a mismatch
between the worker’s tastes or abilities and his job’s attributes or requirements. In
the context of our model, we thus predict regular workers to move from the public
sector to the private sector, whereas lazy and motivated workers move in opposite
direction. Our model implies that for lazy workers, the attractive feature of working
in the public sector is that the workload is relatively low, either because effort is
unverifiable, or because weak incentives are provided. In 2002, the Dutch Ministry of
the Interior and Kingdom Relations undertook a survey of workers who had recently
entered or left the public sector. In Table 4.1, we list the percentage of workers
moving between the private and the public sector who mentioned workload as one
of the three most important reasons to leave their job. Workers who moved from
the private sector to the public sector mention workload more often than workers
who moved in the opposite direction. The difference is most pronounced for central
government and local governments. Education is the main exception. This may be
due to the increasing shortage of teachers in The Netherlands during this period
(Meesters, 2003), or it may indicate that our model does not apply to all jobs in the
public sector.
Another reason for why people may differ in their disutility from work effort is
that they face different external constraints. For instance, the care for children or
2For instance, when there are many lazy workers in the economy, and the public sector is not
too large, the majority of lazy workers will work in the private sector. Depending on the number
of motivated workers, workers in the public sector can be more lazy or less lazy on average than
are workers in the private sector.
4.1 Introduction 67
Table 4.1: Percentage of workers moving from the private sector to the public sector
and vice versa who mention workload (column 1) and combining work and family
life (column 2) as one of the three most important reasons to leave their job (The
Netherlands, 2002).
Sector Inflow Outflow Inflow Outflow Inflow Outflow
Central 15.8 1.5 19.0 8.3 329 134
Local 16.3 7.4 20.5 4.5 681 267
Police 9.1 2.0 10.2 8.7 444 95
Research¹ 12.7 9.3 17.1 4.3 128 31
Hospitals² 11.0 12.9 11.9 14.2 40 46
Defence 3.2 4.6 9.5 34.5 159 107
Education 14.5 35.0 23.4 13.3 432 145
Data source: BZK, Mobiliteitsonderzoek 2002.
¹ Research consists of universities and research institutes.
² Only university hospitals were surveyed.
Workload    respondents
Combining work and 
family life
  Number of 
for a sick family member may draw on someone’s energy and concentration at work
and may raise the opportunity cost of time at work. The second column of Table 4.1
presents the percentage of workers moving between the private and the public sector
who mention combining work and family life as one of the three most important
reasons to leave their job. Clearly, people who moved from a private sector job to a
public sector job mention combining work and family life relatively often compared
to people who moved from the public to the private sector, with defence being an
obvious exception.3
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section discusses how the chapter
relates to the literature. Section 4.3 describes the model. Section 4.4 analyses the
case where effort in the public sector is unverifiable. In Section 4.5, effort is verifiable
in both sectors of the economy. Section 4.6 compares our results with the case where
3When we restrict our sample to people who worked full-time at both jobs, the results for
workload provide even stronger support for our prediction, and the results for combining work and
family life are only slightly weaker.
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the public agency maximises social welfare rather than minimises costs. Section 4.7
concludes.
4.2 Related literature
Our paper is related to the Roy model of occupational choice (Roy, 1951). Roy
studies workers’ self-selection into occupations and the resulting income distribution
in a model where workers are heterogeneous in occupation-specific productivity.
Jovanovic (1982)’s extension of the Roy model allows a worker’s productivity in one
sector of the economy to be private knowledge of the worker. As a result of this
information asymmetry, the market equilibrium has too many people working in
the sector where productivity can not be observed relative to the second-best social
optimum. The crowding-out argument we develop in Section 4.4 is close in spirit
to this result. Besides our focus on the public sector and workers’ motivation, our
analysis differs from both Roy (1951) and Jovanovic (1982) in that worker’s effort
is endogenous, which leads to interesting issues of contract design in Section 4.5.
Moreover, while the earlier studies assume competitive labor markets, we assume
that the public sector has monopsony power over some workers (those with a public
service motivation), which gives rise to rent extraction.
Our model is related to the literature on screening of workers’ ability following
the seminal papers by Spence (1973) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) (for an
overview, see Riley, 2001). In a standard adverse selection model (see e.g. Laffont
and Martimort, 2002), a firm induces the ‘low’ type to exert a suboptimally low
level of effort, so as to extract more of the rents from the ‘high’ type. The contract
of the ‘high’ type is efficient. In contrast, in our model the contracts of both types
are distorted. Whereas in the standard model a firm designs contracts for a fixed
number of workers, our model describes the behaviour of a firm which has to meet
a production requirement.4
Heterogeneity in laziness may stem from differences in people’s physical fitness or
ability, as in the standard adverse selection model, but may also stem from hetero-
4It is easy to extend our model to allow for price-elastic demand for the public good. Then, as
in the case of a production requirement, both contracts are distorted.
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geneity in general work ethic or morale. Differences in work ethic have been as-
sociated with, for instance, personality traits (Furnham, 1992) and cultural factors
(Hofstede, 1991). Caplan (2003) surveys the modern personality psychology lite-
rature and concludes that: “Some people are much more eager to shirk than others
by showing up late, spending their effort on non-work projects, taking their time,
stealing office supplies and so on. Preferences for these sorts of behavior throughout
the population markedly differ, holding constraints constant” (p. 398).
A new strand in the economics literature emphasises that workers in public or-
ganisations (or, more generally, in non-profit organisations) may be intrinsically
motivated to work. For instance, Dixit (2002) argues that organisations that have
an idealistic or ethical purpose may be attractive to workers who share these goals.
Besley and Ghatak (2005) show that, when workers are protected by limited liability,
a good match between an organisation’s and a worker’s mission may reduce mone-
tary incentives. Francois (2000) and Glazer (2004) develop models where workers
intrinsically value the output of the public organisation, see also Preston (1989). In
Benabou and Tirole (2003) workers may enjoy exerting effort at work or intrinsically
value their contribution to output (‘warm-glow’). The main difference between these
papers and our study is that we relax the assumption that types of agents are fully
observed by the principal.
Most related to our work is a recent paper by Prendergast (2004). He assumes
that workers differ in altruism for clients. The government prefers to attract dif-
ferent worker types for different agencies. For agencies where the preferences of the
government and clients are aligned, as in health care, the government prefers the
most altruistic bureaucrats. However, when the preferences of the government and
clients are not aligned, as with (suspected) criminals, bureaucrats should be biased
against their clients. Prendergast shows that, when agents’ types are unobservable,
agencies are likely to attract both the most preferred and the least preferred wor-
kers. The latter enter the agency because they benefit most from diverting from the
government’s most preferred policy.
Our work also relates to Lazear (1986). He argues that firms can use their
wage policy so as to attract certain types of workers, just like the public agency
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in our model does. Strong monetary incentives induce highly productive workers
to apply at a firm, whereas less productive workers prefer a high base salary and
weak incentives (see also Lazear, 1995, and Prendergast, 1999, for surveys). Moen
and Rosen (2005) have recently built on this and argue that, when there is a multi-
tasking problem, competition between firms for highly productive workers may result
in incentives that are too high-powered from a social welfare perspective. Burgess
and Metcalfe (1999) show empirically that private companies make far more use
of incentive wages than public organisations. Moreover, they argue that there are
insufficient grounds to justify the low incentivisation of the public sector. Our model
implies that lazy workers get indeed weaker monetary incentives at the public agency
compared to the private sector, and suggests that this may be cost-efficient. On the
other hand, motivated workers get stronger incentives.
A few papers consider heterogeneity in ability among government workers in the
context of downsizing the government (Jeon and Laffont, 1999, and Rama, 1999).
Jeon and Laffont (1999) show that the optimal voluntary downsizing mechanism
consists of a menu of public wages, severance pay, and probabilities of dismissal.
The government’s choice of which workers to retain closely resembles our results in
Section 4.6, where we impose that the government maximises social welfare. When
workers differ in a sector-specific trait, the government prefers the workers that have
a comparative advantage in the public sector, whereas when workers differ in a gen-
eral trait, the government is indifferent. This chapter differs in three important as-
pects. First, we consider a model in which workers are heterogeneous both in general
and in sector-specific productivity, whereas Jeon and Laffont study heterogeneity in
general and in sector-specific productivity separately. We show that heterogeneity
in sector-specific motivation implies that a cost-minimising government is not in-
different between workers who differ in general work ethic. Second, in their model,
effort is fixed, implying that they do not consider optimal incentive schemes. Third,
most of our analysis focuses on a cost-minimising government rather than a social
welfare maximising government.
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4.3 The model
There are two sectors in the economy, a private and a public sector. The private
sector is a fully competitive market where workers receive their full marginal product.
The public sector is run by a single entity, which can be thought of as the government.
This single organisation will be referred to as the public agency. Both sectors have
the same linear production function:
q(e) = e (4.1)
where q is production and e is effort. Each unit of production of the private sector
can be sold on the world market for the exogenous price p. The public agency
produces public goods, which are therefore not priced. The desired amount of public
production is given by Q.5 First, we assume that the public agency minimises cost
of production. Next, we compare the results with a social welfare-maximising public
agency. We abstract from principal-agent problems between voters, politicians, and
managers of the public agency, which implies that the objective of the public agency
is in line with the interest of (a majority of) the voters.
Three types of workers exist in the economy: regular workers r, motivated wor-
kers m, and lazy workers l. Lazy workers incur greater disutility from working than
the other types. Motivated workers derive intrinsic utility from exerting effort in the
public sector, but are otherwise identical to regular workers.6 Workers know their
own type, but neither private firms nor the public agency can observe a worker’s
type. LetNi denote the number of workers of type i in the economy and let ni denote
the number of workers of type i employed in the public sector, where i ∈ {r,m, l}.
The utility of a worker of type i from working in the private sector is given by:
Ui = w − θiC(e) (4.2)
5Price-elastic demand for public goods would not alter any of the results qualitatively. By
varying the level of Q, our analysis yields the supply function for public goods. Together, demand
and supply then determine the optimal level of Q.
6Allowing for worker types with private sector motivation does not change the results, as these
workers would seek employment in the public sector only when wages in the public sector are very
high.
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where w is the wage, C(e) describes the cost of effort, with properties C(0) = 0,
C 0(·) > 0, and C 00(·) > 0, and θi measures the degree of laziness. We assume that
0 < θr = θm < θl.
The utility of a worker of type i from working in the public sector is given by:7
Ui = w + γiV (e)− θiC(e) (4.3)
where V (e) is a concave function with properties V (0) = 0, V 0(·) > 0 and V 00(·) < 0,
and γi measures the public service motivation of a worker. We assume that γm >
γr = γl = 0. Hence, only motivated workers derive utility from exerting effort
in the public sector. Motivated workers have an action-oriented motivation, as in
Benabou and Tirole (2003). Since q = e, results are the same if we assume that
motivated workers intrinsically value their contribution to output (‘warm-glow’),
as in Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Glazer (2004).8 As motivated workers derive
motivational utility only at the public agency, the agency has monopsony power over
these workers.9
Competition in the private sector ensures that workers in the private sector
receive their full marginal product. Hence, total wage of a worker of type i employed
in the private sector is given by pei. It follows from (4.1) and (4.2) that the optimal
level of effort e∗i of a worker of type i in the private sector is implicitly given by:
C 0(e∗i ) =
p
θi
(4.4)
7We assume that workers are employed either in the private or in the public sector. Allowing
for part-time jobs in the private sector increases the distortions in the optimal contracts when
worker types are unobservable. We also abstract from subcontracting, thereby ruling out that a
motivated worker takes over the contracts of two or more lazy workers at the public firm.
8In contrast, Francois (2000) and Prendergast (2004) assume that workers have an altruistic
motivation, that is, workers care about the provision of public services, but do not derive utility
from their personal involvement in production.
9Allowing for a fourth type of worker, who derives motivational utility from working in the
public sector, but is lazy as well (γ = γm, θ = θl) does not affect the results, unless there are
much more lazy motivated workers than regular motivated workers and γm is very low compared
to θl − θr.
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The resulting level of utility is:
U∗i = pe
∗
i − θiC(e∗i ) (4.5)
Note that U∗i is decreasing in θi.
For future reference, we derive the level of effort motivated workers would exert
in the private sector if they would have intrinsic motivation to work in the private
sector. This level of effort, denoted by exm, is implicitly given by:
C 0(exm) =
p+ γmV 0(exm)
θm
(4.6)
In the public sector, we distinguish two cases, verifiable effort and unverifiable
effort. If effort is verifiable, the public agency offers one or more contracts in which
both the level of effort and the wage are specified. In the second case, effort (and
output) is unverifiable above a certain level of e, e¯.10 We assume that e¯ is sufficiently
small such that it is a binding restriction for lazy and regular workers. This requires
that e¯ < e∗l . Then, the public agency can only offer a contract in which a wage level
is specified, along with the threat not to pay the wage if effort is below e¯.
Wages in the public sector are financed through a lump-sum (non-distortionary)
tax, uniformly levied on all workers in the economy. This implies that we can ignore
taxation when deriving the optimal occupational and effort choice of the workers.
4.4 Unverifiable effort in the public sector
We first consider the case where in the public sector effort levels above e¯ are un-
verifiable. Hence, the best the public agency can do is to offer a contract consisting
of a wage which is only paid if the worker exerts at least effort level e¯. Clearly, lazy
and regular workers never exert more effort than e¯. Motivated workers may decide
to exert more effort, which occurs when the level of effort e˜m implicitly defined by
10 e¯ reflects that workers who do not show up at work or remain idle behind their desk all day
can be detected and are fired. When e¯ = 0, no extrinsic incentives can be provided, implying that
public goods production has to rely completely on intrinsic motivation.
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first-order condition
C 0(em) =
γmV 0(e˜m)
θm
is greater than e¯. The minimum wage wi at which the public agency can attract a
worker of type i is given by the participation constraint:
wi = U∗i + θiC(ei)− γiV (ei) (4.7)
where ei = e¯ for lazy and regular workers and ei = e˜m for motivated workers. Using
(4.5), we find that for non-motivated workers:
∂wi
∂θi
= [p− θiC 0(e∗i )]
∂e∗i
∂θi
− C(e∗i ) + C(e¯) = −C(e∗i ) + C(e¯) < 0
where the first term drops out using first-order condition (4.4). The inequality
follows from the restriction e¯ < e∗i . Hence, the public agency prefers lazy workers
to regular workers because they demand a lower wage. The intuition is that lazy
workers value the relatively low level of effort in the public sector more than regular
workers. The same holds for motivated workers, but for a different reason: they
require a lower wage than regular workers, as they derive motivational utility from
working in the public sector. Hence, the public agency also prefers motivated workers
to regular workers, because wage cost are lower and, if e˜m > e¯, their effort is higher.
Whether the public agency prefers motivated workers to lazy workers is am-
biguous. Motivated workers may exert more effort and need less monetary com-
pensation for their effort, but have higher opportunity cost of working in the public
sector than lazy workers. If e˜m ≤ e¯, then the public agency prefers motivated workers
to lazy workers when wm < wl, where wm and wl follow from participation constraint
(4.7). If e˜m > e¯, then motivated workers are preferred when wm/e˜m < wl/e¯. How-
ever, in the latter case it is possible that the agency prefers to attract only motivated
workers, but that at the wage it has to offer to attract them, lazy workers apply as
well. In other words, lazy workers may crowd out motivated workers in the public
sector. This occurs when wl/e¯ > wm/e˜m and wl < wm.11 Then, setting wm rather
11If the public firm could distinguish between worker types, this crowding out of motivated
workers would not occur, as contracts could be made contingent on type.
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than wl is optimal if:
wl/e¯ > wm
Nl +Nm
Nle¯+Nme˜m
(4.8)
where we assume that, when setting wm, the public agency randomly attracts wor-
kers from the groups of motivated and lazy workers, and that the agency sets em-
ployment such that expected output is Q. Hence, for a larger range of parameter
values, it is optimal to attract lazy workers only. With concave utility from public
goods, the condition becomes even more stringent as total public output becomes
uncertain when the agency sets wm.
Crowding out of motivated workers may also happen when Q is sufficiently large,
such that the public agency would like to attract all of the motivated workers in the
economy and a limited number of lazy workers. Then, as the public agency can not
distinguish between lazy and motivated workers, some of the motivated workers may
not obtain a public sector job.12
4.5 Verifiable effort
When effort is verifiable, the public agency optimally offers one or more contracts
specifying a wage and a required level of effort. Consider first the case where Q is
sufficiently small, such that the agency needs only one worker type. Given the type
of worker, the optimal contract then minimises
Z =
X
i
wini (4.9)
with respect to ei, subject to the participation constraint (4.7) and the production
constraint Q = eini. This gives first-order condition:
[θiC 0(ei)− γiV 0(ei)]−
∙
U∗i + θiC(ei)− γiV (ei)
ei
¸
= 0 (4.10)
12In Appendix 4.A.1 we prove that for each case considered in the main text, there exists a level
of Q for which it is optimal for the public firm to attract two worker types instead of one. When
effort is unverifiable, the supply function of public goods displays a discontinuous jump at this level
of Q. When effort is verifiable, the supply function is continuous but displays a kink at this level
of Q.
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In the optimum, the marginal cost of effort by the employed workers (the first term)
is equal to the marginal cost of effort by hiring an additional worker (the second
term). Using (4.4) and (4.5), it is easy to verify that condition (4.10) is satisfied for
lazy workers and for regular workers if ei = e∗i . Hence, if the public agency chooses
to hire lazy or regular workers, it induces them to exert as much effort as they do in
the private sector. By (4.7), this implies that the public agency has to pay them the
same wage as they earn in the private sector, pe∗i . When we substitute em = e∗m into
equation (4.10) for i = m, we find, by using (4.4) and (4.5), that condition (4.10) is
not satisfied, since:
−e∗mγmV 0(e∗m) + γmV (e∗m) > 0
where the inequality follows from the concavity of V (e). Hence, motivated workers
are induced to exert less effort than in the private sector, even though their intrinsic
motivation makes them willing to exert more effort at the same wage than in the
private sector. The intuition is straightforward. As the marginal rents from motiva-
tion of a single worker decrease in em, it is optimal for the public agency to set em
relatively low and attract additional motivated workers. Thereby, the public agency
increases the total rents from motivation generated in the public sector, resulting in
lower costs of public goods production.13
Comparing the cost per unit of effort for each worker type, it follows that the
public agency prefers to hire motivated workers. It has to pay lazy and regular
workers as much for their effort as the private sector does, which implies that total
cost would be pQ. Even if the public agency would let motivated workers work as
hard as they do in the private sector, total cost would be lower than pQ, namely
pQ− nmγmV (e∗m), as the agency can fully extract the rents from motivation. Since
the agency optimally sets em < e∗m, it follows that total cost are even lower. Clearly,
when the public agency offers the optimal contract to attract motivated workers,
lazy and regular workers have no incentive to opt for a public sector job.
Next, consider the case where Q is sufficiently large, such that two worker types
are needed. Still, the agency prefers to hire all of the motivated workers as they
13It is easy to verify that if V (e) would be a linear function, the public firm optimally sets
em = e∗m.
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are the only workers who are willing to work for less than p per unit of effort. The
interesting question is which worker type the public agency prefers to hire in addition
to the motivated workers. Total cost Z is given by:
Z = wmNm + wknk (4.11)
and the production constraint is given by:
emNm + eknk = Q (4.12)
where k ∈ {r, l}. To attract and separate the two types, the agency creates two
contracts that meet the following conditions. First, the contracts must meet the
participation constraint of both types:
IRk wk − θkC(ek) ≥ U∗k
IRm wm + γmV (em)− θmC(em) ≥ U∗m
Second, the contracts must meet the revelation constraints, that is, each worker
must prefer the contract designed for his type to the other contract:14
ICk wk − θkC(ek) ≥ wm − θkC(em)
ICm wm + γmV (em)− θmC(em) ≥ wk + γmV (ek)− θmC(ek)
Consider first the case where the public agency decides to attract motivated and
regular workers, k = r. This resembles a standard adverse selection problem, where
workers differ in their productivity inside the agency, but have the same outside
option (since θr = θm). As in the standard model, the participation (or Individual
Rationality) constraint of the ‘low’ type and the revelation (or Incentive Compati-
bility) constraint of the ‘high’ type are binding, while the other two constraints are
non-binding (see e.g. Laffont and Martimort, 2002, chapter 2). The optimisation
problem of the public agency is to minimise cost (4.11) with respect to em and er,
14We assume that workers choose which contract to sign after applying. If a worker had to
choose for which contract to apply, motivated workers would have to take into account that not
all workers applying for the contract designed for the other type may get a job, as the number of
applications may exceed the number of jobs. This would weaken ICm, and hence further reduce
the rents that motivated workers obtain. Further, we also assume that the public firm can commit
not to renegotiate the contracts after the types have been revealed, such that the ratchet effect has
no bite.
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subject to IRr, ICm, and the production constraint (4.12). This gives the following
two first-order conditions for em and er, respectively:
−Nm
er
[Ur + θrC(er)] +Nm [θmC 0(em)− γmV 0(em)] = 0 (4.13)
[erθrC 0(er)− U∗r − θrC(er)]
∙
Q− emNm
e2r
¸
+Nm [γmV
0(er) + C 0(er)(θr − θm)] = 0
(4.14)
By substituting er = e∗r into first-order condition (4.14) and using (4.4) and (4.5),
the first term drops out. Since the second term is positive, it follows that the public
agency induces the regular workers to exert less effort than they do in the private
sector, er < e∗r. Substituting this result into equation (4.13), we find that the
contract for the motivated workers is also distorted. The public agency induces the
motivated workers to exert more effort than they would do in the private sector if
they would be motivated to work in the private sector, em > exm.
Intuitively, as in the standard adverse selection model, the public agency makes
the contract of the regular workers less attractive to motivated workers by decreasing
the level of effort in that contract. Thereby, it can extract a greater part of the rents
frommotivation from the motivated workers. However, this decrease in effort implies
that the public agency needs to hire more regular workers to meet the production
constraint, which is costly. It can decrease these costs by increasing the effort of
motivated workers. In the optimum, the cost of an additional unit of effort by giving
stronger incentives to the motivated workers is equal to the cost of an additional
unit of effort by hiring an additional regular worker.15
Next, consider the case where the public agency decides to attract motivated and
lazy workers, k = l. If the revelation constraint of motivated workers ICm is binding,
the optimisation problem of the public agency is similar to that above, leading to
first-order conditions (4.13) and (4.14) with r = l. Hence, the public agency distorts
15Allowing for part-time jobs in the private sector makes contract distortions less costly. Regular
workers would take a part-time job in the private sector alongside their public sector job, thereby
increasing their utility. Hence, the cost of the downward distortion for the public firm is lower,
implying that the firm can extract more rents from the motivated workers.
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both contracts by giving lazy workers weaker incentives than private firms do, and
motivated workers stronger incentives than private firms would.
Interestingly, however, when the public agency attracts lazy workers, it is also
possible that the revelation constraint does not bind, i.e. that the contract for lazy
workers is less appealing to motivated workers than working in the private sector.16
In this case, IRm and IRl are binding, while ICm and ICl are non-binding. Then,
the optimisation problem of the public agency is to minimise cost (4.11) with respect
to em and el, subject to IRl, IRm, and the production constraint (4.12). This gives
the following two first-order conditions for em and el, respectively:
−Nm
el
[U∗l + θlC(el)] +Nm [θmC
0(em)− γmV 0(em)] = 0 (4.15)
[elθlC 0(el)− U∗l − θlC(el)]
∙
Q− emNm
e2l
¸
= 0 (4.16)
By substituting el = e∗l and using (4.4) and (4.5), we find that the first term between
brackets of first-order condition (4.16) is zero. Hence, the public agency sets the
level of effort for the lazy workers equal to their optimal level of effort in the private
sector. Obviously, their wage must also be at the same level as in the private sector.
Substituting this result into first-order condition (4.15) gives em = exm. Hence,
neither contract is distorted and the contract offered to motivated workers extracts
all of their rents (as IRm is binding).17
The final step is to show which type of workers the public agency optimally
attracts in addition to the motivated workers. Let us start with the case we just
discussed, where the participation constraint of motivated workers IRm is binding if
the agency attracts lazy workers. The public agency pays p per unit of effort to lazy
workers and extracts all of the motivational rents from motivated workers. When,
instead, the public agency attracts regular workers, the revelation constraint of the
motivated workers is always binding. Therefore, the public agency can not extract
16Note that this can never happen when the public firm hires regular workers rather than lazy
workers, since regular and motivated workers have the same outside option.
17If the public firm could distinguish between worker types, contracts would not be distorted, as
only the participation constraints of the attracted worker types bind. The public firm would then
prefer to attract motivated workers, and would be indifferent between lazy and regular workers.
80 Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector
all of the rents from motivation. Moreover, it distorts the contract of the regular
workers, implying that the cost per unit of effort of regular workers is greater than
p. Hence, total cost are lower if the public agency attracts lazy rather than regular
workers.
Next, consider the case where the revelation constraint of motivated workers ICm
is binding if the public agency attracts lazy workers. In Appendix 4.A.2, we prove
that total cost Z decrease in the general work ethic of the non-motivated worker type
θk, ∂Z/∂θk < 0. Hence, besides motivated workers, the public agency prefers to at-
tract the economy’s laziest workers. The intuition is straightforward. The extraction
of motivational rents from motivated workers by the public agency is hampered by
the revelation constraint for motivated workers ICm. To induce motivated workers
to choose the proper contract, they must receive all rents they would obtain by
choosing the other type’s contract. A contract satisfying a lazy worker’s participa-
tion constraint has lower wage and lower required effort than a contract satisfying
a regular worker’s participation constraint. Therefore, a lazy worker’s contract is
less appealing to a motivated worker than a regular worker’s contract, implying that
the public agency can extract more rents, and hence attracts motivated workers at
lower cost, if it attracts lazy workers rather than regular workers.18
It follows that the public agency can produce the same output at lower cost
by attracting lazy rather than regular workers. Moreover, the public agency may
deliberately provide weak incentives to lazy workers, implying that lazy workers in
the public sector exert less effort than lazy workers who are employed in the private
sector. The laziness of civil servants may thus be a sign of cost-efficient government!
4.6 Social welfare
In this section, we impose that the public agency maximises social welfare, which
we define as the sum of utilities of all workers in the economy. Recall that, so
18Without motivated workers, Nm = 0, it follows from first-order condition (4.14) that the
government does not distort the contract of regular or lazy workers. Then, the government is
indifferent between lazy and regular workers, as both are willing to work in the public sector for
p per unit of effort. Hence, the contract distortions and the preference for lazy workers stem from
the presence of motivated workers.
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far, we ignored taxation as our assumption of lump-sum taxes implies that none of
the decisions by the workers or the cost-minimising public agency are affected by
taxation. However, taxes do affect workers’ utility and, hence, social welfare. The
total amount of taxes is simply the sum of the wages of the public sector workers
(Z). Since utility is linear in income, social welfare can be written as:19
Ψ =
X
i
[(Ni − ni)U∗i + niUi]− Z (4.17)
By using (4.3) and noting that Z =
P
i niwi, the above expression can be rewritten
to:
Ψ =
X
i
{(Ni − ni)U∗i + ni [−θiC(ei) + γiV (ei)]} (4.18)
Hence, the public agency maximises total utility in the private sector minus the net
cost of effort in the public sector.
In Appendices 4.A.3 and 4.A.4, we prove that the optimal choice of a welfare-
maximising public agency is identical to that of a cost-minimising public agency
when effort is unverifiable (except for condition (4.8)), and when effort is verifiable
and Q is sufficiently small, respectively. Thus, when effort is unverifiable, regular
workers are least attractive to the public agency, and lazy and motivated workers
may both be the best choice. When effort is verifiable and Q is sufficiently small,
the public agency attracts motivated workers, and induces them to exert a level of
effort smaller than private firms do, em < e∗m.
When effort is verifiable and Q is sufficiently large, the public agency hires all
motivated workers (as they have the lowest net cost of effort in the public sector)
and nk workers without public service motivation, implying that social welfare (4.18)
can be rewritten as:
Ψ =
X
i
(NiU∗i )− nk [U∗k + θkC(ek)]−Nm [U∗m + θmC(em)− γmV (em)] (4.19)
where k ∈ {r, l}. Note that (4.19) neither contains wm nor wk. The reason is that
19Since the public firm’s output Q is fixed, we can safely ignore the utility from public goods in
the optimisation problem.
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utility is linear in income, and so the distribution of income does not affect social
welfare. Hence, without affecting social welfare, the public agency sets wages such
that the participation constraints IRm and IRk and the revelation constraints ICm
and ICk are all satisfied. Maximising (4.19) with respect to em and ek, subject
to production constraint (4.12), yields the following first-order conditions for the
optimal effort requirements in the contracts:
Nm
ek
[U∗k + θkC(ek)]−Nm [θmC 0(em)− γmV 0(em)] = 0 (4.20)
Q−Nmem
e2k
[U∗k + θkC(ek)− ekθkC 0(ek)] = 0 (4.21)
Using (4.4) and (4.5), it follows that first-order condition (4.21) is zero for ek = e∗k.
Hence, the non-motivated worker type is induced to exert the same level of effort
as in the private sector. This implies that the public agency is indifferent between
hiring lazy and regular workers, as both types need to be paid p per unit of effort.
Substituting this result into first-order condition (4.20), it follows that the effort of
motivated workers is (implicitly) given by (4.6), the level of effort motivated workers
would exert in the private sector if they would derive utility from working there,
em = exm. Hence, a welfare-maximising public agency does not distort the contracts
of its employees.20
The welfare maximising contracts differ from those offered by the cost-minimising
public agency. This implies that, when the public agency maximises social welfare,
social welfare is higher, but also that total cost and, hence, taxes are higher. Apart
from the difference in taxes, lazy and regular workers attain the same level of utility,
U∗i , in both cases. Hence, as taxes are higher, welfare maximisation makes lazy and
regular workers worse off. It follows that only motivated workers benefit from having
a welfare maximising government. When motivated workers constitute a minority
20Because utility is linear in income, the distribution of income does not affect social welfare.
When the social welfare function is extended to allow for distributional concerns, as in e.g. Boyer
and Laffont (2003, Section 6), the public firm may distort contracts. Then, rent extraction from
motivated workers may be considered optimal for distributive reasons. Rent extraction may also
be optimal when taxes are distortionary, as in e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1993). Then, the social
planner trades off the inefficiencies arising from taxation against the inefficiency of distorting the
contracts of the workers in the public sector.
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in society, politicians are likely to act in the interest of lazy and regular workers and
strive for minimum cost of public goods production.
4.7 Concluding remarks
This chapter has shown that, in addition to workers with a public service motivation,
the public sector may prefer to hire the economy’s laziest workers and provide them
with weaker incentives than the market sector does. Even though this reduces
aggregate welfare, a majority of society may be better off, as motivated workers
can be hired at lower wage, and hence public goods are produced at lower cost.
When effort is to a large extent unverifiable in the public sector, the public sector
may hire too many lazy workers as they crowd out motivated workers.
We have restricted Q such that two worker types are sufficient. It is a straightfor-
ward repetition of the analyses to allow for values of Q such that the public agency
needs all three worker types. When the difference in general work ethic θ between
lazy and regular workers is sufficiently large, the contract for lazy workers is not dis-
torted, whereas the public agency distorts the contracts for motivated and regular
workers. Otherwise, the contract for lazy workers will be distorted as well. In the
limit, when Q→∞, the public agency does not distort any contract, as can be seen
from first-order condition (4.14). When the agency needs a great number of non-
motivated workers, the costs of distorting the contract for non-motivated workers
are large compared to the benefits of rent extraction from the motivated workers.
We have abstracted from interactions between the workers. Work morale, how-
ever, may be affected by the behaviour of one’s colleagues. The enthusiasm of
coworkers may be stimulating, whereas shirking colleagues may reduce the incentive
to work (Stowe, 2002). Likewise, motivated workers may consider the wage paid to
lazy workers to be unfair given the difference in effort. Then, attracting lazy wor-
kers may be detrimental to the effort of motivated workers. Further, if the pace of
production depends on the ‘weakest link’, it may not be optimal to hire lazy workers.
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4.A Appendices
4.A.1 Conditions under which hiring two types of workers
is optimal
Unverifiable effort in the public sector
Because the public agency can not induce workers to exert a certain level of
effort, it is necessary to attract a second worker type as soon as Q > Niei, where i is
the worker type the agency prefers to employ when Q is sufficiently low. As argued
in the main text, it might happen that the public agency can not single out its most
preferred type. Then, the public agency always employs two worker types.
Verifiable effort in the public sector
First, consider the case where the participation constraint of motivated workers
IRm binds when the public agency attracts lazy workers, while the revelation con-
straint ICm is non-binding. Marginal cost of effort when hiring a lazy worker is p.
This implies that the public agency hires lazy workers as soon as the marginal cost
of effort of motivated workers exceeds p. Differentiating the participation constraint
(4.7) of motivated workers with respect to em gives:
∂wm
∂em
= θmC 0(em)− γmV 0(em) (4.A1)
Hence, the public agency attracts a second worker type when Q > Nmeξm, where eξm
is defined by:
θmC 0(eξm)− γmV 0(eξm) = p (4.A2)
Note that (4.A2) is identical to (4.6). Hence, eξm = exm, which is the optimal level
of effort motivated workers would exert in the private sector if they would derive
utility from working in the private sector.
Next, consider the case where the revelation constraint of motivated workers
ICm binds when the public agency attracts lazy workers, while the participation
constraint IRm is non-binding. It is obvious that the public agency attracts only
motivated workers when Q ≤ Nmeξm. Now consider higher levels of Q. When the
agency does not attract lazy workers, total cost can be found by substituting the
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production constraint Q = Nmem and the participation constraint (4.7) of motivated
workers into total cost Z1 = Nmwm:
Z1 = Nm
∙
U∗m + θmC(
Q
Nm
)− γmV (
Q
Nm
)
¸
(4.A3)
It is easy to verify that Z1 is a continuous and convex function of Q. When, instead,
the public agency attracts both motivated and lazy workers, total cost discontinu-
ously increase, as the public agency can no longer extract all motivational rents from
the motivated workers. Suppose the public agency would not distort the contracts
of its workers, el = e∗l and em = e
ξ
m (= exm). Then, total cost when the public
agency attracts both lazy and motivated workers, Z2, is a linear function of Q , as
the marginal cost of effort equals p. Hence, Z1 and Z2 intersect at some level of
Q > Nmeξm. Since the public agency optimally distorts contracts when it attracts
both lazy and motivated workers so as to decrease cost, the minimum level of Q at
which it is optimal to attract lazy workers is smaller than the level at which Z1 and
Z2 intersect.
Verifiable effort, social planner
When effort is unverifiable, hiring a second worker type is inevitable when Q >
Niei (where i is the worker type the agency prefers to employ when Q is sufficiently
small) as well as when the agency can not single out its most preferred type. In case
of verifiable effort, the marginal welfare loss of a unit of effort when hiring workers
without public service motivation is p, while it equals −θmC 0(em)+ γmV 0(em) when
hiring motivated workers only. Hence, a welfare-maximising agency hires a second
type of worker when Q > Nmeξm, where eξm is defined by (4.A2).
4.A.2 Proof that ∂Z∂θk < 0
By substituting the production constraint (4.12), IRk, ICm, and (4.5) into total cost
(4.11), we find:
Z = {pe∗k − θk[C(e∗k)− C(ek)]}
µ
Q− emNm
ek
+Nm
¶
+
Nm{θm[C(em)− C(ek)]− γm[V (em)− V (ek)]}
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A marginal increase in θk leads to a decrease in Z:
∂Z
∂θk
= −[C(e∗k)− C(ek)]
µ
Q− emNm
ek
+Nm
¶
< 0
where, by the envelop theorem, all effects through e∗k, ek, and em are zero, and the
sign follows from ek < e∗k (see first-order condition (4.14)).
4.A.3 Cost-minimisation and welfare-maximisation yield
identical results when effort is unverifiable
A cost-minimising public agency attracts the worker type that minimises Z = niwi.
After substituting the production constraint ni = Q/ei and (4.7), we find that:
Z =
Q
ei
[U∗i + θiC(ei)− γiV (ei)]
A welfare-maximising public agency attracts the worker type that maximises (4.18).
After substituting the production constraint ni = Q/ei, we find that:
Ψ =
X
i
(NiU∗i ) +
Q
ei
[−U∗i − θiC(ei) + γiV (ei)]
Obviously, since
P
i(NiU
∗
i ) is exogenously given, minimisation of Z and maximisa-
tion of Ψ result in the same optimal worker type. The only difference lies in the
response to the crowding-out problem. While a welfare-maximising agency sets wm
when wm/em < wl/e¯, a cost-minimising agency only does so when condition (4.8) is
satisfied.
4.A.4 Cost-minimisation and welfare-maximisation yield
identical results when effort is verifiable and Q is small
A welfare-maximising public agency maximises (4.18) with respect to ei, subject to
the production constraint ni = Q/ei. This gives first-order condition:
− [θiC 0(ei)− γiV 0(ei)] +
∙
U∗i + θiC(ei)− γiV (ei)
ei
¸
= 0
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which is, except for opposite signs, identical to first-order condition (4.10) derived
in Section 4.5. Hence, the optimal contract of a welfare-maximising public agency
is identical to that of a cost-minimising public agency.

Chapter 5
Dedicated Doctors:
Public and Private Provision of
Health Care with Altruistic
Physicians
5.1 Introduction
In many countries, physicians have to take a modern version of the Oath of Hip-
pocrates before entering the profession, in which they pledge to act in the interest
of their patients. For instance, the Declaration of Geneva, adopted in 1948 by the
General Assembly of the World Medical Association, contains the phrase “the health
of my patient will be my first consideration”, and the General Medical Council in the
UK instructs doctors to “make the care of your patient your first concern” (General
Medical Council, 2001).
There is ample anecdotal evidence of physicians living up to their oath. In the
wake of extreme events, such as the September 11 attacks and hurricane Katrina,
many physicians work around the clock to provide care.1 Médecins Sans Frontières
is able to find hundreds of health professionals willing to work in remote, undevel-
1Several health professionals describe the events in New Orleans after Katrina in the New
England Journal of Medicine, Volume 353(15); see also CNN (2005).
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oped regions of the world, despite offering little remuneration. In a more routine
setting, over 70 percent of NHS employees in England claim to work more than
their contractual hours, the majority working unpaid overtime. The most com-
monly mentioned reason for working overtime is “to provide the best care I can for
patients” (Healthcare Commission, 2006). This suggests that at least some health
professionals are willing to step beyond the boundaries of their contractual duties to
provide better care. When we accept that physicians may differ in altruism towards
their patients, the question that arises is: which patients benefit from the altruistic
physicians? And relatedly, how is the allocation of these benefits affected by the
system of health care provision?
This chapter develops a model in which patients differ in income and physicians
differ in altruism to analyse how different systems of health care provision affect
the allocation of patients to doctors and, hence, patients’ welfare. We compare
a purely public system of health care provision, where all patients are treated in
a National Health Service, to a mixed system of health care provision, where a
perfectly competitive private health care sector exists parallel to the NHS. We show
that allowing for private provision of health care benefits both rich and poor patients.
We distinguish between altruistic and regular physicians. Only altruistic physi-
cians intrinsically care about patient welfare, but since their number is limited some
patients will be treated by a regular doctor. Under both systems of health care
provision, patients can obtain treatment for free in the NHS, financed through tax-
ation, and physicians working for the NHS have to adhere to a minimum treatment
quality. Patients who, under the mixed system, receive treatment in the private sec-
tor must pay the price of treatment themselves.2 As any patient who is not treated
by an altruistic physician will be treated by a regular physician, each altruistic
physician infers that he can increase patient welfare by providing better treatment
and, if treating patients in the private sector, by asking a lower price than regular
physicians.
In the NHS, regular physicians provide the minimum treatment quality, whereas
altruistic physicians optimally provide better treatment. We assume that in the NHS
2Allowing for private health insurance does not affect the results if only rich patients buy
insurance. Propper (2000) shows that insurance coverage in the UK indeed increases in income.
5.1 Introduction 91
patients are randomly matched to physicians, and patients and physicians cannot
observe each others’ type. Hence, under purely public provision of health care, every
patient has the same probability of receiving treatment from an altruistic physician.
Under mixed provision, physicians decide whether to work for the NHS or set up a
private practice and patients choose whether to obtain treatment in the NHS or buy
treatment in the private sector. Competition ensures that regular physicians in the
private sector must be equally well off as in the NHS. Obviously, free treatment in
the NHS implies that the only way to attract patients to a private practice is to offer
high-quality treatment, and only rich patients are willing to pay for high quality.3
We show that all patients are better off under mixed provision than under purely
public provision, i.e. allowing for private provision of health care benefits both rich
and poor patients. Rich patients are able to buy high-quality treatment in the private
sector. As in Besley and Coate (1991), this leads to lower cost of public provision
and, hence, to lower taxes. Altruistic physicians face the choice between improving
the utility of a patient who otherwise pays for high-quality treatment in the private
sector and providing higher treatment quality to a patient who otherwise receives
low-quality treatment in the NHS. As the marginal benefit of additional treatment
quality is higher for NHS patients than for private sector patients, working in the
NHS is more rewarding for an altruistic physician. Hence, despite the opportunity to
open up a private practice under mixed provision, altruistic physicians choose to stay
in the NHS. This implies that the departure of rich patients benefits the remaining
NHS patients (that is, the poor patients) by increasing their probability of receiving
the superior treatment provided by altruistic physicians. Hence, allowing for private
provision of health care increases the expected treatment quality received by patients
in the NHS.
This mechanism implies that not only allowing but also encouraging people to go
to the private sector may have favourable consequences for NHS patients. Focussing
on redistribution, Cullis and Jones (1985) show that subsidising private treatment
can benefit those who do not make use of the subsidy through lower taxes, as long as
3Apart from the distinction between altruistic and regular pysicians, our setup is close to Besley
and Coate (1991), who study the redistributional effects of public provision of private goods.
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the cost of the subsidy are smaller than the decrease in total cost of public provision.4
In our framework, there is an additional beneficial effect of subsiding treatment in
the private sector from the point of view of patients in the NHS. As the subsidy
increases the number of patients who opt for treatment in the private sector, the
remaining patients in the NHS have a higher probability of receiving the high-quality
treatment provided by altruistic physicians.
Lastly, we analyse the effect of allowing physicians to ‘moonlight’, i.e. to ope-
rate in both the NHS and the private sector simultaneously. This gives physicians
the possibility to transfer patients from the NHS to their private practice. Barros
and Olivella (2005) and González (2005) analyse physicians’ incentive to transfer the
most profitable patients (‘cream-skimming’). Ma (2004) and Biglaiser andMa (2006)
argue that moonlighting increases efficiency, as it allows for bargaining between
regular doctors and their NHS patients to arrive at better treatment in a private
practice.5 In our framework, allowing for moonlighting is beneficial for some patients,
but harmful for the poorest patients. Moonlighting makes it less ‘risky’ to opt for
treatment in the NHS, as patients need not fear receiving the minimum treatment
quality. Hence, more relatively rich patients choose (initially) to go to the NHS in
the hope of being treated by an altruistic physician, which reduces for each NHS
patient the probability of receiving treatment from an altruistic physician.
The next section discusses some related literature. Section 5.3 describes the
model, and Section 5.4 compares purely public provision to mixed provision of health
care. In Section 5.4, we also discusses the scope for subsidising private health care,
and analyse the effects of moonlighting. Section 5.5 concludes.
4Relatedly, Hoel and Sæther (2003) argue that a waiting list for treatment in the public sector
can be beneficial to the poor despite the cost of waiting, as it drives rich people to the private
sector.
5Brekke and Sørgard (2006) argue that if doctors have market power, so that they can increase
the profits from their private practice by reducing their labour supply, then allowing doctors to
work in the private sector alongside a salaried job in the NHS may lead to a reduction in total
health care capacity.
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5.2 Related literature
The assumption that some health care professionals are altruistic is not uncommon
in the literature. Altruistic physicians have featured in several studies of the agency
relation between physicians, patients, and/or purchasers of health care.6 In Chalkley
andMalcomson (1998), doctors care about treatment quality and can reduce the cost
of treatment by exerting effort. Building on Ellis and McGuire (1986), they derive
the optimal mix of prospective payment and cost-reimbursement when both effort
and quality are unobservable to the purchaser. Jack (2005) generalises the results
of Chalkley and Malcomson (1998) by deriving the optimal reimbursement scheme
when physicians differ in altruism, see also Choné and Ma (2006).7 Ma (2004) and
Biglaiser and Ma (2006) assume that a group of dedicated doctors always provides
high-quality treatment in the public sector and analyse the effects of allowing regular
doctors to be employed in the public and the private sector simultaneously. In
contrast to these papers, the current chapter assumes that quality of treatment is
verifiable and so does not look at optimal incentive schemes. Instead, we analyse
how the system of health care provision affects which patients receive treatment
from altruistic physicians.
As to the source of physicians’ altruism, Arrow (1963) and Evans (1984) argue
that physicians’ concern for patient welfare has developed to reduce the adverse
effects arising from the information asymmetry between patients and physicians.
One aim of the extensive training of physicians is to install a sense of moral obligation
towards patients into their beliefs and norms, so that they abstain from abusing
their superior knowledge. These ethical considerations can be linked to the identity
approach of Akerlof and Kranton (2000), where people prefer to behave like people
in ‘their’ social class are supposed to behave. Applied to physicians, this would
imply that physicians act in the interest of patients so as to comply with the ideal
6For a discussion of the interdependence of physicians’ and patients’ utility, see Mooney and
Ryan (1993). McGuire (2000) surveys the physician agency literature.
7Heyes (2005) argues that if nurses differ in their intrinsic motivation to provide care, paying
higher wages may attract less motivated personnel. For similar arguments in a more general
context, see Dixit (2002). Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Francois (2000) argue that organisations’
ability to attract workers who value working for the organisation reduces the need for providing
monetary incentives.
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of a good physician.
Our setup is close to the literature on the redistributive aspects of public provision
of private goods. In Besley and Coate (1991), the poor obtain a free but low-quality
good in the public sector, whereas the rich prefer to buy a high-quality good in
the private sector. Even when public provision is financed by a head tax, this has
redistributional consequences, as the taxes paid by the rich help to pay for the
provision of the good to the poor. This mechanism also operates in an optimal
taxation framework, see e.g. Blomquist and Christiansen (1995) and Boadway and
Marchand (1995). Epple and Romano (1996a,b) and Gouveia (1997) show in a
median voter setting that there is always a majority favouring a mixed system of
public and private provision over a system of either solely public or solely private
provision.8 Our contribution lies in the addition of differences in providers’ concern
for customer welfare, which turn out to strengthen the case for mixed provision.
Moreover, we show that it increases the scope for subsidising private provision.
5.3 The model
There is a population of patients of size P .9 Patients differ only in income Y ∈
[YL, YH ]. Income is continuously distributed according to density function f(Y )
with cumulative distribution function F (Y ). Each patient needs treatment from
a physician; physicians cannot observe a patient’s income. Patients’ utility u(y, q)
depends on the quality of their treatment q and on the consumption of a composite
good y. For simplicity, we assume that utility is separable in income and treatment
quality:
u(y, q) = U(y) + V (q) (5.1)
Utility is increasing and concave in both elements: Uy > 0, Uyy < 0, Vq > 0, Vqq < 0.
We distinguish between two systems of health care provision. In the purely public
8Jofre-Bonet (2000) models strategic interaction between public and private providers of health
care, and concludes that mixed provision outperforms both purely private and purely public pro-
vision.
9We assume that there are no healthy people. None of the results is affected if each person
needs treatment with a given probability.
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system, treatment is provided within a National Health Service only. In the mixed
system of health care provision, there is private provision of health care parallel to
the NHS. Under both systems, treatment in the NHS can be obtained free of charge.
The NHS runs a balanced budget, and the cost of public provision of health care
are financed by a proportional income tax τ . We assume that treatment quality is
verifiable. Physicians working in the NHS are obliged to provide at least treatment
quality q¯ and receive a salary from the NHS. Under the mixed system, patients and
physicians choose between the NHS and the perfectly competitive private sector. In
the private sector, physicians offer one or more bundles of treatment quality and
price and patients must pay the price of treatment themselves.10
There are two types of physicians: regular and altruistic physicians. Each physi-
cian treats at most one patient. In total, there are sufficient physicians to treat all
patients, but there is a limited number N < P of altruistic physicians. For conve-
nience, we normalise the utility of both physician types from working outside health
care to zero.
Regular doctors have standard preferences:
ZR = w − c(q)
where w is the financial reward a doctor obtains for treating a patient, and c(q)
denotes the effort cost of providing treatment of quality q, with derivatives cq >
0 and cqq ≥ 0. Thus, providing higher treatment quality becomes increasingly
more costly.11 As there are sufficient doctors, the participation constraint of regular
doctors must bind. This implies that for providing treatment of quality q, regular
doctors must receive compensation w = c(q).
The preferences of altruistic doctors are similar to the preferences of regular doc-
tors, except that an altruistic doctor to some extent cares about patients’ utility.
More specifically, an altruistic doctor values increasing the utility of a patient above
10Allowing for private health insurance, such that the cost of treatment in the private sector
is zero at the point of consumption, does not affect the results, as long as only rich patients buy
insurance. Propper (2000) shows that the likelihood of taking private insurance in the UK indeed
increases in income.
11Observe that doctors’ utility is assumed to be linear in income, whereas patients’ utility is
concave in income. This is solely for simplicity, and does not affect any of the results qualitatively.
96 Dedicated Doctors
the level of utility this patient would have obtained elsewhere. Equivalently, altruis-
tic doctors may care about total patient welfare, which increases when an altruistic
doctor provides his patient with greater utility than this patient would have received
had she not been treated by this doctor.12 This is captured by the utility function
of altruistic doctors:
ZA = w − c(q) + γ[u(y, q)− uo] (5.2)
where γ is the weight of altruism in the utility function and uo is the ‘outside option’
of the patient. Clearly, patients will not accept lower utility from treatment by an
altruistic doctor than uo. Hence, the last term in the utility function of altruistic
doctors is nonnegative. Altruistic doctors can increase the utility of their patient by
providing higher treatment quality than this patient would otherwise receive, and,
if working in the private sector, by asking a lower price for treatment.13 Notice
that altruistic physicians care about the absolute increase in utility, irrespective of
whether the patient is rich or poor. Allowing altruistic physicians to place greater
weight on the utility of poor patients than on the utility of rich patients strengthens
the results.
Whereas physicians working in the NHS receive a salary, physicians in the private
sector are free to choose the price of their treatment. We impose one reasonable
restriction on physicians’ choices:
Assumption 1: w ≥ 0.
Assumption 1 precludes situations where physicians are so altruistic that when
they work in the private sector, they charge negative prices. In reality, physicians
may be tempted to, on top of free treatment, slip some money to very needy patients.
This, however, must be the exception rather than the rule, as one cannot live on
altruistic utility alone.14
We assume that the process of matching patients and physicians is instantaneous
12This implies that the altruistic physicians inhabit pure altruism, as in Francois (2000). Instead,
in Glazer (2004) and Besley and Ghatak (2005) agents are impurely altruistic, which implies that
they care about their personal contribution to output (‘warm-glow’).
13Given that patients’ utility is concave in income, altruistic doctors would prefer spreading
money over all (poor) patients rather than granting one patient a large reduction in the price of
treatment. We assume that physicians do not engage in redistribution.
14An equivalent assumption is made in Ma (2004) and Choné and Ma (2006).
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and costless, and we abstract from coordination problems such that each patient is
matched to one physician. In the NHS, patients are assigned randomly to physicians,
and do not observe the type of their physician before treatment. We assume that
if an altruistic physician wants to work in the NHS, he is always matched to a
patient. In the private sector, patients are assigned to their most preferred type of
physician with probabilities depending upon supply and demand for this physician
type. For instance, if all altruistic physicians work in the private sector andM > N
patients want to be treated by an altruistic physician, then each of the M patients
has probability N/M to be matched to an altruistic physician and the remainder is
treated by a regular physician in the private sector.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Purely public provision
Suppose that the NHS is the only provider of health care. The NHS enforces the (ex-
ogenously given) minimum treatment quality q¯, and because there are not sufficient
altruistic physicians to treat all patients, the NHS must employ regular physicians.
To attract regular physicians, the NHS must offer a wage w = c(q¯). Since regular
physicians have no incentive to provide better quality than q¯, patients with income
Yi treated by a regular physician in the NHS obtain utility u[(1 − τ p)Yi, q¯]. Each
altruistic physician infers that if he does not treat a patient, one more patient will
be treated by a regular physician. Hence, patients’ outside option uo is the utility
a patient obtains from treatment by a regular physician. From (5.2), it follows
that altruistic doctors who provide treatment quality q¯ are also willing to work in
the NHS for salary w = c(q¯). However, since altruistic physicians care about pa-
tients’ utility, they may choose to deviate from the treatment offered by regular
physicians. Altruistic physicians cannot affect the price of treatment for the pa-
tient (which equals zero in the NHS), but may optimally decide to provide better
treatment quality.15 Note that if an altruistic doctor is willing to provide better
15Allowing for a monetary transfer from a physician to his NHS patient does not affect the
results.
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quality, he is also willing to accept a lower wage than regular doctors. In theory, the
NHS could extract the rents of altruistic doctors by offering a wage scheme which is
decreasing in treatment quality. This seems unrealistic and difficult to enforce, and
hence we will assume that the NHS sticks to one wage for all doctors: w = c(q¯).
Total cost of purely public provision of health care thus equals c(q¯)P , yielding tax
rate τ p = c(q¯)/
R YH
YL
Y f(Y )dY .
Substituting for w and uo in the utility function of altruistic physicians (5.2) and
taking account of the random matching of patients and physicians gives:
ZA = c(q¯)− c(q) + γ
Z YH
YL
{u[(1− τ p)Y, q]− u[(1− τ p)Y, q¯]}f(Y )dY (5.3)
An altruistic physician maximises utility with respect to q, subject to q ≥ q¯. Using
(5.1), let qA be the resulting optimal level of treatment quality, as given by first-order
condition:
−cq(qA) + γVq(qA) = 0 (5.4)
Note that qA does not depend on the (expected) income of the patient. Using the
treatment quality provided by regular physicians q¯, it follows from (5.4) that altru-
istic physicians provide higher treatment quality than their less altruistic colleagues
if:
γVq(q¯) > cq(q¯) (5.5)
Otherwise, altruistic physicians offer the same treatment as regular physicians.
Hence, if altruistic physicians are sufficiently altruistic, i.e. if γ is sufficiently high,
then they provide higher treatment quality than regular physicians, thereby increas-
ing both the utility of their patient and their own utility. Throughout the chapter,
we will assume that condition (5.5) is satisfied.
5.4.2 Mixed provision
Now suppose that a perfectly competitive private sector of health care provision
exists parallel to the NHS. Each physician chooses whether to work for the NHS
or in the private sector, and each patient decides whether to obtain treatment in
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the NHS or in a private practice. We focus on an equilibrium where some patients
are being treated in the private sector and others in the NHS. We will show that
in equilibrium, all altruistic physicians work in the NHS, relatively poor patients
receive treatment in the NHS, and rich patients buy treatment in the private sector.
Since there are sufficient physicians, competition between regular physicians en-
sures that they are indifferent between working in the NHS and working in the pri-
vate sector. In the previous subsection, we have seen that regular physicians provide
treatment quality q¯ in the NHS and receive wage w = c(q¯). This implies that regular
physicians in a private practice are willing to provide quality q at price w = c(q).
Hence, a patient with income Yi treated by a regular physician in the private sector
maximises utility (5.1), subject to the budget constraint y + c(q) = (1 − τm)Yi,
where τm is the tax rate needed to cover the cost of public provision of health care.
Optimal treatment quality q∗i is implicitly given by first-order condition:
−cq(q∗i )Uy[(1− τm)Yi − c(q∗i )] + Vq(q∗i ) = 0 (5.6)
This yields utility u[(1− τm)Yi− c(q∗i ), q∗i ]. Concavity of U(·) and V (·) ensures that
both treatment quality q∗i and consumption of the composite good are increasing in
income. Obviously, the availability of free treatment quality q¯ in the NHS implies
that patients are only willing to pay for treatment in the private sector if the treat-
ment quality they receive is sufficiently greater than q¯. This immediately implies
that the price regular physicians receive for treating a patient in the private sector
is higher than the wage a regular physician earns when working in the NHS. The
benefits of these higher earnings, however, are fully offset by the cost of providing
higher treatment quality.
In the previous subsection we have seen that the optimal treatment quality pro-
vided by altruistic physicians in the NHS is independent of the (expected) income
of patients in the public sector. Hence, given that condition (5.5) is fulfilled, altru-
istic physicians who operate in the NHS optimally provide treatment quality qA, as
implicitly defined by (5.4).
The following lemma describes patients’ choice between treatment in the NHS
and treatment in the private sector.
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Lemma 1 Consider any combination of treatment bundles offered in the private
sector for which some patients choose treatment in the NHS and other patients choose
treatment in the private sector. There is one level of income at which patients are
indifferent between the NHS and the private sector. Let YM denote this endogenously
determined level of income. Patients with income Yi > YM buy treatment in the
private sector, whereas patients with income Yi < YM receive treatment in the NHS.
Proof. Suppose that patients in the NHS have probability α to be matched to an
altruistic physician. For a patient with income Yi, expected utility from treatment
in the NHS then equals:
Eunhs = αu[(1− τm)Yi, qA] + (1− α)u[(1− τm)Yi, q¯] (5.7)
Consider a bundle of treatment quality q0 and cost w0 offered by one or more altruistic
physicians in the private sector. Suppose that patients who apply for treatment by
an altruistic physician in the private sector who offers this treatment bundle have
probability β to be matched to an altruistic physician. Then, the expected utility
of a patient with income Yi from applying for treatment by an altruistic physician
in the private sector equals:16
Eupriv = βu[(1− τm)Yi − w0, q0] + (1− β)u[(1− τm)Yi − c(q∗i ), q∗i ] (5.8)
Differentiating (5.7) and (5.8) with respect to Yi gives, using (5.1):
∂Eunhs
∂Yi
= (1− τm)Uy[(1− τm)Yi]
∂Eupriv
∂Yi
= (1− τm){βUy[(1− τm)Yi − w0] + (1− β)Uy[(1− τm)Yi − c(q∗i )]}
where the effects through a change in q∗i are zero by the envelop theorem. Using
assumption 1 and Uyy < 0, it follows that for any α, β, and bundle of treatment
16The choice of a single patient between the NHS and private health care affects the cost of
public provision and, hence, the tax rate τm. However, in a sufficiently large population this effect
is small, and for notational convenience we assume throughout the paper that individual patients
neglect this tax effect in deciding whether to opt for treatment in the NHS or in the private sector.
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Figure 5.1: Patients’ utility
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quality q0 and cost w0, we have for any given level of Yi that
∂Eunhs
∂Yi
<
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Hence, for any treatment bundle offered by altruistic physicians in the private sector,
expected utility from private treatment increases more strongly with income than
expected utility from treatment in the NHS.18 It follows that if there is any treatment
bundle offered by altruistic physicians in the private sector that makes that a patient
with income Yi prefers treatment in the private sector over treatment in the NHS,
then all patients with higher income also prefer treatment in the private sector.
Similarly, if given all treatment bundles offered, a patient with income Yi prefers
treatment in the NHS, then all patients with lower income also prefer the NHS over
the private sector. It follows that given all treatment bundles offered in the private
sector, there can be only one patient type indifferent between treatment in the NHS
and treatment in the private sector.
17Note that is it not possible that β = 1 and w0 = 0 simultaneously, since offering costless
treatment in the private sector that is attractive to any patient attracts all patients who prefer
treatment in the NHS over treatment by a regular physician in the private sector. This either
violates β = 1 or the restriction that some patients must prefer treatment in the NHS.
18Note that this argument also holds when altruistic physicians offer the same treatment bundles
as regular physicians or, equivalently, if no altruistic physician works in the private sector.
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The intuition behind Lemma 1 is given with the help of Figure 5.1, which depicts
patients’ utility from treatment in the NHS and treatment the private sector when all
altruistic physicians work in the NHS. In the NHS, patients receive either treatment
quality qA or q¯, and, hence, the expected utility from treatment in the NHS lies
in between the two relatively flat curves. Since patients have to pay for treatment
by a regular physician in the private sector and Uyy < 0, utility from private sector
treatment increases more strongly with income than utility from NHS treatment. By
definition, at income level YM the expected utility from treatment in the NHS equals
the utility from treatment by a regular physician in the private sector. Patients with
income above YM choose to buy treatment in the private sector, whereas patients
with income smaller than YM receive treatment in the public sector. This yields
yields tax rate τm = F (YM)c(q¯)/
R YH
YL
Y f(Y )dY .
Now consider any treatment bundle offered by an altruistic physician in the
private sector. By Uyy < 0 and assumption 1, the slope of a curve depicting the
utility derived from this treatment bundle cannot be flatter than the slopes of the
curves describing the utility from treatment in the NHS. Hence, treatment bundles
offered by altruistic physicians in the private sector can shift YM to the left, but
cannot solely attract the poorest patients.
Lemma 1 implies that in equilibrium the poorest patients are treated in the NHS
whereas the richest patients buy treatment in the private sector. Hence, altruistic
physicians know that if they decide to work in a private practice, they will treat a
relatively rich patient, whereas if they work for the NHS, they get to treat a relatively
poor patient. The following Proposition gives the equilibrium allocation of patients
and altruistic physicians.
Proposition 1 In an equilibrium where some patients choose treatment in the NHS
and other patients choose treatment in the private sector, all altruistic physicians
work in the NHS. The allocation of patients is as described by Lemma 1, with YM
implicitly determined by:
N
F (YM)P
u[(1−τm)YM , qA]+
µ
1− N
F (YM)P
¶
u[(1−τm)YM , q¯] = u[(1−τm)YM−c(q∗M), q∗M ]
(5.9)
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This equilibrium exists if YL < YM < YH, which is satisfied when:
u[(1− τm)YL, q¯] > u[(1− τm)YL − c(q∗L), q∗L]
and
N
P
u[(1− τm)YH , qA] +
µ
1− N
P
¶
u[(1− τm)YH , q¯] < u[(1− τm)YH − c(q∗H), q∗H ]
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward. By working for the NHS,
an altruistic physician can increase the utility of a relatively poor patient who other-
wise receives treatment quality q¯ from a regular physician. Alternatively, he can in-
crease the utility of a relatively rich patient in the private sector, by providing better
quality at a lower price than the patient otherwise buys from a regular physician.
Since the treatment quality provided by regular physicians in the private sector must
be higher than q¯, the marginal benefit of an increase in treatment quality is higher
for NHS patients than for private sector patients. Hence, for altruistic physicians,
providing better treatment quality than regular physicians is more rewarding when
treating a patient in the NHS. Although altruistic physicians can further increase the
utility of patients in the private sector by offering a lower price for treatment than
regular physicians, this additional instrument is not effective enough to outweigh
the higher utility gain patients in the NHS obtain from the increase in treatment
quality.19
For patients, the equilibrium is captured in Figure 5.1. The presence of altruistic
physicians in the NHS makes treatment in the NHS attractive. However, treatment
quality is uncertain in the NHS (either qA or q¯), whereas a patient buys a certain
treatment quality in the private sector, as given by (5.6). Sufficiently rich patients
prefer to buy even higher treatment quality in the private sector than altruistic
physicians provide for free in the NHS. Somewhat poorer patients prefer treatment
by an altruistic physician in the NHS over treatment in the private sector, but
19It immediately follows that if the private sector patients have bought private insurance, such
that their cost of treatment is zero at the point of consumption, altruistic physicians are even more
inclined to treat NHS patients. Hence, allowing for private insurance does not affect the results.
104 Dedicated Doctors
choose to buy treatment in the private sector so as to avoid the possibility of being
treated by a regular physician in the NHS. Still poorer patients also prefer treatment
by a regular physician in the private sector over treatment by a regular physician
in the NHS, but the difference in utility is small enough so that the presence of
altruistic physicians in the NHS makes it worthwhile to run the risk of ending up
with treatment quality q¯. The poorest fraction of patients simply prefers either
treatment in the NHS over treatment by a regular physician in the private sector.
5.4.3 Comparing purely public and mixed provision
The following Proposition compares a purely public system of health care provision
with a mixed system of health care provision, from the point of view of the patients.
Proposition 2 Allowing for private provision of health care benefits all patients.
Proof. Under purely public provision, all patients have probability N/P to receive
treatment quality qA and otherwise receive quality q¯. Hence, the expected utility of
a patient with income Yi under public provision is:
Eu(y, q) =
N
P
u[(1− τ p)Yi, qA] +
µ
1− N
P
¶
u[(1− τ p)Yi, q¯] (5.10)
Proposition 1 has shown that under a mixed system of health care provision, i.e.
when private provision of health care is allowed for, relatively rich patients buy
treatment in the private sector, even though all altruistic physicians work in the
NHS. This immediately implies that these patients are better off under the mixed
system than under the purely public system, as otherwise they would not leave the
NHS. Under mixed provision, patients in the NHS have probability N/F (YM)P to
be treated by an altruistic physician, implying that for a patient with income Yi the
expected utility from treatment in the NHS is given by:
Eunhs(y, q) =
N
F (YM)P
u[(1− τm)Yi, qA] +
µ
1− N
F (YM)P
¶
u[(1− τm)Yi, q¯] (5.11)
As τ p > τm and 0 < F (YM) < 1, it follows that the expected utility of treatment in
the NHS is higher under mixed provision than under purely public provision.
5.4 Results 105
Intuitively, rich patients benefit from private provision of health care, as they are
able to secure high-quality treatment in the private sector. The withdrawal of the
rich patients from the NHS benefits the remaining NHS patients in two ways. First,
the tax rate decreases, as less patients make use of the public service. Second, since
all altruistic physicians optimally decide to work in the NHS, the probability to be
matched to an altruistic physician in the NHS increases. Hence, on average, NHS
patients receive higher treatment quality under mixed provision than under public
provision.20
5.4.4 Subsidising private health care
Proposition 2 has shown that allowing for private provision of health care alongside
public provision benefits relatively poor patients by attracting the rich patients to
the private sector. In other words, in expected terms a patient in the NHS gains
from a reduction in the number of her fellow NHS patients. This suggests a role for
subsidising private health care.
Suppose that every patient treated in the private sector receives a, possibly
negative, subsidy s, with the restriction that s should not be larger than the cost of
treatment. The total cost of health care provision then equals {F (YM)c(q¯) + [1 −
F (YM)]s}P , yielding tax rate:
τ s = {F (YM)c(q¯) + [1− F (YM)]s}/
Z YH
YL
Y f(Y )dY
It is easily verified that, analogous to Proposition 2, all patients prefer mixed pro-
vision with any s ≤ c(q¯) at which some patients seek treatment in the private
sector over a purely public system (or, equivalently, a prohibitive tax on private
treatment). Clearly, the patients opting for private care are better off by revealed
preference. When s < c(q¯), all patients benefit from a reduced tax burden, as each
patient treated in the private sector reduces the cost of health care provision by
20If altruistic physicians place greater weight on the utility of relatively poor patients than on
the utility of richer patients, poor patients benefit even more from private provision. As altruistic
physicians infer that on average they treat a poorer patient under mixed provision than under
public provision, they optimally provide even better treatment quality under mixed provision.
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c(q¯) − s. When s = c(q¯), mixed provision is essentially a voucher system, where
every patient receives a voucher which can be used to obtain treatment quality q¯ in
both the NHS and the private sector. The cost of this voucher system are identical
to the cost of a purely public system. However, the presence of altruistic physicians
in the NHS implies that the remaining patients in the NHS also strictly prefer the
voucher system, as the withdrawal of the relatively rich patients from the pool of
NHS patients increases their probability of being treated by an altruistic physician.
Let us now consider the effect of an increase in subsidy s. Given a subsidy s,
the expected utility of a patient with income Yi who opts for treatment in the NHS
is given by (5.11) with τm replaced by τ s. When treated in the private sector, this
patient’s utility equals
upriv(y, q) = U [(1− τ s)Yi − c(q∗i ) + s] + V (q∗i )
where q∗i is defined by the first-order condition for optimal treatment quality in the
private sector (5.6) with (1 − τm)Yi = (1 − τ s)Yi + s. Recall that by definition,
YM is the endogenously determined level of income at which a patient is indifferent
between treatment in the NHS and treatment in the private sector.
The effect of a marginal increase in s on the total cost of health care provision
and, hence, on the tax rate is ambiguous:
∂τ s
∂s
=
[c(q¯)− s]f(YM)
∂YM
∂s
+ [1− F (YM)]R YH
YL
Y f(Y )dY
(5.12)
The first term in the numerator gives the net savings from the reduction in the
number of patients treated in the NHS, and the second term gives the increase in
infra-marginal subsidies paid to the private sector patients. Using (5.1), we find that
a marginal increase in s affects the utility from treatment in the NHS (5.11) through
the tax rate and through a change in the probability of treatment by an altruistic
physician:
∂Eunhs(y, q)
∂s
= −Yi
∂τ s
∂s
Uy[(1− τ s)Yi]−
Nf(YM)
PF (YM)2
∂YM
∂s
{V (qA)− V (q¯)} (5.13)
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The utility from private treatment is affected directly by the change in the subsidy
and indirectly through the change in the tax rate (the effect through q∗i is zero by
the envelop theorem):
∂upriv(y, q)
∂s
=
µ
1− Yi
∂τ s
∂s
¶
Uy[(1− τ s)Yi − c(q∗i ) + s] (5.14)
It follows that an increase in s reduces the number of patients treated in the
NHS. If YM would not change, the second term of (5.13) would vanish. However,
since (1− YM [∂τ s/∂s]) > 0 and Uy[(1− τ s)Yi − c(q∗i ) + s] ≥ Uy[(1 − τ s)Yi] > 0 for
all patients, that would imply that treatment in the private sector becomes more
attractive to patients with income YM relative to treatment in the NHS.21 Hence,
the patients who were indifferent at the original level of s now prefer treatment in
the private sector, implying that YM must decrease: ∂YM/∂s < 0.
If the effect of the reduction of the number of NHS patients in (5.12) outweighs
the effect of the increase in infra-marginal subsidies, then a higher subsidy leads to
lower cost of health care provision and, hence, lower taxes, ∂τ s/∂s < 0. This implies
that everyone benefits from a higher subsidy, as can be seen from (5.13) and (5.14).
The increase in s reduces the (public) cost of health care provision and increases the
(expected) treatment quality for all patients.
Now suppose that the increase in s increases total health care cost. From (5.14), it
follows that private sector patients generally benefit from the higher subsidy.22 NHS
patients are hurt by the increase in the tax. However, (5.13) shows that they may
still benefit from the higher subsidy, since the probability of receiving treatment from
an altruistic physician increases. Hence, for NHS patients, the presence of altruistic
physicians makes subsidising treatment in the private sector more appealing.
The discussion in this subsection is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The presence of altruistic physicians increases the benefits of subsi-
dising private provision of health care.
21That (1− YM [∂τ s/∂s]) > 0 when ∂YM/∂s = 0 follows from (5.12). For any YM < YH it holds
that
R YH
YM
Y f(Y )dY > [1− F (YM )]YM .
22If the income distribution is sufficiently skewed, then it is possible that the increase in taxes
paid by patients with top incomes outweigh the increase in subsidy received.
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5.4.5 Moonlighting
We have assumed that under the mixed system, physicians either work for the NHS
or work in a private practice. In this subsection, we study the effects of allowing for
‘moonlighting’, i.e. allowing physicians to operate a private practice alongside their
NHS job. This enables physicians to transfer their NHS patients to their private
practice, if this is mutually beneficial.23 For a monopolistic doctor in the private
sector, this gives an incentive to select highly profitable patients for treatment in the
private sector (Barros and Olivella, 2005, González, 2005). Ma (2004) and Biglaiser
and Ma (2006) show that moonlighting can increase efficiency by enabling a patient
and a physician to share the surplus arising from a transfer to the private sector, in
a model where the number of patients who enter the NHS is fixed.
In our framework, allowing for moonlighting benefits some patients, but has
adverse effects on the poorest patients by increasing the number of patients who
(at least initially) opt for treatment in the NHS. As shown in Figure 5.1, when
moonlighting is not allowed relatively poor private sector patients would obtain
higher utility from treatment by an altruistic physician in the NHS than from their
treatment in the private sector. They refrain from treatment in the NHS because
they fear receiving the low-quality treatment provided by regular physicians in the
NHS. Similarly, for some relatively rich NHS patients, the utility of treatment by a
regular physician in the private sector exceeds the utility of treatment by a regular
physician in the NHS.
Figure 5.2 extents Figure 5.1 to show the effects of moonlighting. Allowing
for moonlighting implies that patients matched to a regular physician in the NHS
can choose between receiving quality q¯ for free and buying their optimal treatment
quality in the private sector, as given by (5.6). Hence, as depicted in Figure 5.2, all
patients with income Yi > Y¯ are willing to be transferred to the private sector after
being matched to a regular physician in the NHS, where Y¯ is implicitly defined by:
u[(1− τm)Y¯ , q¯] = u[(1− τm)Y¯ − c(q¯∗), q¯∗]
23In our setup, this is identical to assuming that patients in the NHS observe their physician’s
type before treatment and are able to subsequently withdraw from the NHS and enter the private
sector.
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Figure 5.2: The effect of moonlighting on patients’ utility
  
 
'
nhsEu  
 
 
 
nhsEu  
 
 
u
        Y        MY          
'
MY    Y  
However, since the relatively poor private sector patients need not fear receiving
treatment quality q¯ anymore, more patients will apply for treatment in the NHS,
in the hope of receiving treatment from an altruistic physician. In fact, all patients
who obtain higher utility from treatment by an altruistic physician in the NHS than
from treatment a regular physician in the private sector have an incentive to go to
the NHS. This implies that the income at which patients are indifferent between
applying for treatment in the NHS and in the private sector increases from YM to
Y 0M , where Y 0M is implicitly defined by:
u[(1− τm)Y 0M , qA] = u[(1− τm)Y 0M − c(q0∗M), q0∗M ]
As regards patients’ utility, Figure 5.2 shows that allowing for moonlighting
implies that the expected utility from opting for treatment in the NHS shifts from
Eunhs to Eu0nhs.
24 Clearly, relatively rich NHS patients as well as private sector
24Here, we abstract from changes in the tax rate. The effect of allowing for moonlighting on the
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patients with income up to Y 0M benefit from moonlighting. However, moonlighting
harms the poorest patients. They do not gain (enough) from the opportunity to buy
higher quality treatment when matched to a regular physician, and because more
patients opt for treatment in the NHS, they have a lower probability of receiving
the high-quality treatment provided by altruistic physicians.
The following proposition summarises the arguments made in this subsection.
Proposition 4 Allowing physicians to transfer NHS patients to their private prac-
tice is beneficial for patients with middle/high income, but harms the poorest patients.
5.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter has shown that when physicians are allowed to start up a private
practice, physicians who intrinsically care about the patients’ well-being prefer to
work in the public sector. This implies that in expected terms, even poor patients
obtain higher treatment quality after allowing for private provision of health care.
Under mixed provision, rich patients are able to buy high-quality treatment in the
private sector. The withdrawal of the rich from the NHS implies that the remaining,
relatively poor NHS patients have higher probability to be treated by one of the
altruistic physicians. Along the same lines, we have argued that subsiding private
provision of health care can benefit NHS patients, by further increasing the number of
patients who leave for the private sector. Conversely, allowing physicians to transfer
patients from the NHS to a private practice harms the poorest patients, through an
increase in the number of patients who enter the NHS.
We have assumed that physicians treat the same number of patients in the NHS
as in the private sector. Concavity of patients’ utility function implies that altruistic
physicians would prefer to improve the treatment of many patients a little over
greatly improving the treatment of a few. If altruistic physicians could treat more
patients in a private practice than in the NHS, they may be tempted to work in
the private sector. On the one hand, a private practice may offer more flexibility
total cost of health care provision is ambiguous. Without moonlighting, the cost are c(q¯)F (YM )P .
With moonlighting the cost are uncertain, as it depends on the matching of physicians and patients.
Expected cost are equal to c(q¯){F (Y¯ )P + [1− F (Y¯ )/F (Y 0M )]N}.
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to increase working hours, but on the other hand individual patients in the private
sector may demand more attention from their physician. Moreover, the NHS may
guarantee a steady inflow of patients. And even if altruistic physicians can treat
more patients in a private practice, this has to make up for a less favourable patient
base, as a private practice attracts richer patients than the NHS.
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5.A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that all altruistic physicians work in the
NHS. Given that condition (5.5) is satisfied, altruistic physicians optimally provide
treatment quality qA as implicitly defined by (5.4). Each NHS patient has probability
N/F (YM)P to receive treatment quality qA. Otherwise, NHS patients receive quality
q¯. Private sector patients with income Yi optimally buy treatment quality q∗i from
regular physicians, as implicitly defined by (5.6). Hence, the level of income at
which patients are indifferent between NHS and private treatment, YM , is implicitly
determined by the equality in the proposition. Lemma 1 implies that patients with
income Yi < YM opt for treatment in the NHS and patients with income Yi > YM
prefer treatment in the private sector.
Patients are being treated in both the NHS and the private sector if YL < YM <
YH . The first inequality in the Proposition states that the poorest patient must
prefer treatment in the NHS over treatment in the private sector even when N = 0.
Similarly, the second inequality in the Proposition states that patients with income
YH must prefer treatment in the private sector if all other patients are treated in the
NHS.
Lastly, we have to proof that given this allocation of patients, altruistic physicians
prefer to work in the NHS. Consider an individual altruistic physician choosing
between the NHS and the private sector. Substituting optimal treatment quality qA
into (5.3) and using (5.1) gives the utility of an altruistic physician from working in
the NHS:
ZA = c(q¯)− c(qA) + γ[V (qA)− V (q¯)] (5.A1)
Alternatively, the altruistic physician can work in the private sector. When he
offers a bundle of treatment quality q0 and cost w0, all private sector patients for
whom it holds that this treatment bundle yields higher utility than treatment by a
regular physician, u[(1 − τm)Yi − w0, q0] > u[(1 − τm)Yi − c(q∗i ), q∗i ], will apply for
treatment by the altruistic physician.25 Here, we derive that even if the altruistic
25As all private sector patients not treated by an altruistic physician will be treated by a regular
physician, they optimally apply for treatment by an altruistic physician when this gives higher
utility than treatment by a regular physician, even if the probability to be matched to an altruistic
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physician could provide his private sector patient with the optimal treatment bundle
for this patient type, the altruistic physician prefers to treat a NHS patient rather
than any patient in the private sector. Obviously, offering one or more treatment
bundles which are optimal for certain patient types also attract other patient types,
and to discourage some patients types from applying the altruistic physician may
optimally distort treatment bundles. As this implies that treating a patient in the
private sector brings about even lower expected utility for the altruistic physician
than we derive below, the findings below are sufficient to proof that altruistic physi-
cians indeed prefer to work in the NHS, as stated in the Proposition.
Providing treatment quality q0i at cost w0i to a patient with income Yi ∈ [YM , YH ]
yields utility:
ZA = w0i − c(q0i) + γ{u[(1− τm)Yi − w0i, q0i]− u[(1− τm)Yi − c(q∗i ), q∗i ]} (5.A2)
where we have used that the outside option of the patient is treatment by a regular
physician in the private sector, yielding utility u[(1− τm)Yi− c(q∗i ), q∗i ]. Maximising
(5.A2) with respect to q0i and w0i, subject to u(y, q) ≥ uo, gives first-order conditions:
−cq(q0i) + γVq(q0i) = 0 (5.A3)
1− γUy[(1− τm)Yi − w0i] = 0 (5.A4)
From (5.A3), it follows that the optimal treatment quality is independent of income.
Moreover, the optimal quality is equal to the optimal quality provided by altruistic
physicians in the NHS, qA, as (5.A3) is identical to (5.4), the first-order condition for
altruistic physicians’ optimal treatment quality in the public sector. Substituting
for the optimal treatment bundle a patient with income Yi obtains from a regular
physician and using (5.6), we find that both first-order conditions imply that the
altruistic physician improves his patient’s utility when:
γVq(q∗i ) > cq(q
∗
i ) (5.A5)
physician is infinitesimal.
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If this inequality is violated, the altruistic physician would optimally offer the same
treatment bundle to a patient with income Yi as regular physicians. Otherwise,
i.e. when γ is sufficiently high, the altruistic physician offers both higher treatment
quality and lower treatment cost to a patient with income Yi than regular physicians.
Note that since q∗i increases with income, condition (5.A5) is satisfied for smaller
values of γ for patients with relatively low income than for patients with higher
income.
Clearly, the altruistic physician prefers treating a NHS patient over providing
the same treatment bundle as regular physicians to a patient in the private sector,
as the latter does not yield altruistic utility. Comparing (5.5) to (5.A5), it is easily
verifiable that for some levels of γ, the altruistic physician optimally refrains from
improving the utility of any patient in the private sector but does improve the utility
of NHS patients. By (5.9), q¯ < q∗i for all patients in the private sector. It follows that
cq(q∗i ) ≥ cq(q¯) and concavity implies that Vq(q∗i ) < Vq(q¯). Hence, for some values
of γ condition (5.5) is satisfied, but condition (5.A5) is violated, implying that for
these values of γ altruistic physicians prefer to work in the NHS.
Now suppose that γ is sufficiently high, such that (5.A5) is satisfied for at least
some private sector patients. Again, treating a patient for whom condition (5.A5) is
violated is less rewarding than treating a NHS patient. By (5.A3), (5.A5) is violated
if a patient optimally buys treatment quality q∗i ≥ qA when treated by a regular
physician. Consider any patient for whom condition (5.A5) is satisfied. We have
to show that even if the altruistic physician could provide the optimal treatment
bundle to his private sector patient, treating a patient in the NHS is more rewarding
than treating any patient in the private sector. Subtracting (5.A2) with q0i = qA
from (5.A1) and using (5.1), this implies that we have to show that:
γ[V (q∗i )−V (q¯)] > w0i− c(q¯)+γ{U [(1− τm)Yi−w0i]−U [(1− τm)Yi− c(q∗i )]} (5.A6)
for all patients with income Yi ∈ [YM , YH ] for whom condition (5.A5) is satisfied,
where w0i is given by (5.A4). From assumption 1 and by combining conditions (5.6),
(5.A4), and (5.A5), we know that 0 ≤ w0i < c(q∗i ).
First, suppose that w0i = c(q∗i ). The last term on the right-hand side of (5.A6)
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vanishes, and the condition boils down to γ[V (q∗i ) − V (q¯)] > c(q∗i ) − c(q¯). This is
always satisfied, as if (5.A5) is fulfilled we have that q∗i < qA, and from (5.A3) we
know that γVq(q) > cq(q) for any q < qA. Altruistic physicians are willing to incur
the cost of increasing treatment quality up to qA. Second, suppose that 0 ≤ w ≤ c(q¯).
It suffices to show that V (q∗i )− V (q¯) > U [(1− τm)Yi −w0i]− U [(1− τm)Yi − c(q∗i )].
From Figure 5.1, we know that private sector patients prefer treatment by a regular
physician in the private sector over treatment by a regular physician in the NHS,
u [(1− τm)Yi − c(q∗i ), q∗i ] > u [(1− τm)Yi, q¯] for all Yi ∈ [YM , YH ], i.e. all private
sector patients are willing to pay c(q∗i ) for an increase in treatment quality from q¯
to q∗i . Using (5.1), this implies that condition (5.A6) is satisfied.
Lastly, suppose that c(q¯) < w0i < c(q∗i ). Let qw be the treatment quality provided
by a regular physician in the private sector in exchange for w0i, as given by w0i =
c(qw). From the two arguments of the previous paragraph, it follows from (5.A3)
that γ[V (qw) − V (q¯)] > c(qw) − c(q¯) as qw < qA and that γ [V (q∗i )− V (qw)] >
γ{U [(1− τm)Yi −w0i]− U [(1− τm)Yi − c(q∗i )]} as private sector patients are willing
to pay c(q∗i )−w0i for an increase in treatment quality from qw to q∗i . Hence, for any
w0i condition (5.A6) is satisfied. This implies that even when the altruistic physician
can provide the optimal treatment bundle to a private sector patient, treating a
patient in the NHS yields higher utility than treating any patient in the private
sector. Hence, all altruistic physicians optimally work in the NHS.

Chapter 6
The Effect of Job Satisfaction on
Job Search: Not Just Whether,
But Also Where∗
6.1 Introduction
Workers change jobs when a new job opportunity yields higher expected utility
than the current job, net of mobility costs. Similarly, workers start searching for
another job when they feel that some aspects of their current job can be improved
upon. At an aggregate level, labour mobility is needed to accommodate differences
in growth between firms, industries, or nations. At the firm level, however, the
recruitment and selection process can make turnover a costly affair. Moreover, firms
expecting workers to quit as well as workers searching for another employer are
less likely to invest in firm-specific skills, thereby reducing productivity. Knowledge
about workers’ reasons to (intend to) leave the firm can help to improve retention
and, hence, reduce the cost that accompany turnover. Similarly, knowledge about
workers’ reasons to (intend to) leave their current industry can shape policy measures
to reduce personnel shortages in vital sectors of the economy.1
Labour mobility and workers’ assessment of their job have been related in the
∗A version of this chapter is forthcoming in Labour Economics.
1From a more cynical perspective, this knowledge may also be helpful in times of downsizing.
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literature. The seminal paper by Freeman (1978) shows that the probability that a
worker voluntarily leaves his job decreases with his job satisfaction. The robustness
of this negative relation between job satisfaction and turnover has been established
in e.g. Akerlof et al. (1988) and Clark et al. (1998). Furthermore, Clark (2001)
and Kristensen and Westergard-Nielsen (2004) show that satisfaction with several
job domains also correlates with the probability that a worker quits. Another series
of papers concludes that the negative effect of job satisfaction on labour mobility
runs through workers’ turnover intentions or job search behaviour.2 Sousa-Poza and
Henneberger (2004) find a strongly negative relation between job satisfaction and
intentions to quit in a cross-national analysis covering 25 countries, as do Shields
and Price (2002) in a sample of British nurses. Using Finnish data, Böckerman
and Ilmakunnas (2004) report strong relations between job satisfaction and both
intentions to quit and job search. The link between turnover intentions or job search
and actual turnover has been established by e.g. Hartog et al. (1988), Hartog and
Van Ophem (1996), and Keith and McWilliams (1999).
In this chapter, we show that workers’ assessment of their job not only affects
whether they search for a new position, but that it also influences where they try
to take up this new position. More precisely, we show that workers’ reasons to
search for another job affect whether they seek another job in their organisation,
seek to move to another organisation in the industry, or seek to leave the industry
altogether. In other words, workers’ satisfaction with specific job aspects relates to
both the intensity and the direction of their job search efforts.
We exploit data from a survey conducted in 2003 among public sector employees
in the Netherlands. Respondents had to state their satisfaction with various job do-
mains and their job search intensity. The job seekers were subsequently asked where
they searched for another job and had to indicate the importance of 19 different
job aspects in their decision to start searching.3 Correcting for selection into the
2This work follows a vast literature in psychology. A meta-analysis of this literature establishes
that job satisfaction and turnover intentions are strongly related, and that turnover intentions is
the best predictor of actual turnover (Tett and Meier, 1993).
3The 19 job domains are listed in Table 6.3. This list covers many potential reasons for
searching, but is not exhaustive. For instance, it has been shown that workers are more likely to
search for another job in case of a mismatch between their educational attainment and their job,
both with respect to the field of education (Wolbers, 2003) as well as to the level of education
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subsample of job seekers using Heckman’s (1979) two-step sample selection model,
we pose two questions. First, what is the relation between workers’ reasons to
search for another job and their decision to search within or outside their current
organisation? Second, given that a worker tries to leave his organisation, what is the
relation between his reasons to search and the decision to search within or outside
the industry?4
An intuitive pattern emerges. Employees uncomfortable with a job domain which
differs little across jobs within an organisation, such as commuting time or manage-
ment, try to leave their organisation. On the contrary, when problems are job-
rather than organisation-specific, as in case of a lack of autonomy, employees look
for another position in their organisation. Dissatisfaction with job aspects that have
an industry-specific component, like work pressure and job duties, induces workers
to look for jobs in other industries.
To sharpen intuition, consider a junior nurse on the lookout for a new job. If
she wants more autonomy, she may try to find a senior position in her current
hospital. Conversely, she prefers a job in another hospital if her job search is caused
by commuting time, whereas she may decide to leave the industry altogether if her
dissatisfaction stems from a dislike for caring for patients.
The existence of a relation between workers’ reasons for searching and the direc-
tion of their search efforts can be understood by observing that on-the-job experience
provides workers with information about the qualities of their own and other jobs in
their organisation and industry.5 A worker can use this information to infer where
he might find a job that connects better to his preferences than his current job.
Looking for another job within the organisation or industry is only useful if jobs
are sufficiently heterogeneous with respect to the job domain the worker wants to
(Allen and Van der Velden, 2001).
4Whether the absence of private sector employees in our sample affects the results is an open
question. There is evidence that public and private employees differ in the importance they attach
to good conditions on certain job aspects, see e.g. Frank and Lewis (2004). However, this does
not imply that workers’ reaction to dissatisfactory conditions differs between public and private
employees.
5Johnson (1978) and Jovanovic (1979) argue that over time, workers learn about the qualities
of their job and quit if the match turns out to be poor. Discussing patterns of individual job
mobility, Neal (1999) concludes that “many workers are apparently using on-the-job experience as
a means of gaining information about possible careers” (p. 239).
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improve upon. Hence, the combination of information on why workers search for
another job and where they decide to search gives a unique view on workers’ assess-
ment of the relative heterogeneity of job domains across jobs within organisations
and industries.
In the first-step regression of the selection model (i.e. the selection equation),
we relate domain job satisfaction to workers’ decision to start searching for another
job. This part of the analysis is closely related to Clark (2001) and Kristensen and
Westergard-Nielsen (2004). They study the relation between domain job satisfaction
and workers’ decision to quit, which allows for a ranking of the impact of job domains
on labour mobility. Our findings square well with the findings of these studies,
further confirming the strong connection between job satisfaction, job search, and
turnover.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section describes
the data and Section 6.3 gives a description of the estimation method. Section
6.4 reports and discusses the relation between domain job satisfaction and workers’
decisions on whether and where to search for another job. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 Data
In 2003, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations undertook a
large-scale survey among employees who worked continuously for one public sector
organisation in 2002. Aggregate data were collected from the salary administration of
the participating employers.6 A sample of 78,800 workers received a questionnaire,
28,312 workers returned it. Weights have been applied to reflect the aggregate
information on gender, age, tenure, province, and wage.
The main purpose of the survey was to get insight into the job satisfaction of
public personnel. Hence, the survey included questions on job satisfaction and on
job search. We exclude 2,849 workers who reported a change in position within their
6This includes information on respondents’ current industry of employment, which has been
classified in the following 14 categories: the central government, three forms of local government
(municipality, province, and water-government), the police, defense, the judicial system, academic
hospitals, and six forms of education and research (primary, secondary, vocational, and higher
vocational education, universities, and research institutes).
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employers’ organisation in 2002 from the analysis, as these workers may have based
their answers to the questions on search behaviour on the situation before rather
than after their internal job change. Note that this implies that all respondents
in the analysis held one position continuously throughout 2002. Furthermore, we
remove 3,555 respondents for failure to comment upon their job search behaviour
or job satisfaction, and another 1,897 respondents for non-response to questions on
personal or job characteristics except for earnings and size of the organisation.7 This
leaves 20,011 respondents.
To assess workers’ job satisfaction, respondents had to indicate, on a 5-point scale
ranging from ‘very dissatisfied’ to ‘very satisfied’, their satisfaction with 15 different
job domains as well as with their job in general. The part of the survey on job search
started with the question ‘Have you searched for another job or position in 2002?’,
with possible answers ‘No, not at all’, ‘Yes, I have been looking around’, and ‘Yes,
I have intensively searched for another job/position’. Table 6.1 reports summary
statistics for job satisfaction and for job search intensity, as well as for the available
worker and job characteristics.8 Most respondents are satisfied with their job, as 55
percent claim to be somewhat satisfied with their job, and another 19 percent are
very satisfied. Only 13 percent of the respondents express dissatisfaction. About 30
percent of the respondents indicate to have searched for another job or position. Of
these, one out of six has searched intensively. The relation between job satisfaction
and job search is depicted in Figure 6.1. Clearly, the distribution of job satisfaction
scores is much more skewed towards satisfaction for workers who do not search than
for workers who do search for another job.
The relation between job search and job satisfaction also emerges from mean
7Excluding the 1,724 respondents who did not provide answers on either earnings or the size
of their organisation has no effect on the results.
8‘Married / cohabitating’ and ‘children’ are dummy variables representing whether or not the
worker has a partner and children, respectively. The education dummies depend on the highest
attained level of schooling. ‘Low education’ consists of respondents with primary school and lower
vocational education, and ‘medium education’ comprises respondents who completed high school or
medium vocational education. Tenure is computed as the number of months from the starting date
of the employment spell at the current employer up to December 2002. For the 203 respondents
who gave only the starting year but not the starting month of this employment spell, we have set
the starting month at July. The information on respondents’ age, monthly wage, and organisational
size has been collected using the categories listed in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean            SD  
Job satisfaction: 
   Very dissatisfied 0.023
   Somewhat dissatisfied 0.110
   Neutral 0.130
   Somewhat satisfied 0.550
   Very satisfied 0.187
Job search: 
   Not at all 0.703
   Looking around 0.247
   Searching intensively 0.050
Female 0.449
Minority 0.034
Age: 
   15 - 19 0.004
   20 - 24 0.042
   25 - 29 0.085
   30 - 34 0.116
   35 - 39 0.133
   40 - 44 0.175
   45 - 49 0.174
   50 - 54 0.165
   55 - 59 0.089
   60 - 69 0.018
Married / cohabitating 0.806
Children (dummy) 0.538
Low education 0.139
Medium education 0.245
Higher vocational education 0.438
University 0.179
Tenure (in months)    151.085  121.717 
Experience (in years)     20.163    10.536
Contractual hours      32.751      8.244
Temporary contract 0.083
Monthly wage (euro):
   Less than 1250 0.096
   1251 - 1500 0.074
   1501 - 1750 0.085
   1751 - 2000 0.103
   2001 - 2500 0.183
   2501 - 3000 0.140
   3001 - 3500 0.118
   3501 - 4000 0.067
   4001 - 4500 0.040
   4501 - 5000 0.023
   More than 5000 0.031
   No response 0.040
Size  (number of employees): 
    0 - 10 0.006
   11 - 20 0.024
   21 - 50 0.064
   51 - 100 0.075
   101 - 500 0.281
   501 - 1000 0.100
   1001 - 5000 0.225
   More than 5000 0.181
   No response 0.044
Observations 20,011
Data source: BZK, Personeelsonderzoek 2003.
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Figure 6.1: Job satisfaction and job search
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
satisfaction scores. Table 6.2 relates the mean satisfaction scores for all job domains
and for the job overall to job search intensity.9 The respondents are especially
positive about their contract duration, commuting time, and job duties, but fairly
negative about their financial prospects and work pressure. Job search intensity
is negatively related to satisfaction with all job domains. The difference in mean
satisfaction scores between workers who do not search at all and workers who search
intensively is largest for the job overall, followed by atmosphere, (future) job duties,
9This is the only instance in this chapter where we, for expositional reasons, treat the satisfac-
tion scores as cardinal.
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Table 6.2: Mean satisfaction scores
Searching
Satisfaction with All Not at all Looking around  intensively
   Job overall 3.77 3.95 3.46 2.99
   Contract duration 4.20 4.25 4.15 3.91
   Rewards 3.31 3.41 3.12 3.10
   Financial prospects 2.61 2.71 2.40 2.34
   Work pressure 2.82 2.87 2.71 2.74
   Facilities at work 3.18 3.21 3.14 3.08
   Physical working conditions 3.10 3.18 2.96 2.89
   Job duties 4.02 4.19 3.71 3.45
   Future job duties 3.48 3.68 3.11 2.89
   Education / training opportunities 3.41 3.54 3.18 2.92
   Atmosphere at work 3.94 4.13 3.62 3.30
   Commuting time 4.08 4.18 3.88 3.78
   Personnel management 2.98 3.15 2.67 2.44
   Management of the organisation 2.88 3.04 2.58 2.43
   Style of leadership 3.02 3.21 2.66 2.40
   Autonomy / responsibility 3.97 4.12 3.69 3.41
Observations 20,011 14,059 4,943 1,009
Data source: BZK, Personeelsonderzoek 2003.
Job search intensity
Tests of equality of the means across rows all reject the hypothesis of equality at the 0.01 level.
management, and autonomy.
Respondents who indicated that they had searched for another job were subse-
quently asked to indicate the importance of 19 different job aspects in their decision
to start searching, on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘very important’ to ‘not important
at all’.10 Moreover, the job seekers had to rank the three most important reasons
to start searching. We use this information to construct ‘reason-to-search’ variables
in the following way, as proposed by Mathios (1989). A reason-to-search variable
is assigned the value 0 if the respondent did not consider this reason to search as
10The four job domains added to the 15 job domains listed in Table 6.2 are ‘threat of restruc-
turing’, ‘threat of losing job’, ‘contractual hours’, and ‘combination of work and private life’, see
Table 6.3.
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Table 6.3: Means of the reason-to-search variables
Reasons to search All
Threat of restructuring 0.30 0.40 0.26 0.30
Threat of losing job 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.20
Contract duration 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.29
Rewards 0.79 0.66 0.83 0.82
Financial prospects 1.00 1.11 0.96 1.00
Work pressure 0.84 0.67 0.86 1.00
Facilities at work 0.31 0.26 0.33 0.36
Physical working conditions 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.41
Job duties 1.01 1.11 0.93 1.02
Future job duties 1.22 1.45 1.19 1.15
Education / training opportunities 0.47 0.60 0.43 0.43
Atmosphere at work 0.88 0.84 0.91 0.89
Contractual hours 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26
Combination of work and private life 0.57 0.51 0.55 0.58
Commuting time 0.56 0.34 0.67 0.55
Personnel management 0.89 0.77 0.91 0.99
Management of the organisation 1.01 0.93 1.03 1.10
Style of leadership 1.08 1.02 1.13 1.13
Autonomy / responsibility 0.94 1.20 0.86 0.78
Observations 4,794 1,806 2,505 2,234
Direction of search efforts
Data source: BZK, Personeelsonderzoek 2003
In current 
organisation
In current 
industry
Outside current 
industry
important (3-5 on the 5-point scale), the value 1 if the respondent considered the
reason to search important (1-2 on the 5-point scale), but did not indicate it as one
of the three most important reasons to search, the value 2 if this reason to search
was the third most important reason, the value 3 if it was the second most important
reason, and the value 4 if it was the most important reason to search for a new job.11
11As acknowledged by Mathios (1989), it is obvious that this specification imposes arbitrary
weights on the answers regarding the importance of job domains. The robustness of our results is
checked by using three different specifications. The first two specifications use only the most impor-
tant reason for searching and the three most important reasons for searching (equally weighted),
respectively. These specifications yield qualitatively similar results, but perform worse than the
0-1-2-3-4 specification in terms of explanatory power. Furthermore, we used a specification which
imposes no structure of weights, by inserting a dummy variable for each level of importance of all
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Furthermore, job seekers were asked where they searched for another job: within
their current organisation, within their current industry, and/or in other industries.12
Table 6.3 lists the means of the reason-to-search variables for all job seekers together,
as well as separated by the direction of their search efforts.13 The main reasons for
searching appear to be pay, job duties, and management. Furthermore, Table 6.3
hints at the main message of this chapter. The differences in the importance of the
reason-to-search variables between the second, third, and fourth column point to
a relation between workers’ reasons for searching and the direction of their search
efforts. For instance, workers who search within their organisation attach relatively
much importance to autonomy and future job duties, and relatively little importance
to work pressure and commuting time. Likewise, work pressure is more important
in the decision to search for those who search for a new job outside their industry
than for those who search within their industry. The purpose of this chapter is to
analyse these differences in greater detail.
6.3 Estimation method
We focus on two questions. First, what is the relation between workers’ reasons
for searching for another job and their decision to search within or outside their
current organisation? We estimate a binary probit of the effects of workers’ rea-
sons for searching on the probability that workers search outside their organisation,
controlling for the available worker and job characteristics.14 Obviously, these esti-
mations are based on the workers who actually searched for another job, which is a
job domains. Again, qualitatively similar results emerge.
12Note that ‘other industries’ includes, besides the other public industries, the whole private
sector.
13As 1,060 out of the 5,952 job seekers in the sample did not answer all questions on their reasons
for searching, and 98 job seekers did not indicate where they searched for another job, Table 6.3
is based on 4,794 respondents. Note also that respondents were allowed to indicate more than one
direction of their search efforts. Hence, respondents may appear in more than one column of Table
6.3.
14In addition to the worker and job characteristics listed in Table 6.1, all estimations include
quadratic terms for tenure, experience, and contractual hours and control for the current industry
of employment. For expositional reasons we do not report the results for the control variables, but
an earlier version of this paper contains the regression coefficients of these variables as well as some
discussion of their effect on search behaviour (Delfgaauw, 2005).
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subsample of our sample of public servants. Figure 6.1 indicates that selection into
this subsample is not random, as dissatisfied workers are more likely to search for
another job than satisfied workers.
We correct for this selection effect using Heckman’s (1979) two-step sample se-
lection model, which has been modified by Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) to
account for a probit in the second step. The first-step selection equation is a binary
probit of the probability that a worker searched for another job (i.e. the proba-
bility that the worker is present in the sample of job seekers). Let xi be the set of
explanatory variables in this regression, which includes workers’ domain job satisfac-
tion measures, and let βˆ be the estimated parameter vector. We then calculate the
inverse Mills ratio λi = φ(xiβˆ)/Φ(xiβˆ), where φ(·) is the standard normal density
function with cumulative distribution Φ(·), and use it as an additional regressor in
the probit of the probability of searching outside the current organisation.
The second question we address is: What is the relation between workers’ reasons
for searching and their decision to search within or outside their current industry,
given that they search outside their organisation? Again, we use a binary probit to
estimate this relation. This estimation is based on the subsample of workers who
only search outside their current organisation. Since selection into this subsample is
governed by the probit regression of the probability of searching outside the organi-
sation, we can again apply the two-step sample selection model by using the probit
of the probability of searching outside the organisation as the selection equation.
In both regressions on the direction of search efforts, we stack workers who search
only within against workers who only search outside their organisation or industry.
This creates a clear distinction between searching within and searching outside, but
has the disadvantage that we have to drop all respondents who searched both within
and outside their organisation or industry. In the appendix, we present the results
of two corresponding multinomial logits which take into account the possibility of
searching both within and outside the organisation or industry. Even though these
estimations do not correct for sample selection, they are indicative of how the motives
of workers who search both within and outside compare to the motives of workers
who search in one direction only.
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6.4 Results
6.4.1 Job satisfaction and job search
Before analysing the effects of workers’ reasons for searching on their decision to
search within or outside their organisation and industry, we briefly look at the results
of the first-step selection equation of workers’ decision to search for another job. This
is essentially an analysis of the determinants of job search, allowing us compare its
results to findings in the literature.
Table 6.4 gives the results of the probit regression, where the dependent vari-
able is zero when the respondent did not search for another job in 2002, and one
otherwise.15 Besides the control variables, the estimation reported in the first col-
umn includes a binary variable which takes value 1 when the respondent is either
somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the job in general (1-2 on the 5-point
scale). Clearly, dissatisfied workers are more likely to search than satisfied workers,
corresponding to findings by Shields and Price (2002), Sousa-Poza and Henneberger
(2004), and Böckerman and Ilmakunnas (2004). A change in this dummy variable
from satisfied to dissatisfied decreases the probability that a worker does not search
at all by more than 30 percentage points.
In the third column, the dummy for overall job dissatisfaction is replaced by
similar dummies for domain job dissatisfaction. For most job aspects, dissatisfac-
tion raises the probability of job search significantly. The main instigators of job
search are dissatisfaction with (future) job duties, followed by dissatisfaction with
the atmosphere at work, commuting time, and autonomy. The main exception is
dissatisfaction with facilities at work, which has a negative effect on search intensity.
Clark (2001) and Kristensen and Westergard-Nielsen (2004) relate satisfaction with
7 job domains to workers’ decision to quit their job, using British and Danish data,
respectively. For British workers, job security correlates most with the probability
that a worker quits, followed by pay, the use of initiative, the work itself, and hours
of work. For Danish workers, satisfaction with type of work and with earnings have
15Using the ordered structure of the information on workers’ search intensity yields results
similar to those reported in Table 6.4.
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Table 6.4: The determinants of job search (probit)
Variables
Dissatisfaction with: 
   Job overall 0.853      (0.028)***
   Contract duration 0.087      (0.049)*
   Rewards 0.081      (0.026)***
   Financial prospects 0.195      (0.024)***
   Work pressure -0.025      (0.023)
   Facilities at work -0.136      (0.025)***
   Physical working conditions 0.030      (0.024)
   Job duties 0.356      (0.042)***
   Future job duties 0.698      (0.032)***
   Education / training 0.089      (0.028)***
   Atmosphere at work 0.485      (0.034)***
   Commuting time 0.343      (0.032)***
   Personnel management 0.080      (0.028)***
   Management of the organisation 0.176      (0.028)***
   Style of leadership 0.171      (0.026)***
   Autonomy / responsibility 0.285      (0.039)***
Observations                 20,011
Loglikelihood
McFadden's R2
Control variables only:
   Loglikelihood
   McFadden's R2
Data source: BZK, Personeelsonderzoek 2003.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
In addition to the worker and job characterics listed in Table 6.1, the estimations control for current industry
of employment and include a constant and quadratic terms for tenure, experience, and contractual hours.
* significant at the 0.10 level. ** significant at the 0.05 level. *** significant at the 0.01 level.
              -11,481.176
                0.057
  Coefficient  Coefficient 
              -10,980.934
                0.098
                20,011
               -9,996.171
                 0.179
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most predictive power, but satisfaction with job security appears to have little im-
pact. Given the absence of a job domain reflecting job security in our data, our
findings are well in line with these studies, apart from a smaller effect of financial
rewards. The smaller effect of rewards may be due to the relatively compressed wage
structure in the Dutch public sector, but may also arise from the difference between
searching and quitting.16
6.4.2 Direction of search efforts: within or outside the cur-
rent organisation
When discomfort with a certain job domain cannot be remedied in the current job,
workers start searching for another job. They will aim their search efforts at places
where they expect to find a job that eases their discomfort. For some job domains,
the conditions may vary sufficiently across jobs within an organisation to make an
internal job change a viable option. For other job domains, however, conditions are
more homogeneous within an organisation, implying that workers need to find a new
employer. For instance, a police officer who moves from a junior to a senior position
within his department gets more responsibility, but may not improve his relation
with the department chief.
Hence, we expect that an organisation-specific problem drives workers out of
their organisation, whereas more job-specific problems may be solved by internal job
search. Unfortunately, not all job domains are easily classified as either job-specific
or organisation-specific. In some organisations, employees can obtain a higher wage
or different job duties by taking up another position, whereas in other organisations
employees are placed within a certain job category with prescribed wages and tasks.
For several job domains, however, the classification is clear. Commuting time and
management do not differ between jobs in most organisations. Contract duration is
also an organisation-specific problem, as it only hinders workers whose fixed-term
contracts are not renewed and, hence, have little chance of obtaining another position
16The ranking of the strength of the effects of domain job satisfaction on job search is largely
preserved when the effects are estimated by including the satisfaction variables one by one in
the estimation, as in Clark (2001) and Kristensen and Westergard-Nielsen (2004), rather than
simultaneously.
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within their organisation. Conversely, a lack of autonomy is primarily a job-specific
problem, which can be remedied by obtaining a higher-level job in the organisation.
Table 6.5 gives the results of the probit regression of workers’ decision to search
within or outside their organisation, where we correct for sample selection by in-
cluding the inverse Mills ratio calculated from the probit regression of job search
on domain job satisfaction (Table 6.4, second column).17 The dependent variable is
zero if the respondent searched within his current organisation (909 respondents),
and 1 if the respondent searched outside the organisation (2,989 respondents). The
896 respondents who searched both within and outside their organisation are left
out of the analysis.18
Jointly, the reason-to-search variables have a highly significant influence on the
direction of search efforts, and several have an individually significant effect as well.
As hypothesised, we find that workers having problems with their contract duration
or commuting time are less likely to search within their current organisation. Dis-
satisfaction with management works in the same direction, although only the effect
of personnel management is statistically significant. When workers search for more
autonomy or responsibilities, they are indeed more likely to look within their current
organisation.
An increase in responsibilities is often associated with an increase in rank. Lluis
(2005) reports that more than 20 percent of intra-firm job change in Germany con-
cerns a promotion. Hence, we might expect that also a significant fraction of internal
job search has to do with the desire to promoted. Besides autonomy, the reasons for
searching that are most likely to capture promotion desires are rewards, financial
prospects, and (future) job duties. We indeed find that when workers seek better
financial prospects or nicer future job duties, they are more likely to look for another
job within their current organisation. Job duties has the right sign, but the effect
is not statistically significant, which may reflect that some workers who dislike their
17Including instead the inverse Mills ratio calculated from the probit regression of job search
on overall job satisfaction (Table 6.4, first column) does not affect the results. The correction
for sample selection is indeed necessary, as the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is significantly
different from zero.
18Removing these 896 respondents from the analysis of the determinants of job search in the
previous subsection has no effect on any of the results.
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Table 6.5: Searching within or outside the organisation (probit)
Dependent variable:   0 = searching within organisation 
                                   1 = searching outside organisation
Variables   effect
Reason to search:    
   Threat of restructuring -0.081    (0,028)*** -0.021
   Threat of losing job 0.006    (0,043) 0.002
   Contract duration 0.078    (0,038)** 0.020
   Rewards 0.131    (0,024)*** 0.033
   Financial prospects -0.066    (0,022)*** -0.017
   Work pressure 0.068    (0,023)*** 0.017
   Facilities at work 0.072    (0,044) 0.018
   Physical working conditions -0.040    (0,035) -0.010
   Job duties -0.019    (0,021) -0.005
   Future job duties -0.077    (0,022)*** -0.019
   Education / training -0.080    (0,030)*** -0.020
   Atmosphere at work -0.014    (0,023) -0.003
   Contractual hours -0.076    (0,039)* -0.019
   Work vs private life 0.012    (0,029) 0.003
   Commuting time 0.237    (0,031)*** 0.060
   Personnel management 0.113    (0,028)*** 0.029
   Management of the organisation 0.041    (0,026) 0.010
   Style of leadership 0.030    (0,024) 0.008
   Autonomy / responsibility -0.163    (0,021)*** -0.041
Inverse Mills ratioa -0.423    (0,076)***
Observations
Loglikelihood
McFadden's R2
Control variables only:
   Loglikelihood
   McFadden's R2
Data source: BZK, Personeelsonderzoek 2003.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a Calculated from the results of the regression in Table 6.4, second column.
In addition to the worker and job characterics listed in Table 6.1, the estimation controls for current industry
of employment, and includes a constant and quadratic terms for tenure, experience, and contractual hours.
* significant at the 0.10 level. ** significant at the 0.05 level. *** significant at the 0.01 level.
                        -1,605.916
Marginal 
           Coefficient
                         0.160
         3,898
                         0.241
                        -1,778.467
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current job duties are not qualified to do other work in their organisation.
The finding that workers who want higher earnings are more likely to search
outside the organisation is not in line with the promotion argument. Apparently,
the effect of workers who try to increase their salary through a promotion is offset
by the search efforts of workers who feel that they have more chance of obtaining a
better salary at another firm. Indeed, wage gains accompanying a change in employer
can be significant. For instance, Topel and Ward (1992) show that for young men in
the US, about one-third of total wage growth occurs through changes in employer,
and a typical move from one employer to another yields a 10 percent wage gain.19
Work pressure and lacking facilities at work also induce workers to search for a
new employer. When work pressure stems from organisational culture or from an
(industry-wide) shortage of qualified personnel, then internal job change does not
reduce work pressure. Similarly, it is hard to imagine that facilities differ widely
across jobs within an organisation.
Lastly, if workers search for different contractual hours, better opportunities
for training, or feel threatened by a restructuring, then they are more likely to
look for another position within the organisation. Böheim and Taylor (2004) show
indeed that within-employer mobility facilitates the adjustment of work hours in
the direction desired by employees. Yet, between-employer mobility improves this
adjustment even more, see also Altonji and Paxson (1992). The result on training
can be explained by observing that many firms cater training opportunities to the
skills needed for the job, implying that training opportunities can differ across jobs
within an organisation. For instance, Oosterbeek (1996) shows that workers in low-
level jobs have less opportunities for training than workers in higher-level jobs. As
workers will have better information about the training opportunities within their
organisation than about training in other firms, workers who want more training
may look first for another position within their organisation.
That an upcoming restructuring does not chase away employees, but rather in-
19Notice, however, that the literature on the wage effects of mobility compares workers who stay
with workers who quit. The latter workers thus found and accepted another job, whereas our job
seekers have not found a better position. Hence, some of our respondents may simply have had
few opportunities for job change.
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duces them to search for a new position within their organisation may seem counter-
intuitive. Yet, a restructuring not only destroys positions, but may also open up
and create positions. The results of the multinomial logit analysis, reported in Table
6.A1, provide further insight. Workers who are threatened by restructuring or fear
losing their jobs for other reasons are most likely to search both within and outside
their organisation, which seems to be a wise strategy. Probably, workers who search
in one direction only have simply less to fear from the restructuring than workers
who search in both directions.20
The magnitudes of these effects are substantial. The marginal effects in Table 6.5
give the change in the probability that a worker searches outside the organisation of a
one-point increase in the reason-to-search variable, evaluated at the sample means of
all other variables. Given the 0-1-2-3-4 specification of the reason-to-search variables,
the difference in this probability between workers for whom a reason to search is most
important in the decision to start searching and workers for whom the reason to
search is not important is about four times the marginal effect.21 Thus, if workers’
primary reason to search is commuting time, rewards, or personnel management,
then they are 17, 11, and 10 percentage points more likely to search outside their
organisation, respectively, than workers who attribute no importance to these job
domains. Similarly, if workers’ most important reason to search is autonomy, future
job duties, or financial prospects, then they are 19, 8, and 7 percentage points less
likely to search outside their organisation, respectively.22
20Table 6.A1 further shows that for most other job domains, the category of workers who search
in both directions falls in between the two categories of workers who search in one direction only.
Acknowledging that caution is warranted because these estimates are not corrected for sample
selection, we interpret this as further support for the pattern found in the main analysis. Thus, a
greater importance of e.g. personnel management in a workers’ decision to search for another job
makes it more (less) likely that the worker searches outside (within) the current organisation.
21The nonlinear nature of the probit model and the relatively high fraction of job seekers who
search outside their current organisation imply that this difference is actually somewhat smaller
(larger) than four times the marginal effect for reason-to-search variables which have a positive
(negative) effect on the probability to search outside the organisation.
22These effects can add up to large differences between workers. For instance, a worker who
ranks autonomy as the most important reason to search for another job, followed by future job
duties and financial prospects, is more than 50 percentage points more likely to search within the
organisation than a worker for whom commuting time is the most important reason to search,
rewards second most important, and personnel management third most important.
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6.4.3 Direction of search efforts: within or outside the cur-
rent industry
Just like jobs within an organisation, jobs within an industry also have features in
common. If a worker is looking to improve upon a job domain which is influenced
by the industry, then jobs outside the industry may be better suited than other
jobs within the industry. For instance, a scholar who hates teaching and doing
research has little to gain from moving to another university. Hence, we might
expect that if workers want to improve upon a job domain which has an industry-
specific component, they search for a job in another industry.
For most job domains, the strength of the influence of industry is hard to assess,
and probably differs across industries. Yet, two job domains that are likely to be
affected by the industry are job duties and work pressure. Furthermore, given the
prevalence of wage bargaining at industry-level in the Dutch public sector, we expect
that workers who want better rewards or financial prospects also seek employment
outside their current industry.
Table 6.6 gives the results of the probit regression of workers’ decision to search
within or outside their industry. We correct for selection into the subsample of
job seekers who search outside their organisation by including the inverse Mills
ratio calculated from the probit regression of the probability of searching outside
the organisation (Table 6.5). The dependent variable takes the value zero if the
respondent searched for another job within the current industry (1,335 respondents),
and the value 1 if the respondent searched in other industries (1,106 respondents).
The remaining 548 respondents who searched both within and outside their current
industry are left out of the analysis.
Jointly, the reason-to-search variables are statistically significant, although their
explanatory power is considerably smaller than in Table 6.5. Most reason-to-search
variables have a negligible effect on workers’ decision to stay in or leave their industry.
Still, we find that when work pressure or job duties trigger job search, employees
try to leave the industry. Dissatisfaction with financial prospects is also positively
related to the probability that a worker seeks to leave the industry, but, in contrast
to our expectations, the effect of rewards is negative. Possibly, industry-specific skills
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Table 6.6: Searching within or outside the industry (probit)
Dependent variable:   0 = searching within industry
                                   1 = searching outside industry
Variables   effect
Reason to search:    
   Threat of restructuring 0.038    (0,035) 0.015
   Threat of losing job -0.048    (0,045) -0.019
   Contract duration -0.029    (0,041) -0.011
   Rewards -0.080    (0,029)*** -0.031
   Financial prospects 0.071    (0,027)*** 0.028
   Work pressure 0.040    (0,025)* 0.016
   Facilities at work 0.027    (0,046) 0.011
   Physical working conditions 0.063    (0,038)* 0.025
   Job duties 0.083    (0,023)*** 0.033
   Future job duties -0.002    (0,025) -0.001
   Education / training 0.036    (0,040) 0.014
   Atmosphere at work -0.010    (0,024) -0.004
   Contractual hours -0.011    (0,045) -0.004
   Work vs private life 0.013    (0,030) 0.005
   Commuting time -0.170    (0,037)*** -0.067
   Personnel management -0.041    (0,031) -0.016
   Management of the organisation -0.026    (0,028) -0.010
   Style of leadership -0.042    (0,026) -0.017
   Autonomy / responsibility -0.009    (0,032) -0.004
Inverse Mills ratioa -1.238    (0,295)***
Observations
Loglikelihood
McFadden's R2
Control variables only:
   Loglikelihood
   McFadden's R2
Data source: BZK, Personeelsonderzoek 2003.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a Calculated from the results of the regression in Table 6.5.
In addition to the worker and job characterics listed in Table 6.1, the estimation controls for current industry
of employment and includes a constant and quadratic terms for tenure, experience, and contractual hours.
* significant at the 0.10 level. ** significant at the 0.05 level. *** significant at the 0.01 level.
            Coefficient
Marginal 
         2,441
                         0.083
                        -1,483.230
                         0.118
                        -1,542.279
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have a role in this negative effect of dissatisfaction with rewards on the probability
of leaving the industry, if workers expect that their skills are not as valuable in other
industries.23
We further find that workers who face tough working conditions want to leave
their industry. Probably, some workers have limited opportunities to find a different
type of work within their industry. Excessive commuting time induces workers
to search for another job within their industry, suggesting that these workers are
relatively positive about other aspects of their current job and, hence, try to find a
better located job similar to their current job.24
Again, the magnitudes of these effects are large. Workers for whom job duties
is the most important reason to search are 13 percentage points more likely to
search outside their industry than workers who do not consider job duties important,
evaluated at the sample means of the other variables. For work pressure, physical
working conditions, and financial prospects, these figures are 6, 10, and 13 percentage
points, respectively. If commuting time is the primary reason for searching, workers
are 25 percentage points less likely to search outside their industry; for rewards this
figure is 12 percentage points.
In Table 6.7, we qualitatively summarise our findings. Rather than searching
randomly, workers appear to base the direction of their search efforts on the job
domains they want to see improved. Generally, workers will use their knowledge
of other jobs in their organisation and industry to infer where they can expect
23It is remarkable that the effects of rewards and financial prospects differ in sign in both
regressions. Workers who want higher earnings try to leave their organisation but not their industry,
whereas workers who seek better prospects search either within their organisation or, when internal
search is pointless, outside their industry. The difference must stem from the distinction between
current and future earnings. When current salary cannot be raised within the organisation, workers
may try to find a similar job with an employer who has a higher valuation of their skills. Financial
prospects seem to be more related to career opportunities. Thus, respondents seeking better
prospects look for advancement within their organisation or, when this is not possible, apparently
infer that they may not be able to reach the top positions in their current industry.
24The results of the multinomial logit in Table 6.A2 indicate that workers who want less work
pressure, better financial prospects, or better working conditions are primarily less likely to search
only within their industry, whereas workers who want to reduce their commuting time are less likely
to search only outside their industry. There are no reasons for searching which make it more likely
that workers search both within and outside the industry rather than either within or outside.
Although these results should be treated with caution, this suggests that the exclusion of workers
who search in both directions does not have a large effect on the results.
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Table 6.7: Qualitative summary of findings
                                                           Effect on probability of searching 
Reason to search:
   Threat of restructuring - 0
   Threat of losing job 0 0
   Contract duration + 0
   Rewards + -
   Financial prospects - +
   Work pressure + +
   Facilities at work + 0
   Physical working conditions 0 +
   Job duties 0 +
   Future job duties - 0
   Education / training - 0
   Atmosphere at work 0 0
   Contractual hours - 0
   Work vs private life 0 0
   Commuting time + -
   Personnel management + 0
   Management of the organisation 0 0
   Style of leadership 0 0
   Autonomy / responsibility - 0
outside the 
industry
outside the 
organisation
to find a job that mitigates their problems. Hence, Table 6.7 captures workers’
assessment of their chances to find better conditions on the various job domains
within their organisation, within their industry, and elsewhere. In other words,
Table 6.7 pictures workers’ assessment of the relative heterogeneity of job domains
across jobs within organisations and industries. Thus, for job domains like training,
hours, and autonomy, workers feel that the conditions are sufficiently heterogeneous
across jobs within an organisation to make internal job search worthwhile, in contrast
to the conditions for job domains like rewards, work pressure, and management.
When the discomfort cannot be resolved internally, workers may even need to leave
their industry if conditions on the troubling job domain are too homogeneous across
organisations within the industry, as in case of work pressure and financial prospects.
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6.5 Concluding remarks
The economics literature on job satisfaction has shown that workers’ job satisfaction
influences their intentions to stay in or leave their job. Besides confirming this finding
in a large sample of employees in the Dutch public sector, this chapter shows that
workers’ satisfaction with various job domains affects the direction of their job search
efforts. Provided that workers search where they expect to find mitigation of their
discomfort, our findings give a unique view of workers’ assessment of the relative
heterogeneity of job domains across jobs within organisations and industries.
The results indicate that in general, firms facing high cost of turnover should
focus their attention to earnings, work pressure, and personnel management. At the
industry level, poor financial prospects and working conditions and unpleasant job
duties feed workers’ desire to leave the industry. Hence, when personnel shortages
loom, improving these job domains should be given priority, especially for high-
turnover occupations like nursing (Andrews and Dziegielewski, 2005) and teaching
(Ingersoll, 2001). A similar conclusion is reached by the Audit Commission (2002)
after surveying workers who left the British public sector. They found that bureau-
cracy and workload were important reasons to leave the public sector, and that better
pay, less workload, and more managerial support might have persuaded workers to
stay.
A potential drawback of our data is that it consists of employees who did not
change jobs in 2002. This implies that there may be a sorting effect, insofar as
those who did change jobs in 2002 differed in their motives for job search from
those who searched but did not change jobs. In the next chapter, we analyse the
relation between job movers’ reasons for quitting their job and their decision to
stay in or leave the industry, using similar survey data of job-to-job movers who
ended an employment spell at a public sector organisation in the Netherlands in
2001. Hence, for industry change, we can compare the intentions of the job seekers
in the present sample to the motives of the job movers in the next chapter. Except
for dissatisfaction with rewards, which induces job movers to leave their industry,
dissatisfaction with job domains that induce job seekers to search within (outside)
the industry also induce job movers to take up another position within (outside) the
140 The Effect of Job Satisfaction on Job Search
industry. Hence, the lack of job movers in the present sample does not appear to
drive the results.
One critique on relating job satisfaction to job search is that job search may be
nothing more than an alternative measure of job satisfaction (cf. Clark, 2001). A
more tangible measure of job search behaviour is whether or not an employee has
actually applied for another position. In our sample, almost 59 percent of the job
seekers said to have applied for another job in 2002. There is a clear distinction
by search intensity, as 52 percent of the respondents who were ‘looking around’ had
applied for another job, against 89 percent of the respondents who ‘searched inten-
sively’. Using the application decision as our measure of job search has no qualitative
effect on our findings. Hence, we feel confident that domain job satisfaction not only
affects workers’ job search behaviour, but also bears on job mobility.
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Table 6.A1: Reasons to search within or outside the organisation, or both (multino-
mial logit)
Variables Coefficient      (SE) Coefficient      (SE)
Reason to search:    
   Threat of restructuring -0.033    (0.049) -0.138    (0.043)***
   Threat of losing job -0.131    (0.076)* -0.141    (0.060)**
   Contract duration -0.133    (0.070)* -0.030    (0.054)
   Rewards -0.067    (0.049) 0.157    (0.040)***
   Financial prospects -0.020    (0.043) -0.129    (0.037)***
   Work pressure -0.079    (0.047)* 0.030    (0.037)
   Facilities at work -0.045    (0.091) 0.090    (0.071)
   Physical working conditions -0.054    (0.068) -0.116    (0.057)**
   Job duties 0.018    (0.040) -0.004    (0.034)
   Future job duties -0.039    (0.041) -0.160    (0.035)***
   Education / training 0.029    (0.055) -0.120    (0.051)**
   Atmosphere at work -0.018    (0.045) -0.012    (0.036)
   Contractual hours 0.104    (0.081) -0.059    (0.069)
   Work vs private life 0.006    (0.058) 0.016    (0.049)
   Commuting time -0.114    (0.067)* 0.306    (0.051)***
   Personnel management -0.135    (0.054)** 0.105    (0.043)**
   Management of the organisation -0.083    (0.049)* -0.004    (0.039)
   Style of leadership -0.113    (0.046)** -0.017    (0.037)
   Autonomy / responsibility 0.122    (0.040)*** -0.150    (0.035)***
Observations
Loglikelihood
McFadden's R2
Data source: BZK, Personeelsonderzoek 2003.
a Reference category: searching both within and outside the organisation
In addition to the worker and job characterics listed in Table 6.1, the estimation controls for current industry
of employment and includes a constant and quadratic terms for tenure, experience, and contractual hours.
* significant at the 0.10 level. ** significant at the 0.05 level. *** significant at the 0.01 level.
Direction of search efforts:a
 Within organisation  Outside organisation
  0.149
  4,794
                -3,768.699
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Table 6.A2: Reasons to search within or outside the industry, or both (multinomial
logit)
Variables Coefficient      (SE) Coefficient      (SE)
Reason to search:    
   Threat of restructuring 0.037    (0.072) 0.059    (0.074)
   Threat of losing job -0.029    (0.095) -0.107    (0.098)
   Contract duration -0.111    (0.073) -0.121    (0.077)
   Rewards 0.034    (0.051) 0.005    (0.053)
   Financial prospects -0.103    (0.052)** -0.013    (0.054)
   Work pressure -0.148    (0.045)*** -0.014    (0.046)
   Facilities at work -0.148    (0.084)* -0.051    (0.084)
   Physical working conditions -0.130    (0.076)* -0.014    (0.076)
   Job duties -0.082    (0.048)* 0.065    (0.049)
   Future job duties -0.004    (0.048) -0.048    (0.051)
   Education / training -0.032    (0.075) -0.017    (0.081)
   Atmosphere at work 0.000    (0.046) -0.006    (0.049)
   Contractual hours -0.060    (0.087) -0.134    (0.091)
   Work vs private life 0.084    (0.063) 0.123    (0.065)*
   Commuting time -0.034    (0.053) -0.170    (0.057)***
   Personnel management -0.095    (0.053)* -0.066    (0.055)
   Management of the organisation -0.005    (0.051) -0.001    (0.053)
   Style of leadership -0.078    (0.048) -0.104    (0.051)**
   Autonomy / responsibility 0.063    (0.050) -0.078    (0.055)
Observations
Loglikelihood
McFadden's R2
Data source: BZK, Personeelsonderzoek 2003.
a Reference category: searching both within and outside the organisation
In addition to the worker and job characterics listed in Table 6.1, the estimation controls for current industry
of employment and includes a constant and quadratic terms for tenure, experience, and contractual hours.
* significant at the 0.10 level. ** significant at the 0.05 level. *** significant at the 0.01 level.
Direction of search efforts:a
 Within industry  Outside industry
  0.106
  2,989
                -2,777.706
Chapter 7
Where To Go?
Workers’ Reasons to Quit and
Intra- versus Interindustry Job
Mobility∗
7.1 Introduction
In many countries, the public sector faces problems recruiting and retaining skilled
personnel (OECD, 2001). Borjas (2003) shows that since 1970, the private sector
in the US has become financially more attractive to high-skilled workers, as wage
dispersion has increased more in the private sector than in the public sector. The
Audit Commission (2002) reports that the main reasons for workers to leave the
public sector in the UK are bureaucracy, workload, pay, and management. Workers
felt that these problems were specific to the public sector. Still, many workers
remained in the public sector, as “personal fulfilment made up for the lack of financial
rewards” (p. 29). Clearly, nonpecuniary factors influence workers’ decision to stay
in or leave the public sector. Moreover, it suggests that workers use their on-the-job
experience to evaluate other jobs in their sector.
∗A version of this chapter is forthcoming in Applied Economics.
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Neal (1999) draws a similar conclusion. He examines labour mobility in the US
and distinguishes between ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ job change. Complex job mobility
involves a change in career, empirically defined as a change in both industry and
occupation. Neal develops a model in which workers first search for a suitable
career and subsequently search for a suitable employer. Evidence from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth supports the model. Complex job changes are less
common among experienced workers than among unexperienced workers, and the
likelihood of a complex job change falls sharply after a worker has changed employer
without changing career. Based on this evidence, Neal concludes that “many workers
are apparently using on-the-job experience as a means of gaining information about
possible careers” (p. 239).
This chapter shows that workers’ self-proclaimed reasons for quitting their job
affect their decision to stay in their current industry or to move to another industry.
We employ data from a survey among employees who either accepted or left a public
sector job in the Netherlands in 2001. Employees who quit their previous job had
to indicate the importance of 19 different job aspects in their decision to leave the
job. We find that the motives for job change of workers who stay in their industry
differ from the motives of workers who change industry, in a fairly intuitive pattern.
Workers are more likely to move to another industry when pay, work pressure,
working conditions, job duties, or management are important in the decision to quit.
In contrast, dissatisfaction with the opportunities for training, the atmosphere at
work, the number of hours worked, or commuting time makes it more likely that
a worker stays in the current industry. We argue that correlation of job aspects
among jobs within an industry may explain most of these findings, as the first group
of job aspects is more likely to have an industry-specific component than the latter.
Moreover, we show that the different motives for job change lead to differences
in wage growth: the apparent wage premium of interindustry job movers is fully
explained by workers’ reasons for quitting.
Although the diversity of jobs within an industry is large, the jobs open to a
specific worker may share some features. The salary spread may be limited, espe-
cially when firms offer ‘competitive’ salaries or when salary negotiations take place
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at industry-level. Similarly, the jobs open to a specific worker may have tasks in
common, and working conditions may depend partially on the specific industry.
Conversely, other job aspects are determined solely by the combination of a worker
and an organisation. For instance, commuting time and the atmosphere at work are
unlikely to be influenced by the industry.
When jobs within an industry have features in common, experience in one job
generates information on other jobs, but only on those job aspects that have an
industry-specific component. If one of these job aspects causes a worker to quit, this
worker may need to change industry in order to find a better suited job. Conversely,
dissatisfaction with a job aspect for which jobs within the industry differ sufficiently
does not necessitate a change in industry. A move to another hospital is of little use
to a nurse who dislikes her job duties, but may solve the problems of a nurse who
dislikes her colleagues. Similarly, a teacher may shorten commuting time by moving
to another school, but it is unlikely that he improves his salary substantially. Our
findings thus suggest that, in line with Neal (1999), workers use their on-the-job
experience to update their expectations of other jobs in the industry.
It is interesting to note that respondents considered financial matters less impor-
tant in their decision to quit than job duties, atmosphere at work, and management.
This chapter is not the first study documenting that nonpecuniary factors are im-
portant determinants of quit behaviour. For instance, Akerlof et al. (1988) find that
more people quit for nonpecuniary reasons than for pecuniary reasons, and argue
that “any realistic portrait of labor turnover must include a role for nonpecuniary
rewards” (p. 498). Nonetheless, many authors have ignored these factors in studies
of labour mobility, possibly due to lack of data.1
Further, we look into the main reasons for workers to leave the public sector
altogether. We find that public sector workers who quit for pay or management
take up employment in the private sector relatively often. In contrast, when the
possibilities for training are important in the decision to quit, workers are more
likely to stay in the public sector. These findings are an indication of the relative
strengths and weaknesses of public sector jobs.
1See, among many others, Topel and Ward (1992), Light and McGarry (1998), Campbell
(2001), McCaughlin and Bils (2001), and Lima (2004).
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section shortly
discusses the literature on the causes and consequences of job mobility. Section
7.3 describes the data. In Section 7.4, we report the effects of workers’ reasons for
quitting on their wage growth and relate these findings to earlier work on the relation
between wages and workers’ evaluation of different job aspects. This provides us with
an indication of how our data compare to the data used in other studies. Section
7.5 discusses the effects of workers’ reasons for quitting on the decision to stay in
or leave the industry of employment. Section 7.5 also looks into workers’ reasons to
leave the public sector altogether. Section 7.6 concludes.
7.2 Job mobility
A large literature has evolved on the causes and consequences of job mobility. Bartel
(1982) studies the effects of several job attributes on quit behaviour, and finds that
for young men, repetitive work and bad working conditions increase the probability
that a worker quits, whereas for older men repetitive work may actually decrease this
probability. Higher starting wages decrease the likelihood of a separation (Topel and
Ward, 1992), whereas workers are more likely to quit jobs that are complex (Weiss,
1984), or that pose health and safety risks (Viscusi, 1979). Altonji and Paxson (1992)
show that females whose family composition has changed obtain larger changes in the
number of hours worked when they move to another employer than by staying in the
same job. The authors argue that adjusting working hours to changing preferences
may be easier by changing jobs than within a job.
Workers’ own assessment of their job also provides information on the likelihood
of a quit. Freeman (1978) already found that job satisfaction is negatively related
to the probability that a worker quits, see also Akerlof et al. (1988) and Clark et
al. (1998). A decomposition of job satisfaction into satisfaction with different job
aspects reveals that satisfaction with job security is the best predictor of quits among
UK workers (Clark, 2001), whereas satisfaction with the type of work appears most
important in Denmark (Kristensen and Westergard-Nielsen, 2004).
Concerning the consequences of a quit, Topel and Ward (1992) find that one-
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third of the total wage growth of young men in their first ten years in the labour
market occurs through job changes. Akerlof et al. (1988) show that workers who quit
out of dissatisfaction with pay usually obtain a wage increase, whereas a substantial
fraction of workers who quit for nonpecuniary reasons take a wage cut. Still, both
groups report being better off after the job change. Keith and McWilliams (1997)
find that the wage growth of employees who quit for family-related reasons is smaller
than the wage growth of both non-movers and workers who quit for non-family-
related reasons. Relatedly, a common finding in the literature is that job movers
who voluntarily left their job fare better financially than workers who are laid off or
discharged (McLaughlin, 1991, Keith and McWilliams, 1997).2
A common feature of these studies is that the data used contain both movers
and non-movers. As we only have information on workers who entered or left a
public sector job, we cannot compare movers to non-movers. The contribution of
this chapter lies in the extensive set of reasons for quitting, which we can relate to
a worker’s decision to stay in or leave the current industry and to the change in a
worker’s wage.
7.3 The data
In 2002, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations conducted a sur-
vey among employees who started in or left a public sector job in 2001. Information
about employees who had either entered or left an organisation in the public sector
was collected from salary administrations. Representative samples were drawn and
22,000 employees who left an organisation and 20,250 employees who entered an
organisation received a questionnaire, yielding 7,854 and 6,942 respondents, respec-
tively.3 The data are weighted in two steps. First, weights are applied so as to reflect
the information from the salary administrations on gender, age, tenure, province,
and wage for each industry in the public sector independently. These industries
are the central government, local governments, education, research, the police, the
2The literature on displaced workers is surveyed by Kletzer (1998) and Kuhn (2002).
3Employees who moved from one job in the public sector to another may have received two
questionnaires. However, there is no evidence of duplicate cases in the dataset.
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judicial system, defense, and university hospitals.4 Second, each industry receives a
weight corresponding to its share in total public sector employment.
We merge the two samples, and divide the respondents in four groups, depending
on their former and new industry of employment. Stayers move to another employer
within the same industry, movers leave their former industry of employment but
remain employed in the public sector, leavers move from the public sector to the
private sector, and entrants move from the private sector to the public sector. This
gives 3,105 stayers, 1,967 movers, 2,483 entrants, and 1,103 leavers.5 Partial non-
response reduces these numbers to 2,261, 1,430, 1,912, and 717, respectively. We
have removed another 64 stayers, 34 movers, 79 entrants, and 28 leavers because
they reported implausible wage levels or wage changes.6
One of the main purposes of the survey was to gain insight into employees’
reasons for entering or leaving a public sector job. The respondents who had left
a job were asked to indicate on a 5-point scale the importance of 19 job aspects
in their decision to leave their old job. Furthermore, they had to rank the three
most important reasons for quitting. We construct ‘reason-to-quit’ variables in the
following way, as proposed by Mathios (1989). A reason-to-quit variable is assigned
the value 0 if the respondent did not consider this job aspect important in the
decision to quit (1-3 on the 5-point scale), the value 1 if the respondent considered
the job aspect important (4-5 on the 5-point scale), but did not indicate it as one
of the three most important reasons for quitting, the value 2 if this job aspect was
the third most important reason, the value 3 if this job aspect was the second most
important reason, and the value 4 if it was the most important reason for quitting.7
4The data also distinguish nine different industries in the private sector.
5The focus on job-to-job mobility removes 2,904 respondents from the sample who did not
have a job before entering their public sector job, as well as 3,234 respondents who did not take
up another job after leaving their public sector job.
6We have set the floor and the ceiling for both the former and the new hourly wage at 3 euro
and 60 euro, respectively. The floor is slightly below the legal minimum wage for 18-year old
employees, and the ceiling is (in terms of monthly income) slightly above a Minister’s wage in
the Netherlands. The cut-off levels for relative wage change have (arbitrarily) been set such that
workers whose hourly wages more than halved or more than tripled were excluded. Inspection of
the data reveals that most of these cases involve typo’s, misspecifications, or misinterpretation of
the questions (for instance, some respondents appear to report yearly rather than monthly income).
7This specification imposes arbitrary weights on the questions regarding the importance of job
aspects, which is also acknowledged by Mathios (1989). We have checked the robustness of our
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Table 7.1: Means of the reason-to-quit variables
Reasons to quit All Stayers Movers Leavers Entrants
Threat of restructuring 0.22 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.35
Threat of losing job 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.13 0.26
Contract duration 0.32 0.37 0.37 0.24 0.24
Rewards 0.62 0.52 0.63 0.84 0.65
Financial prospects 0.79 0.66 0.79 1.06 0.85
Work pressure 0.61 0.64 0.60 0.47 0.64
Facilities at work 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.28
Physical working conditions 0.32 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.44
Job duties 1.17 0.90 1.38 1.16 1.35
Future job duties 1.16 1.02 1.36 1.38 1.11
Education / training opportunities 0.57 0.45 0.54 0.43 0.79
Atmosphere at work 1.06 1.13 0.96 0.98 1.07
Contractual hours 0.32 0.28 0.23 0.19 0.49
Combination of work and private life 0.69 0.74 0.61 0.52 0.75
Commuting time 0.71 0.98 0.59 0.34 0.63
Personnel management 0.87 0.84 0.86 1.20 0.78
Management of the organisation 0.91 0.81 0.98 1.26 0.84
Style of leadership 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.28 0.86
Autonomy / responsibility 0.86 0.84 0.91 0.92 0.88
Observations 6,115 2,197 1,396 689 1,833
Data source: BZK, Mobiliteitsonderzoek 2002.
Table 7.1 lists for each group of job movers the means of the reason-to-quit
variables. Interestingly, financial motives appear less important than dissatisfac-
tion with management, (future) job duties, or the atmosphere at work.8 Several
results by using different specifications. Specifications including only the most important reason
for quitting or the three most important reasons for quitting (equally weighted) yield qualitatively
similar results, but perform worse than the 0-1-2-3-4 specification in terms of explanatory power.
Furthermore, we used a specification which imposes no structure of weights, by inserting a dummy
variable for each level of importance of all job aspects. Again, qualitatively similar results emerge,
although for several job aspects, the magnitude of the coefficients is not monotonically increasing
in the level of importance. Still, the estimated effects of job aspects being ‘most important’ relative
to being ‘not important’ closely resemble the results of the estimations reported here.
8Note that this need not imply that employees care little about the level of their wage. Due to
the rather compressed wage structure in the Netherlands, employees may rationally expect a job
change to yield little financial gain.
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differences between the four groups emerge from Table 7.1. Relatively few stayers
indicate that they were unhappy with their job duties, whereas commuting time is
mentioned more frequently by stayers than by the other groups. Leavers complain
relatively little about commuting time and work pressure, but complain most about
their former management and pay. Movers voice dissatisfaction about (future) job
duties relatively strongly, whereas entrants often emphasize (the lack of) possibilities
for training and the number of hours worked. The threat of involuntary separations
also prevails more often among entrants than among the other groups.9
Summary statistics for several worker and job characteristics are listed in Table
7.2.10 In line with Neal (1999), stayers are on average more experienced than the
other groups. Furthermore, the fraction of stayers with higher vocational education
is relatively large. Entrants have less education, experience, and tenure, and earn
less than the other groups. Leavers obtain the largest wage growth, whereas stayers
receive the smallest increase in hourly wage. The average increase in hourly wage is
9.15 percent, which is close to the estimates by Topel and Ward (1992).
This study focusses on job-to-job mobility. We also have data on the reasons to
quit of 237 employees who left a public sector job but did not take up another job.
In comparison to the figures in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2, these employees were more
often female, less educated, and worked fewer hours. They considered work pressure
and in particular the combination of work and private life more important in their
9Unfortunately, the survey among employees who entered a public sector job did not explicitly
ask whether the respondent quit their previous job. Hence, there may be some actual layoffs
and discharges in the sample. The survey among employees who left a public sector job did ask
whether the employee voluntarily left the job or had been displaced. Given the evidence in the
literature that the consequences of a separation differ between workers who quit and workers who
are displaced, we have checked whether elimination of all respondents who considered threats of
involuntary separations important in their decision to quit would affect our results. It turns out
that all results are qualitatively similar in this restricted sample, except for the effect of the reason-
to-quit variable ‘contractual hours’ on wage growth, which becomes smaller and insignificant (see
Table 7.3).
10The variables married and children at home are dummy variables, representing whether or
not the respondent has a partner or children, respectively. The education dummies depend on the
highest completed level of schooling. Low education comprises respondents who completed primary
school only and respondents who completed lower vocational education. Medium education consists
of workers with high school education or medium vocational education, and higher vocational
education and university speak for themselves. Tenure describes the number of years a worker has
been employed by his former employer. Experience is measured as the number of years since the
respondent finished education. Hourly wages are computed from the respondents’ monthly income
and contractual hours.
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Table 7.2: Summary statistics
Variables Stayers Movers Leavers Entrants
Female 0.532 0.542 0.379 0.462
(0.499) (0.498) (0.486) (0.499)
Minority 0.029 0.038 0.042 0.054
(0.167) (0.191) (0.200) (0.226)
Married / cohabitating 0.806 0.766 0.777 0.680
(0.395) (0.424) (0.416) (0.467)
Children 0.535 0.473 0.435 0.368
(0.499) (0.499) (0.496) (0.483)
Low education 0.035 0.074 0.073 0.136
(0.185) (0.261) (0.261) (0.343)
Medium education 0.140 0.209 0.256 0.337
(0.347) (0.407) (0.437) (0.473)
Higher vocational education 0.604 0.392 0.379 0.304
(0.489) (0.488) (0.485) (0.460)
University 0.221 0.325 0.292 0.223
(0.415) (0.469) (0.455) (0.416)
Tenure (in years) 7.370 6.870 7.060 4.690
(7.427) (6.615) (6.670) (5.463)
Experience (in years) 13.635 11.684 11.490 10.051
(9.326) (8.701) (8.109) (8.276)
Hours worked in old job 33.024 32.586 35.379 32.819
(7.941) (7.900) (5.688) (8.859)
Hours worked in new job 33.186 32.913 35.473 34.079
(7.764) (7.421) (5.293) (7.034)
Hourly wage old job (€) 15.611 14.855 15.591 12.643
(5.581) (5.884) (6.109) (5.967)
Hourly wage new job (€) 16.978 16.406 17.424 13.761
(6.346) (6.696) (7.250) (6.066)
Δ log hourly wage 0.079 0.096 0.105 0.098
(0.180) (0.241) (0.219) (0.257)
Observations 2,197 1,396 689 1,833
Data source: BZK, Mobiliteitsonderzoek 2002.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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decision to quit. By contrast, financial prospects and future job duties were less
important. This points to the argument that some women may invest less in human
capital, because they expect to withdraw (temporarily) from the labour market at
some point in time to dedicate themselves to their family (see Weiss and Gronau,
1981, Blau and Ferber, 1986, and Polachek and Kim, 1994).
7.4 Workers’ reasons to quit and wage growth
Workers change jobs to improve upon job aspects causing discomfort. Hence, it is
likely that the new job offers better conditions with respect to these troubling job
aspects. Unfortunately, we can not assess the effect of the reasons to quit on all job
aspects, as the survey did not ask workers to compare job aspects of their former
and new job. The data do allow us to estimate the effect of workers’ reasons for
quitting on their wage growth. Hence, we estimate:
∆(wi) = α+ βQi + γXi + ei (7.1)
where ∆(wi) is the difference in log hourly wage between the new and the former job
of employee i and Qi is a vector of the 19 reason-to-quit variables. Xi is a vector of
other explanatory variables, containing the change in the number of hours worked,
tenure, tenure-squared, experience, experience-squared, and dummies for gender,
minority, partner, children, educational levels, and former and new industry.11
The results of the estimation of equation (1) reported in Table 7.3 square well
with the findings of previous studies. In line with Keith and McWilliams (1997),
but in contrast to Loprest (1992), we find no evidence of a smaller wage effect of a
job change for females. On the contrary, after the inclusion of the reasons-to-quit
variables, the coefficient on the female dummy turns positive. Wage growth is posi-
tively related to the level of education, as in Connolly and Gottschalk (2000), Lima
(2004), and Villanueva (2004), using data on US, Portuguese, and German workers,
respectively. Employees with a partner obtain a significantly smaller wage increase
11Elimination of constant characteristics from the set of explanatory variables turns out not to
affect the results.
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Table 7.3: The effects of the reason-to-quit variables on wage growth (OLS)
Variables    Coefficient    Coefficient
Constant       0.112    (0.019)***       0.054    (0.021)**
Female       0.000    (0.006)       0.011    (0.006)*
Minority       0.012    (0.014)       0.002    (0.014)
Married      -0.022    (0.007)***      -0.017    (0.007)**
Children       0.006    (0.006)       0.008    (0.007)
Medium education       0.021    (0.012)*       0.021    (0.012)*
Higher voc. education       0.044    (0.012)***       0.048    (0.012)***
University       0.040    (0.013)***       0.046    (0.013)***
Reason to quit:    
   Threat of restructuring      -0.009    (0.004)**
   Threat of losing job      -0.009    (0.004)**
   Contract duration       0.004    (0.003)
   Rewards       0.027    (0.003)***
   Financial prospects       0.014    (0.003)***
   Work pressure      -0.012    (0.003)***
   Facilities at work       0.001    (0.005)
   Physical working conditions      -0.001    (0.004)
   Job duties       0.003    (0.002)
   Future job duties       0.001    (0.002)
   Education / training      -0.002    (0.003)
   Atmosphere at work       0.001    (0.002)
   Contractual hours       0.008    (0.004)**
   Work vs private life      -0.007    (0.003)***
   Commuting time      -0.003    (0.002)
   Personnel management       0.002    (0.003)
   Management of the organisation      -0.001    (0.003)
   Style of leadership       0.002    (0.003)
   Autonomy / responsibility       0.010    (0.002)***
Observations
R2
Data source: BZK, Mobiliteitsonderzoek 2002.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at the 0.10 level. ** significant at the 0.05 level. *** significant at the 0.01 level.
Also included, but not reported, were the change in the number of working hours, tenure, tenure-squared,
experience, experience-squared and dummies for the former and new sector of employment.
Reasons to quit included
6,115
0.118
Reasons to quit excluded
0.076
6,115
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than singles. Villanueva (2004) reports a marriage effect of similar magnitude.
The reason-to-quit variables are jointly significant at the 0.01 level, and several
are individually significant as well. We find that the threat of an employer-initiated
separation leads to significantly smaller wage growth. This is in line with evidence
that job changers who quit obtain larger wage increases than job changers who are
laid-off or discharged (McLaughlin, 1991, Keith and McWilliams, 1997). However,
we can not rule out that this result is caused by a (small) number of actual layoffs
and discharges in the sample. This suspicion is reinforced by the finding that the
effect becomes insignificant if we restrict the sample to the survey among employees
who left a public sector job (recall that this survey explicitly asked workers whether
they quit their job or were displaced).
In line with Akerlof et al. (1988), we find that employees leaving their job
out of dissatisfaction with pecuniary rewards obtain relatively high wage growth.
The specification of the reason-to-quit variables implies that an employee for whom
rewards was the most important reason to quit obtains a wage increase which is 10.8
percentage points higher than an employee for whom rewards were not important in
the decision to quit.
Responsibility and autonomy are also being rewarded, as employees complaining
about this job aspect receive significantly larger wage increases. Predictions of both
theory and previous empirical work are mixed. Efficiency wage theory predicts a
positive relation between employees’ autonomy and wages, while the theory of com-
pensating differentials suggests that employees may be willing to give up a fraction
of their income in return for more autonomy (see e.g. Dur and Glazer, 2004). In
line with our result, some authors find a negative relation between supervision and
pay (Krueger, 1991, Kruse, 1992, Rebitzer, 1995), while some find a positive relation
(Smith et al. 1997), and others find no relation (Leonard, 1987, Brunello, 1995).
Similarly, Brown and Sessions (2002) report a positive relation between supervisors’
pay and the number of supervisees, but Frey and Kucher (1999) find no effect of the
number of subordinates on supervisors’ wages.
Somewhat surprising is the positive relation between a quit for the number of
hours worked and the wage change. Inspection of the data reveals that workers for
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whom the number of hours worked was important in their decision to quit on average
increase the number of hours worked, but variation is large.
Lastly, dissatisfaction with work pressure or with the combination of work and
private life appears to induce workers to accept significantly smaller wage growth.
The specification of the reason-to-quit variables implies that the difference between
the wage growth of an employee for whom work pressure was the most important
reason for quitting and an employee who had no problem with work pressure is 4.8
percentage points, about half of the average wage increase in the sample. This is
close to estimates by Villanueva (2004), using data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel. He finds that job movers who indicate that their work load has worsened
obtain 5 percent higher wage growth, whereas an improvement of work load yields
3 percent smaller wage growth, both relative to workers without a change in work
load.
Overall, the findings presented in this section fit reasonably well into the previous
literature on the relation between wages and workers’ evaluation of different job
aspects. This bolsters our confidence that the findings in the next section extend
beyond the population under study here. The next section shows that workers’
evaluation of job aspects not only affects their wage, but also their decision on
where to (seek) work.
7.5 Where to go?
7.5.1 Intra- vs interindustry mobility
The theory of job shopping postulates that workers are uncertain about their valu-
ation of jobs (Johnson, 1978, Jovanovic, 1979). By spending time on a job, workers
learn their true valuation of the job. As such, a job is an experience good. A separa-
tion occurs when it becomes clear that the match between the worker’s preferences
or productivity and the conditions of the job is bad. At this point, the worker is
still clueless about his valuation of other jobs, and, hence, randomly applies for a
new position. This theory explains several empirical findings, including the positive
relation between tenure and wages in cross-sectional data and the relatively high
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turnover frequency of workers early in their career.
Yet, it is hard to imagine that working in one job provides no information on at
least some aspects of other jobs in the economy. The information a worker obtains in
the current job extends in particular to similar jobs within the industry. University
professors know that the job duties of a position at another university will include
a mix of teaching, research, and management tasks, despite lacking the experience
of working at this university. In general, when the jobs within an industry open
to a specific worker have one or more job characteristics in common, working in
one job yields information on the other jobs. Then, workers’ expectations of other
jobs in the industry are affected by their valuation of certain job aspects in their
current job. This implies that a bad experience with a job aspect correlated among
jobs within the industry makes a change in industry more likely. Hence, workers’
experience in a job not only influences the decision to stay in or leave the job, but
also the decision to stay in or leave the industry.
A priori, it is unfeasible to create an indisputable division of the 19 job aspects
listed as potential reasons for quitting into correlated and independent features of
jobs within an industry. Yet, it can be argued that some job aspects are more influ-
enced by the industry than others. For instance, atmosphere at work and commuting
time are largely determined by the organisation and the worker, and are unlikely to
be related among jobs within an industry. Other job aspects, such as job duties,
rewards, and working conditions, are more likely to be related among the subset of
jobs within an industry open to a single worker. Intuitively, working in one hospital
provides a decent indication of job duties and salary at other hospitals, but may be
less informative about the atmosphere at another hospital. Hence, we would expect
that workers quitting for atmosphere at work or commuting time are more likely
to stay in the industry than workers who quit for job duties, rewards, or working
conditions.
The information on workers’ reasons to quit provides us with the opportunity to
test this prediction. For that matter, we explore the differences in the reasons to
quit of stayers, movers and leavers. These employees all quit jobs in public sector
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industries, but only stayers have taken a new job in the same industry.12 Table 7.4
shows the results of a logistic regression of the reasons to quit on the decision to stay
in or leave the industry of employment. The dependent variable is 0 if the respondent
is a stayer, and 1 if the respondent is a mover or a leaver. Hence, a positive coefficient
implies a positive relation between the variable and the probability that a respondent
leaves the industry, whereas a negative coefficient implies that the variable increases
with the probability that a respondent stays in the industry.
From Table 7.4, we conclude that workers’ reasons to quit indeed affect their
decision to stay in or leave the industry. The arising pattern supports the argument
that workers update their expectations of specific aspects of other jobs in the indus-
try. Workers who quit for pay, work pressure, working conditions, or job duties are
more likely to move to another industry. These job aspects are likely to be partially
determined by the industry, as it seems unlikely that moving to a similar job yields
substantially higher pay, radically different job duties, or more favourable working
conditions. Therefore, moving to another job within the industry may not suffice
to improve upon these job aspects. By contrast, a quit for training opportunities,
atmosphere at work, the number of hours worked, or commuting time decreases
the probability that the worker moves to another industry. Arguably, these job as-
pects are primarily determined by the organisation and the worker, and are hardly
influenced by the industry. Somewhat puzzling are the positive coefficients on man-
agement and leadership. Possibly, management style varies less within an industry
than across industries.
Overall, the findings in Table 7.4 suggest an extension of the theory of job shop-
ping. By forming a match, workers not only obtain information on their own job,
but also on certain aspects of other jobs in the industry. Hence, workers’ experience
on the job not only aides them in deciding whether to stay in or leave the job, but
also in deciding where to go.
12The lack of data on employees who change jobs within the private sector hinders a similar
estimation for industries in the private sector.
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Table 7.4: Reasons to stay in or leave the industry
Dependent variable:   0 = stayer
                                   1 = mover or leaver
Variables    Coefficient
Constant 2.702    (0.434)***
Female      -0.071    (0.083)
Minority       0.284    (0.197)
Married       0.015    (0.094)
Children -0.143    (0.085)*
Medium education      -0.215    (0.189)
Higher voc. education -0.533    (0.192)***
University      -0.190    (0.208)
Log hourly wage old job -0.353    (0.130)***
Reason to quit:
   Threat of restructuring      -0.003    (0.056)
   Threat of losing job       0.048    (0.056)
   Contract duration -0.076    (0.041)*
   Rewards 0.096    (0.036)***
   Financial prospects 0.095    (0.034)***
   Work pressure 0.099    (0.034)***
   Facilities at work -0.020    (0.069)
   Physical working conditions 0.138    (0.054)**
   Job duties 0.141    (0.028)***
   Future job duties 0.115    (0.030)***
   Education / training -0.171    (0.044)***
   Atmosphere at work -0.079    (0.029)***
   Contractual hours -0.119    (0.058)**
   Work vs private life -0.026    (0.036)
   Commuting time -0.193    (0.034)***
   Personnel management       0.040    (0.035)
   Management of the organisation 0.212    (0.035)***
   Style of leadership 0.081    (0.032)**
   Autonomy / responsibility      -0.021    (0.031)
Observations
Loglikelihood
Nagelkerke's R2
Control variables only:
   Loglikelihood
   Nagelkerke's R2
Data source: BZK, Mobiliteitsonderzoek 2002.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at the 0.10 level. ** significant at the 0.05 level. *** significant at the 0.01 level
Also included, but not reported, were the number of working hours, tenure, tenure-squared,
experience, experience-squared, and dummies for the former sector of employment.
           4,282
          -2,528.778
           0.247
          -2,388.663
           0.315
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7.5.2 Workers’ reasons to leave the public sector
The information on the reasons for quitting can also be used to determine which job
aspects drive workers out of the public sector. Thereby, we get an indication of the
job aspects that need attention if retention rates are to be improved. By regrouping
the respondents, we can use the same method as in the previous subsection. Stayers
and movers have changed jobs within the public sector, whereas leavers have moved
from a public sector job to a job in the private sector. Table 7.5 reports the result of
a logistic regression where the dependent variable is 0 if the respondent is a stayer
or a mover, and 1 if the respondent is a leaver.
We find that employees who quit their public sector job out of dissatisfaction
with rewards, financial prospects, or management are more likely to move to a job
in the private sector. Similar, but somewhat less strong effects are found for physical
working conditions and future job duties. This resembles the reasons given by UK
workers for their exit from the public sector (Audit Commission, 2002). Employees
with children are less likely to leave the public sector, suggesting that it is easier to
combine the care for children with working in the public sector than with working in
the private sector. Likewise, Table 7.5 suggests that the public sector offers better
conditions regarding the opportunities for education and training than the private
sector. These findings are an indication of the relative strengths and weaknesses of
public sector jobs. Yet, a similar analysis among private sector workers is needed
for a more conclusive comparison between public and private sector jobs.
The relatively high discontent with management among workers who leave the
public sector may be related to Dixit’s (2002) observation that public agencies often
face multiple principals. When the management of a public agency is unable to trans-
late the diverse interests and pressures of the principals into a clear organisational
goal and consistent objectives, workers may lose confidence in their management’s
capacities. Private firms are less prone to pursue conflicting goals, as the ultimate
objective of a private firm is to generate shareholder value.
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Table 7.5: Reasons to stay in or leave the public sector
Dependent variable:   0 = stayer or mover
                                   1 = leaver 
Variables    Coefficient
Constant -2.217    (0.557)***
Female -0.229    (0.105)
Minority 0.197    (0.231)
Married 0.078    (0.118)
Children -0.280    (0.106)***
Medium education 0.113    (0.206)
Higher voc. education -0.392    (0.220)*
University -0.214    (0.240)
Log hourly wage old job 0.171    (0.167)
Reason to quit:
   Threat of restructuring -0.024    (0.075)
   Threat of losing job -0.045    (0.079)
   Contract duration -0.117    (0.059)**
   Rewards 0.153    (0.042)***
   Financial prospects 0.131    (0.041)***
   Work pressure -0.015    (0.048)
   Facilities at work -0.015    (0.089)
   Physical working conditions 0.132    (0.071)*
   Job duties 0.008    (0.036)
   Future job duties 0.092    (0.038)**
   Education / training -0.178    (0.065)***
   Atmosphere at work -0.029    (0.038)
   Contractual hours -0.074    (0.084)
   Work vs private life -0.063    (0.050)
   Commuting time -0.380    (0.057)***
   Personnel management 0.121    (0.042)***
   Management of the organisation 0.154    (0.041)***
   Style of leadership 0.108    (0.039)***
   Autonomy / responsibility 0.013    (0.039)
Observations
Loglikelihood
Nagelkerke's R2
Control variables only:
   Loglikelihood
   Nagelkerke's R2
Data source: BZK, Mobiliteitsonderzoek 2002.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at the 0.10 level. ** significant at the 0.05 level. *** significant at the 0.01 level
Also included, but not reported, were the number of working hours, tenure, tenure-squared,
experience, experience-squared, and dummies for the former sector of employment.
          -1,747.911
           0.109
          -1,649.991
           4,282
           0.180
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Table 7.6: Reasons to quit and the wage growth of intra- and interindustry job
movers
Variables    Coefficient    Coefficient
Movers 0.007    (0.008) 0.002    (0.007)
Leavers 0.016    (0.009)* 0.001    (0.009)
Reasons to quit
Observations
R2
Data source: BZK, Mobiliteitsonderzoek 2002.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at the 0.10 level. ** significant at the 0.05 level. *** significant at the 0.01 level.
Except for the dummies for the new sector of employment, all variables included in the
specifications of Table 6.3 are also included here.
Reasons to quit included
4,282
0.125
Reasons to quit excluded
0.088
4,282
NO YES
7.5.3 The wage effects of a change in industry
Section 7.4 analysed the effect of workers’ reasons for quitting on their wage develop-
ment, without examining directly the effect of a change in industry. By exploring
differences in wage growth between stayers, movers, and leavers, we can compare
the wage growth of intra-industry job movers (stayers) to the wage growth of in-
terindustry job movers (movers and leavers). Table 7.6 presents the differences in
wage growth between intra- and interindustry job movers, both with and without
controlling for workers’ reasons for quitting.13 The estimation without the reason-
to-quit variables indicates that leavers obtain on average a significantly larger wage
increase than stayers. Lima (2004) reports a wage premium for a change in industry
of similar magnitude in a large sample of Portuguese workers. However, the second
column of Table 7.6 makes clear that the differences in wage growth between stayers,
movers, and leavers are fully explained by differences in the reasons for quitting the
initial job. Hence, we conclude that neglecting workers’ reasons to quit may yield
incorrect estimates of the effect of a change in industry on wage growth.
13The difference with the estimations in Table 7.3 is that the dummies for the new industry of
employment have been replaced by dummies for movers and leavers, with stayers as base category.
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Data limitations prevent differentiating between workers entering, leaving, and
staying in specific industries. Studies using matched employer-employee data have
shown that unobserved worker heterogeneity explains most of the interindustry wage
differentials (Abowd et al., 1999, Goux and Maurin, 1999). Relatedly, McLaughlin
and Bils (2001), who find that workers leaving declining industries and workers en-
tering growing industries tend to have higher wage growth than their new colleagues
who did not change industry, conjecture that “the wage changes of interindustry
movers could be [explained] by an extension to compensating wage differentials for
industry attributes” (p. 131). Although on a more aggregate level, the results in
Table 7.6 confirm that differences in wage growth between intra- and interindus-
try job movers may be explained by heterogeneous preferences for industry-specific
components of job characteristics.
7.6 Conclusions
Analysing data from a survey of public sector workers in the Netherlands, this chap-
ter has shown that job movers’ experience in their initial job affects their decision
to stay in or leave their industry of employment. When pay, work pressure, working
conditions, job duties, or management are important in the decision to quit, workers
are more likely to move out of their industry. By contrast, a quit for the atmosphere
at work, commuting time, the opportunities for training, or working hours makes
a change in industry less likely. This suggests that workers use their experience in
the initial job to update their expectations on other jobs in the industry, as the first
set of job aspects is more likely to be related among jobs within an industry than
the latter. Moreover, we show that different motives for quitting lead to differences
in wage growth, as the apparent wage premium of interindustry job movers relative
to intra-industry job movers vanishes once workers’ reasons to quit are controlled
for. Lastly, we find that many workers who quit out of dissatisfaction with pay or
management leave the public sector altogether. Hence, improvement of these job
aspects should receive priority if employee turnover in the public sector is to be
reduced.
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A similar, but economy-wide survey of job movers would improve the analysis of
the effects of workers’ reasons for quitting. With the addition of job movers within
the private sector, an analysis of the relatively attractive and repulsive aspects of
public and private sector jobs would be feasible. Moreover, a larger sample size would
enable us to assess the main reasons for entering and leaving specific industries.
As called for by McLaughlin and Bils (2001), this may facilitate the estimation of
industry attributes and their effect on workers’ wages.

Chapter 8
Summary and directions for
further research
The starting point of this thesis has been the premise that people not solely work for
money, and that working is not an altogether dreadful experience. Although many
people will agree with this statement, economic models of human behaviour at the
workplace often assume exactly the opposite. Applying the techniques used in stan-
dard economic analysis, this thesis has examined the implications of heterogeneity
in the intrinsic motivation of workers for optimal monetary incentive schemes and
for the recruitment and selection of employees. Furthermore, the thesis has looked
into the relation between workers’ satisfaction with various aspects of their job and
their decision whether or not to search for another job, and if so, where to look for
or take up a new position. Here, we summarise the main findings and give some
suggestions for further research.
8.1 Summary
In Chapters 2 to 5, we have looked at optimal monetary incentive schemes and
the recruitment and (self-)selection of employees when workers differ in intrinsic
motivation. In Chapter 2, we have started by showing that firms value intrinsically
motivated workers. At a given level of monetary incentives, motivated workers
provide more effort than non-motivated workers. Moreover, since motivated workers
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derive utility from working, they are willing to provide a given level of effort in
exchange for a lower wage than non-motivated workers. Thus, the stronger a worker’s
motivation, the lower the wage needs to be to attract the worker. Hence, the recruit-
ment of intrinsically motivated workers can yield both higher productivity and lower
wage cost for a firm.
However, since intrinsically motivated workers obviously prefer to receive a high
wage, they may want to hide their motivation from the firm, so as to increase
their wage. This makes the recruitment of highly motivated personnel difficult.
In Chapter 2, we have constructed a model where workers differ in their intrinsic
motivation to work for a particular firm. We have studied how the firm can use
the wage scheme to recruit a highly motivated worker when the firm is uncertain
about the level of motivation of potential hirees. We have argued that in order
to attract any applicants at all, the firm must credibly promise not to extract all
motivational rents from the hiree, by committing to a minimum wage. For without
this commitment, workers know that the firm would fully exploit their intrinsic
motivation through a reduced wage offer. We have shown that the optimal level
of the minimum wage depends on whether or not the firm can observe the level of
intrinsic motivation of applicants during the selection process. If the firm can observe
the level of intrinsic motivation of applicants, it always picks the best-motivated
applicant, and the optimal minimum wage is given by a trade-off between wage
cost and the probability of getting at least one applicant. If motivation is not
observable, the firm has to choose one of the applicants randomly. This gives the
firm an incentive to discourage low-motivation workers from applying, by setting a
lower wage. This prediction is in line with evidence that firms that have extensive
screening procedures pay higher wages (Huang and Cappelli, 2006).
Chapter 3 has examined the effect of intensifying competition between firms
when workers differ in intrinsic motivation, by comparing a market served by one
public agency to a perfectly competitive market where multiple firms offer jobs
with similar intrinsic qualities. In recent decades, we have witnessed many cases
of liberalisation and privatisation, often inspired by the (perceived) inefficiency of
public organisations. Surveys of the empirical literature find that liberalisation and
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privatisation generally lead to higher productivity, lower employment, and higher
wages for the retained workers (Megginson and Netter, 2001, Kikeri and Nellis,
2002). These effect are often attributed to the strengthening of monetary incentives
after liberalisation (Megginson et al. 1994). Relatedly, Burgess and Metcalfe (1999)
find that public organisations provide their workers with weaker financial incentives
than comparable private organisations. Competition from private organisations has
shown to strengthen incentives and to increase wages in the Swedish health care
sector (Hjertqvist, 2001) and at public schools in the US (Hoxby, 1994, 2002).
In Chapter 3, we distinguish between high- and low-motivation workers, and as-
sume that there are insufficiently many high-motivation workers to serve demand.
Firms in a competitive market compete for the best-motivated workers, as these
are willing to exert more effort and, hence, are more productive. This competition
drives wages up to the point where workers fully obtain the value of their production.
Before liberalisation, the public agency is the only organisation that offers jobs with
intrinsic qualities and, therefore, it has monopsony power over the high-motivation
workers. As workers’ motivation is not observable, the public agency cannot make
contracts contingent on motivation, implying that it must leave some motivational
rents to the high-motivation workers. Otherwise, high-motivation workers would
pretend to be low-motivation workers. However, Chapter 3 has shown that its
monopsony power enables the public agency to extract part of the motivational
rents, by providing weaker incentives than firms in competition, which is in accor-
dance with the empirical evidence. Weaker incentives lead to lower productivity,
lower wages, and higher employment. The public monopsonist also has lower wage
cost than firms in a competitive market, implying that it can charge a lower price.
It follows that only the high-motivation workers benefit from liberalisation, as they
get to keep all motivational rents. The remainder of society loses as a result of the
price increase.
Chapter 3 has shown that the provision of weak incentives by public organisations
need not be a sign of inefficiency, but rather can be a means to reduce wage cost when
workers differ in intrinsic motivation. However, as argued by Lazear (1986), weak
incentives are also attractive to less productive workers. A stereotype view of civil
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servants suggest that some public sector workers indeed provide little effort. Besides
the popular image of the dedicated civil servant, another depiction of civil servants,
abounding in jokes and stories, is that of the lazy, incompetent bureaucrat who only
cares about forms and coffee. This is reflected in surveys among US citizens, which
find that people tend to be negative about bureaucrats and bureaucracy in general,
although they are more positive about specific civil servants and agencies (Katz et
al., 1975, Goodsell, 1985).
In Chapter 4, we have studied which worker types are attracted by a public
agency when workers not only differ in their intrinsic motivation to work for the
agency, as in Chapter 3, but also differ in general productivity. More specifically,
we have assumed that low-motivation workers come in two types, lazy and regu-
lar workers, where lazy workers have higher cost of providing effort than regular
workers. Workers can choose to work for the public agency or in a competitive pri-
vate sector. Chapter 4 has shown that when there are insufficiently many motivated
workers, the public agency prefers to attract lazy rather than regular workers to work
alongside the motivated workers. Moreover, it optimally provides the lazy workers
with weaker incentives than private firms. Thereby, the public agency can extract
more motivational rents from motivated workers (i.e. offer a lower wage per unit of
effort). The optimal contract for a lazy worker has a lower wage and lower effort
requirement than the optimal contract for a regular worker. This implies that for
motivated workers, pretending to be not motivated is less appealing when it yields a
contract designed for a lazy worker. Hence, Chapter 4 has argued that the laziness
of bureaucrats may be a sign of efficiency.
Chapter 5 has examined how the system of health care provision affects the
allocation of patients to physicians when some physicians intrinsically care about
patients’ welfare. In many countries, physicians have to take a modern version of
the Oath of Hippocrates, in which they pledge to act in their patients’ interest.
In Chapter 5, we have constructed a model where patients differ in income and
where altruistic physicians enjoy improving the utility of their patients, in contrast
to regular physicians. Patients can receive treatment for free in a National Health
Service, and physicians working in the NHS have to adhere to a minimum treatment
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quality.
We have shown that allowing for private provision of health care parallel to the
NHS benefits both rich and poor patients. Rich patients are better off because they
are able to buy high-quality treatment in the private sector. Altruistic physicians
then face the choice between treating patients who already obtain high-quality treat-
ment in the private sector and helping patients who otherwise receive (relatively)
low-quality treatment in the NHS. They optimally decide to work in the NHS, be-
cause they can have a larger impact on NHS patients’ utility. This implies that
poor patients also benefit from allowing for private provision of health care, as the
withdrawal of the rich implies that the remaining patients in the NHS have a higher
probability of receiving the superior treatment provided by altruistic physicians.
Chapter 5 has also shown that this mechanism increases the scope for subsidising
private provision of health care, as a subsidy increases the number of patients who
leave the NHS. Conversely, allowing physicians to transfer NHS patients to their
private practice (if this is mutually beneficial) is shown to be harmful for the poor-
est patients, by increasesing the number of patients who (at least initially) opt for
treatment in the NHS.
In Chapters 6 and 7, we have studied how workers’ own assessment of various
aspects of their job affects both whether and where they would like to obtain another
position. Chapter 6 has examined search behaviour, using data from a survey among
employees in the Dutch public sector. All respondents had to state their satisfaction
with various job domains and their job search intensity. In line with Freeman (1978)
and Clark (2001), we have shown that both for satisfaction with the job overall as
well as for satisfaction with almost all job domains, more satisfied workers are less
likely to search for another job.
The survey also asked job seekers whether they searched within their current
organisation, within the industry, or outside the industry, and they had to indicate
the importance of 19 job domains in their decision to search. In Chapter 6, we
have established an intuitive relation between workers’ reasons for searching and
the direction of their search efforts. Workers try to leave their current organisation
when they want to improve upon a job domain that varies little across jobs within an
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organisation, like management or commuting time. Conversely, problems with a job
domain that differs more across jobs within an organisation, such as autonomy, are
more likely to induce workers to search within their organisation. Workers attempt
to leave their industry when they feel uncomfortable with a job domain that may
have an industry-specific element, like job duties. We have argued that this indicates
that workers use information about their own job and other jobs in their organisation
and industry to infer both whether and where they may find a job that better suits
their preferences.
Whereas Chapter 6 is based on a survey among employees who stayed in their
public sector job throughout 2002, in Chapter 7 we have used data from an equivalent
survey among employees who entered or left an organisation in the Dutch public
sector in 2001. Respondents had to indicate the importance of 19 job domains in
their decision to leave their former job. In line with Akerlof et al. (1988), non-
pecuniary job aspects like job duties, management, and autonomy are more often
mentioned than pecuniary job aspects. In Chapter 7, we have examined the relation
between workers’ reasons to quit and their decision to take up another job within
the same industry, in another part of the public sector, or in the private sector.
We have shown that when workers leave their job because of a job aspect that
may have an industry-specific component, like (future) earnings, work pressure, or
job duties, they are more likely to leave their current industry of employment. Con-
versely, problems with contractual hours, opportunities for training, or commuting
time induce workers to take up another job within their industry. The main reasons
to quit of workers who leave the public sector altogether are pay and management.
Chapter 7 has also shown that workers’ reasons to quit affect their wage growth.
Wage growth is significantly higher for workers who quit their job out of dissatis-
faction with their rewards or their autonomy, whereas workers who quit for work
pressure or work-life balance put up with significant lower wage growth. Moreover,
Chapter 7 has shown that the difference in (average) wage growth between intra-
and interindustry job movers can be fully explained by differences in the reasons for
quitting.
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8.2 Directions for further research
In Chapters 2 to 5 of this thesis, we have assumed that the level of intrinsic moti-
vation of a specific worker to work in a certain job is fixed. One direction of further
research is to abandon this assumption and acknowledge that intrinsic motivation
can be subject to change, for two reasons. First, workers may be uncertain about
their intrinsic motivation to work in a certain job. Initially, a worker may have
limited information about the intrinsic qualities of a new job. In various ways, the
worker may learn about the attractiveness of the work. Along these lines, Bena-
bou and Tirole (2003) argue that if the principal has better information about the
work than an employee, then the provision of strong monetary incentives may be
interpreted by the employee as a signal that the work is dreadful, which leads to a
downward adjustment in her (expected) intrinsic motivation. Similarly, the attitude
of co-workers and clients and the intensity of monitoring by management may also
yield information about the intrinsic qualities of the job.
Second, the level of intrinsic motivation may be directly affected by other as-
pects of the job. Experiments in psychology have shown that the provision of a
monetary reward may reduce individuals’ intrinsic motivation to perform a task,
see e.g. Deci (1971). Similarly, workers can become more enthousiastic about their
job through involvement in decision-making, after an increase in autonomy, or from
the introduction of teamwork. As argued in the Concluding remarks of Chapter 4,
we have abstained from interaction effects between differently motivated colleagues.
However, it is certainly conceivable that enthousiastic co-workers are inspiring, while
working with grumbling colleagues is depressing, as in Stowe (2002). Another job
aspect that may affect intrinsic motivation is task assignment. For instance, a recur-
rent complaint among workers in Dutch hospitals and nursing homes is the reduction
in time available for social interaction with patients and clients, caused by personnel
shortages or strict time-management. If employees intrinsically value giving atten-
tion to patients, then limited opportunities for doing so reduce their enjoyment of
working, causing lower effort and high turnover. This research area seems particu-
larly well-suited for conducting (field) experiments.
Another interesting direction for future work is the interplay between intrinsic
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motivation and career advancement. In many organisations, job duties change when
a worker progresses through the ranks. This implies that workers who enjoy the tasks
performed at the field level may have mixed feelings about a promotion. Moreover,
after landing a higher-level position, these workers have an incentive to stay involved
in field-level tasks, even if this comes at the expense of more important tasks. For
instance, a dean who once started his career out of love for doing research may be
unwilling to spend most of his time managing the school, which may be detrimental
for the research output of the whole school. These considerations are important for
designing the hierarchical structure of an organisation, for determining the rules and
standards for promotion, and for task assignment. Recently, DeVaro and Samuelson
(2004) make an argument along these lines to explain the finding that workers in
non-profit firms are less likely to receive promotions than workers in for-profit firms.
Since non-profits are particularly attractive to people who intrinsically share the
goals of the organisation, non-profits have less need for promotions as an external
incentive.
In the coming years, economic research using subjective data will continue to
grow. One particularly interesting question is whether regularities found in the
literature using objective data are also present in subjective data. For instance, the
literature on industry wage differentials has shown that workers in some industries
obtain significantly higher wages than seemingly identical workers in other industries
(see Krueger and Summers, 1988). Similarly, Brown and Medoff (1989) show that
large firms tend to pay higher wages than smaller firms, and Borjas (2003) finds
that the wage structure is more compressed in the public sector than in the private
sector. Careful analysis using workers’ subjective assessment of their job may tell
us whether workers who receive ‘inexplicable’ high wages are really better off, or are
merely compensated for high work pressure and other discomforting features of their
job. An original approach is taken by Clark (2003). He compares industrial wage
differentials to industry ‘satisfaction differentials’, where the latter is the unexplained
variation in job satisfaction across industries after controlling for a set of worker
and job characteristics. It turns out that high-wage industries need not be high-
satisfaction industries and vice versa.
Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Introductie
Werk is voor veel mensen niet alleen de belangrijkste bron van inkomsten, maar
behoort ook tot de voornaamste activiteiten in hun leven. In economische modellen
die menselijk gedrag op de werkvloer beschrijven, worden werknemers traditioneel
afgeschilderd als opportunistische, luie wezens die iedere mogelijkheid om zich te
onttrekken aan het leveren van inspanning met beide handen aangrijpen. Alleen
een financiële beloning kan werknemers ertoe aanzetten naar het werk te gaan en
zich daar nuttig te maken. Taken die niet strikt noodzakelijk zijn of niet in de
functieomschrijving staan, worden niet uitgevoerd en voor iedere minuut overwerk
eisen werknemers (financiële) compensatie.
Weinig mensen zullen zich herkennen in het hierboven geschetste beeld. Werk is
meer dan een bron van inkomsten. Veel mensen zijn trots op hun werk of vinden
het (tot op zekere hoogte) leuk om te werken. In een enquête onder de Amerikaanse
beroepsbevolking gaf 70 procent van de ondervraagden aan ook door te gaan met
werken als ze voldoende geld zouden hebben om comfortabel van te kunnen leven
(Quinn en Staines, 1979). In een andere enquête werd door 95 procent van de
Amerikaanse ondervraagden geclaimd dat ze zelfs hard zouden werken als hun baas
hen niet kon controleren (Minkler, 2004). De belangrijkste reden die men hiervoor
gaf was “I enjoy my work”. Enquêtes onder managers laten zien dat managers zich
bewust zijn van het feit dat werknemers ook met niet-financiële middelen te moti-
veren zijn (Agell en Lundborg, 1999, Bewley, 1998). Deze bevindingen suggereren
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dat het standaard economische model een (potentieel belangrijk) element van werk
mist.
Psychologen en sociologen daarentegen gaan wel uit van de brede invloed die
werk heeft op het leven van mensen. Werk biedt mensen de mogelijkheid een so-
ciale positie te verwerven en zichzelf te ontwikkelen (Maslow, 1970). Daarnaast
beweren psychologen dat ‘intrinsieke motivatie’ ten grondslag ligt aan een groot
gedeelte van de gedragskeuzes die mensen maken. Met andere woorden, veel gedrag
wordt gedreven door interne motieven, zonder dat er externe prikkels voor nodig
zijn (DeCharms, 1968). Dit betekent dat mensen die intrinsiek gemotiveerd zijn om
te werken, bijvoorbeeld omdat ze plezier hebben in hun werk, harder zullen werken
dan wordt voorspeld door het standaard economische model. Dit is natuurlijk van
belang voor bedrijven. Als werknemers verschillen in intrinsieke motivatie om bij
een bepaald bedrijf te werken, dan zijn de prestaties van het bedrijf afhankelijk van
de mate waarin het bedrijf in staat is om goed gemotiveerd personeel te werven.
Werknemers kunnen dus geïnteresseerd zijn in alle facetten van hun baan, in
plaats van slechts in het salaris. In dit proefschrift staat het belang dat werknemers
toekennen aan de niet-financiële aspecten van hun baan centraal. Het proefschrift
bestudeert de implicaties van intrinsieke waardering van werk voor de (optimale)
beloningsstructuur binnen een bedrijf en voor de werving en selectie van personeel.
Daarnaast analyseren we, aan de hand van enquêtes, de relatie tussen de tevreden-
heid van werknemers met verschillende (financiële én niet-financiële) aspecten van
hun baan en de beslissing of en wáár op zoek te gaan naar een nieuwe baan.
Hieronder gaan we kort in op de belangrijkste elementen in de analyse: intrinsieke
motivatie, financiële prikkels en selectie-effecten, en de relatie tussen de tevredenheid
van werknemers met hun baan en personeelsverloop. Daarna volgt een overzicht van
de hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift.
Intrinsieke motivatie op de werkvloer
Mensen kunnen om veel redenen intrinsiek gemotiveerd zijn om inspanning te
leveren op het werk. Werken kan mensen het gevoel geven dat ze een substantiële
bijdrage leveren of dat ze moeilijk gemist kunnen worden. Het helpen van collega’s
of klanten kan bevredigend zijn en meewerken aan een ‘goed’ doel of project kan
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inspirerend werken. Wat de reden ook is, mensen die intrinsiek nut ontlenen aan
hun werk zullen zich daarvoor inspannen, zelfs als er nauwelijks of geen financiële
prikkels zijn.
In principe kan iedere baan intrinsieke motivatie oproepen, afhankelijk van de
preferenties van de werknemer. Banen in het onderwijs of in de gezondheidszorg
worden vaak genoemd als voorbeelden van banen waarvoor mensen intrinsiek gemo-
tiveerd kunnen zijn, met name omdat werknemers in dit soort banen direct invloed
hebben op het leven en de vooruitzichten van patiënten en scholieren. Natuurlijk
zal het soort baan waarvoor iemand gemotiveerd is per persoon verschillen. Mensen
met hoogtevrees zullen weinig intrinsieke motivatie hebben om te werken als glazen-
wasser, vegetariërs zullen weinig plezier ontlenen aan een baan als slager en mensen
met hooikoorts gaan niet graag als tuinman aan de slag. Het niveau van intrinsieke
motivatie wordt dus bepaald door de combinatie van baan en werknemer.
De baten van intrinsiek gemotiveerde werknemers voor een bedrijf zijn duidelijk.
Besley en Ghatak (2005), Francois (2000), Glazer (2002) en hoofdstuk 2 van dit
proefschrift laten zien dat intrinsiek gemotiveerde werknemers harder werken en ge-
noegen nemen met een lagere beloning voor hun inspanningen dan ongemotiveerde
werknemers. Om hiervan te profiteren moet het bedrijf natuurlijk wel eerst in
staat zijn om gemotiveerde werknemers aan te trekken. Anders dan met bepaalde
vaardigheden het geval is, is intrinsieke motivatie moeilijk meetbaar. Hierdoor is
de werving en selectie van gemotiveerd personeel geen eenvoudige klus. Hoewel
bedrijven tijdens de sollicitatieprocedure kunnen proberen om een indruk te krij-
gen van de intrinsieke motivatie van een sollicitant, zal deze indruk nooit perfect
zijn. Bovendien kunnen sollicitanten proberen om intrinsieke motivatie te simuleren
of verbergen. De problemen die spelen bij de werving en selectie van personeel
als mensen verschillen in intrinsieke motivatie is een van de onderwerpen van dit
proefschrift.
Financiële prikkels en selectie
Er is weinig twijfel onder economen over de vraag of financiële prikkels effect
hebben op het gedrag van mensen in het algemeen en werknemers in het bijzonder.
Van stukloon, bonussen en andere vormen van prestatiebeloning wordt verwacht dat
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ze werknemers aanzetten tot extra inspanningen. Daarnaast is prestatiebeloning
vooral interessant voor productieve werknemers, wat inhoudt dat prestatiebeloning
de werving van productief personeel kan vergemakkelijken. Verschillende studies
hebben aangetoond dat de productiviteit inderdaad stijgt na invoering van presta-
tiebeloning, zowel via verhoogde inspanning van werknemers als door het selectie-
effect (Lazear, 2000, Prendergast, 1999). Anekdotes over prestatiebeloningen die
ongewenste effecten ten gevolg hadden, suggereren ook dat prestatiebeloning leidt
tot gedragsveranderingen. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn onderwijzers die voor een exa-
men de antwoorden uitdeelden nadat hun beloning afhankelijk was gemaakt van de
examenresultaten van de leerlingen, en typistes die tijdens hun lunchpauze continu
dezelfde toets bleven aanslaan nadat hun salaris deels werd gebaseerd op het aantal
aanslagen (Kerr, 1975). Kortom, financiële prikkels beïnvloeden gedrag en kunnen,
indien verstandig toegepast, leiden tot hogere productiviteit.
Baantevredenheid en mobiliteit
Werknemers gaan op zoek naar een nieuwe baan als ze het gevoel hebben dat ze
in staat zijn een betere baan te vinden, en stappen over als de nieuwe baan een hoger
(verwacht) nut oplevert dan de huidige baan. In principe kan ieder aspect van de
huidige baan, ook een niet-financieel aspect, een motief zijn om te gaan zoeken naar
een andere baan. Akerlof et al. (1988) laten zien dat meer Amerikaanse werkne-
mers vrijwillig van baan veranderen vanwege niet-financiële redenen dan vanwege
financiële redenen, en dat vrijwel alle overstappers stellen dat ze beter af zijn in hun
nieuwe baan. In principe is arbeidsmobiliteit noodzakelijk voor het accommoderen
van verschillen in groei tussen bedrijven en sectoren. Echter, voor individuele bedrij-
ven kan personeelsverloop hoge kosten met zich meebrengen, via opleidingskosten
en werving- en selectieprocedures. Bedrijven kunnen het personeelsverloop wellicht
reduceren als zij inzicht krijgen in de redenen die werknemers hebben om hun baan
op te zeggen. Voor sectoren waar een personeelstekort dreigt, zoals de onderwijssec-
tor in Nederland (Ministerie van OCW, 2006), kunnen de redenen die werknemers
hebben om de sector te (willen) verlaten helpen bij het nemen van maatregelen die
het tekort moeten voorkomen of verminderen.
In de economische literatuur over de oorzaken en effecten van arbeidsmobiliteit
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is veel aandacht voor objectief meetbare baanaspecten, zoals het salaris. Voor
baanaspecten die niet of nauwelijks objectief meetbaar zijn, zoals de inhoud van
het werk en de omgang met collega’s en het management, is traditioneel minder
aandacht. Een alternatief voor objectieve maatstaven is het verzamelen van sub-
jectieve data, door werknemers verschillende aspecten van hun eigen baan te laten
beoordelen. In navolging van psychologen maken economen meer en meer gebruik
van dit soort subjectieve data (Frijters en Ferrer-i-Carbonel, 2004), voornamelijk
omdat is gebleken dat subjectieve data het gedrag van mensen helpt te verklaren.
Freeman (1978) laat bijvoorbeeld zien dat de kans dat een werknemer binnenkort
ontslag neemt significant groter is voor werknemers die ontevreden zijn met hun
huidige baan dan voor tevreden werknemers; Clark (2001) trekt dezelfde conclusie
voor het effect van ontevredenheid met bepaalde aspecten van de baan. Het ligt
voor de hand dat (on)tevredenheid met verschillende baanaspecten niet alleen in-
vloed heeft op de keuze om al dan niet op zoek te gaan naar een andere baan, maar
ook invloed heeft op wáár mensen een nieuwe baan gaan zoeken. Een PhD-student
die zich realiseert dat onderwijs en onderzoek niet aan haar besteed zijn, heeft weinig
te zoeken op een andere universiteit. De vraag die rijst is: wat is de relatie tussen
de redenen die een werknemer heeft om van baan te veranderen en zijn zoekgedrag,
zowel wat betreft de intensiteit als de richting van de zoekinspanningen?
Overzicht van het proefschrift
Het centrale thema van dit proefschrift is het belang dat mensen toekennen aan niet-
financiële aspecten van werk en het effect daarvan op het gedrag van werknemers en
bedrijven. In hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 5 bestuderen we de effecten van heterogeniteit
in de intrinsieke motivatie van werknemers op de optimale beloningsstructuur en op
de werving en selectie van werknemers. In de hoofdstukken 6 en 7 wordt aan de
hand van enquêteresultaten een link gelegd tussen de tevredenheid van werknemers
met verschillende aspecten van hun (vorige) baan en hun zoek- en mobiliteitsgedrag.
Hoofdstuk 2 begint met de constatering dat intrinsiek gemotiveerde werknemers
productiever zijn dan minder gemotiveerde werknemers en dat ze, omdat ze een
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hoger nut ontlenen aan werken, bereid zijn te werken voor een lager salaris (zie ook
bijvoorbeeld Besley en Ghatak, 2005, en Francois, 2000). Intrinsiek gemotiveerde
werknemers zijn dus waardevol voor bedrijven. De werving van intrinsiek gemo-
tiveerd personeel kan echter lastig zijn. Als een bedrijf gemotiveerde werknemers
een lager salaris biedt dan ongemotiveerde werknemers, dan hebben de gemotiveerde
werknemers een prikkel om hun motivatie te verbergen tijdens de sollicitatieproce-
dure.
Om de problemen rond de werving en selectie van gemotiveerd personeel te kun-
nen bestuderen, stelllen we in hoofdstuk 2 een model op waarin mensen verschillen in
hun intrinsieke motivatie om bij een bedrijf te werken, en waarin het bedrijf onzeker
is over de motivatie van potentiële sollicitanten. We laten zien dat het bedrijf moet
beloven niet al het extra nut dat gemotiveerde werknemers ontlenen aan het werken
bij het bedrijf af te romen, door zich vast te leggen op een minimumsalaris (bijvoor-
beeld via een CAO), omdat anders niemand solliciteert. Het bedrijf wil dit mini-
mumsalaris natuurlijk laag zetten, maar hoe lager het minimumsalaris, hoe hoger
de motivatie van een potentiële werknemer moet zijn om hem te doen solliciteren.
Omdat het bedrijf voordat mensen solliciteren niet weet hoe hoog de motivatie van
de meest-gemotiveerde persoon is, vergroot een lager minimumsalaris de kans dat er
niemand solliciteert. Het optimale niveau van het minimumsalaris is ook afhanke-
lijk van het vermogen van het bedrijf om de intrinsieke motivatie van sollicitanten
te observeren. Als intrinsieke motivatie observeerbaar is, dan zal het bedrijf altijd
de meest-gemotiveerde sollicitant aannemen. In dat geval wordt het salarisniveau
bepaald door de afweging tussen de loonkosten en de kans dat er niemand sollici-
teert. Als het bedrijf de motivatie niet kan observeren, dan zal het ‘blind’ één van de
sollicitanten moeten kiezen. Het bedrijf wil dan mensen met relatief lage motivatie
uit de selectieprocedure weren. Dit kan door een lager minimumsalaris te zetten.
Een hypothese die volgt uit dit model is dat bedrijven die beter de intrinsieke moti-
vatie van sollicitanten kunnen inschatten een hoger loon zullen bieden dan bedrijven
die de motivatie minder goed kunnen inschatten. Deze voorspelling wordt gesteund
door recent onderzoek dat laat zien dat bedrijven die intensieve selectieprocedures
hanteren hogere lonen betalen (Huang en Cappelli, 2006).
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Privatisering en liberalisering
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat in op de gevolgen van het intensiveren van competitie tussen
ondernemingen als werknemers binnen de sector verschillen in intrinsieke motivatie.
Gedreven door technologische vooruitgang en een negatief beeld van publieke or-
ganisaties zijn de laatste decennia over de hele wereld veel bedrijven geprivatiseerd
en veel sectoren geliberaliseerd, vaak tegelijkertijd. Verschillende empirische stu-
dies laten zien dat liberalisering en privatisering over het algemeen leiden tot hogere
productiviteit, hogere lonen, lagere werkgelegenheid en sterkere financiële prikkels
voor het (overgebleven) personeel (Kikeri en Nellis, 2002, Megginson en Netter,
2001). Burgess en Metcalfe (1999) vinden dat publieke organisaties over het alge-
meen zwakkere financiële prikkels geven dan private organisaties, en stellen dat dit
een teken is dat publieke organisaties minder efficiënt opereren. In hoofdstuk 3 be-
weren wij echter dat zwakke prikkels in de publieke sector een teken van efficiëntie
kunnen zijn.
In hoofdstuk 3 vergelijken we de situatie waar het aanbod in een sector wordt
verzorgd door één publieke organisatie met de situatie waar meerdere (private) on-
dernemingen actief zijn, bijvoorbeeld na liberalisering van de sector. Doordat vóór
de liberalisering de publieke organisatie de enige werkgever is met banen waarvoor
werknemers intrinsiek gemotiveerd zijn, kan de publieke organisatie een gedeelte
van het intrinsieke nut van de gemotiveerde werknemers afromen.1 Na liberalisering
zal er concurrentie ontstaan tussen bedrijven om de diensten van de gemotiveerde
werknemers, omdat deze productiever zijn. De concurrentie leidt ertoe dat bedrijven
geen winst maken op de productie van een werknemer en dus ook geen intrinsiek nut
kunnen afromen. In andere woorden, na liberalisering is het loon van een werknemer
gelijk aan de waarde van zijn productie. Dit betekent dat werknemers een sterke
financiële prikkel hebben om inspanning te leveren, omdat de volledige opbrengst
van hun inspanningen aan henzelf toekomt. We laten zien in hoofdstuk 3 dat de
publieke organisatie het intrinsieke nut van gemotiveerde werknemers kan afromen
door lagere financiële prikkels te geven dan werknemers krijgen op de competitieve
1Het is niet mogelijk om al het intrinsieke nut af te romen door het salaris afhankelijk te maken
van de motivatie van een werknemer, omdat de organisatie de motivatie van werknemers niet kan
observeren.
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markt (na liberalisering). Zwakkere prikkels leiden tot lagere inspanningen en dus
lagere productiviteit, lagere lonen en hogere werkgelegenheid, wat overeenkomt met
de bevindingen van de empirische literatuur. Het netto-effect is dat de publieke orga-
nisatie lagere loonkosten heeft dan bedrijven op een competitieve markt, wat inhoudt
dat de publieke organisatie goedkoper produceert dan de competitieve markt. Het
gevolg is dat alleen relatief hooggemotiveerde werknemers baat hebben bij liberali-
sering. Na liberalisering wordt het intrinsieke nut dat zij ontlenen aan het werken
in de sector niet langer afgeroomd. De rest van de samenleving is echter slechter af
vanwege de hogere productiekosten in de sector.
Lage productiviteit dankzij efficiënt personeelsbeleid
Zwakke financiële prikkels in publieke organisaties kunnen dus een signaal zijn
van efficiëntie, omdat ze gebruikt kunnen worden als middel om de loonkosten te
reduceren als werknemers verschillen in intrinsieke motivatie. De sterkte van finan-
ciële prikkels heeft echter ook een selectie-effect. Zwakke prikkels zijn vooral interes-
sant voor minder productieve werknemers (Lazear, 1986). In de beeldvorming rond
ambtenaren speelt juist deze aantijging een grote rol. Tegenover het beeld van de
bevlogen docent, de verpleegster die geeft om haar patiënten en de politieagent die
vastberaden is om criminelen op te sporen, staat de stereotype luie, incompetente
ambtenaar die zich verschuilt achter regels, procedures en formulieren en die zich
voornamelijk bezighoudt met het drinken van koffie. Uit enquêtes onder burgers in
de VS blijkt dat mensen inderdaad negatief zijn over ambtenaren en bureaucratie
in het algemeen, maar positiever over specifieke publieke instanties (Katz et al.,
1975, Goodsell, 1985). Hoofdstuk 4 gaat in op de selectie van werknemers door een
publieke organisatie als werknemers niet alleen verschillen in intrinsieke motivatie
om voor de organisatie te werken, maar ook verschillen in productiviteit in het al-
gemeen. We veronderstellen dat er drie typen werknemers zijn. Naast intrinsiek
gemotiveerde werknemers zijn er twee andere typen werknemers: standaardwerkne-
mers en luie werknemers. Luie werknemers hebben hogere kosten van het leveren van
inspanning dan standaardwerknemers. In de private sector zullen luie werknemers
dus minder inspanning leveren dan standaardwerknemers.
Hoofdstuk 4 laat zien dat, mits er voldoende gemotiveerde werknemers zijn, de
181
publieke organisatie in staat is om alleen gemotiveerde werknemers aan te trekken
en al het intrinsieke nut dat deze werknemers aan het werken voor de organisatie
ontlenen, af te romen. Als er niet voldoende gemotiveerde werknemers zijn, dan moet
de publieke organisatie een tweede type werknemer aantrekken, wat het afromen
van intrinsiek nut bemoeilijkt. Als gemotiveerde werknemers een hoger nut kunnen
bereiken door zich ongemotiveerd voor te doen, dan zullen zij dat natuurlijk doen.
We laten zien dat de publieke organisatie, naast de gemotiveerde werknemers, liever
luie werknemers dan standaardwerknemers aantrekt. Bovendien geeft de organisatie
zwakkere prikkels aan de luie werknemers dan de private sector, wat inhoudt dat
luie werknemers minder inspanning leveren bij de publieke organisatie dan in de
private sector. De verklaring is als volgt: doordat luie werknemers optimaal minder
inspanning leveren dan standaardwerknemers, is het voor gemotiveerde werknemers
vervelender om zich voor te doen als lui dan als standaard. Hierdoor kan de publieke
organisatie meer nut afromen van de gemotiveerde werknemers en zo goedkoper
produceren. De conclusie van hoofdstuk 4 is dat lage productiviteit van (een gedeelte
van de) ambtenaren een teken kan zijn van efficiënt personeelsbeleid.
Altruïstische artsen
Hoofdstuk 5 gaat in op marktwerking in de sector gezondheidszorg. Veel mensen
staan hier huiverig tegenover. Een argument tegen marktwerking in de zorg is dat
het leidt tot lagere zorgkwaliteit voor arme mensen, bijvoorbeeld doordat de beste
artsen hun vaardigheden in de private sector te gelde gaan maken. Hoofdstuk 5 be-
kijkt deze claim vanuit de veronderstelling dat een gedeelte van de artsen altruïstisch
is ten opzichte van patiënten. In veel landen, waaronder Nederland, leggen begin-
nende artsen een moderne versie van de Eed van Hippocrates af, waarin zij onder
andere zweren om in het belang van hun patiënt te handelen. Het ligt voor de hand
dat sommige artsen meer geven om hun patiënten dan andere artsen.2 Als artsen
inderdaad verschillen in hun altruïsme ten opzichte van patiënten, dan rijst de vraag:
welke patiënten profiteren van het altruïsme van artsen en hoe wordt dit beïnvloed
2Uit een enquête onder ziekenhuispersoneel in Engeland blijkt bijvoorbeeld dat zo’n 70 procent
van het personeel meer uren maakt dan contractueel vastgelegd; vaak zonder daarvoor betaald te
worden. Een groot gedeelte van de overwerkers geeft als reden dat zij daardoor betere zorg kunnen
leveren aan hun patiënten (Healthcare commission, 2006).
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door de wijze waarop de markt is ingericht? Om deze vraag te beantwoorden, stellen
we in hoofdstuk 5 een model op waarin patiënten verschillen in inkomen, waarin een
gedeelte van de artsen altruïstisch is en waar hogere zorgkwaliteit leidt tot hoger nut
voor de patiënt en tot hogere inspanningskosten voor de arts. Altruïstische artsen
ontlenen nut aan het verhogen van het welzijn van de patiënt. We vergelijken een
puur collectief systeem met een mixed publiek-privaat systeem. In beide systemen
wordt gratis zorg aangeboden in publieke instellingen, gefinancierd vanuit algemene
middelen. We veronderstellen dat in de publieke sector een minimum zorgkwaliteit
wordt gehandhaafd, die niet afhankelijk is van de inrichting van de markt. Het
verschil tussen de beide systemen ligt in de private sector. In het puur collectieve
systeem is er geen private sector, zodat alle patiënten in de publieke sector behandeld
worden. In het mixed systeem hebben artsen de mogelijkheid een private kliniek te
openen, zodat patiënten kunnen kiezen tussen (gratis) publieke zorg en het kopen
van zorg in een private kliniek.
Hoofdstuk 5 laat zien dat alle patiënten beter af zijn in het mixed systeem.
In de publieke sector leveren standaardartsen de minimumkwaliteit, altruïstische
artsen leveren hogere kwaliteit. Doordat de toewijzing van patiënten aan artsen
willekeurig is, heeft iedere patiënt in de publieke sector dezelfde kans op behandeling
door een altruïstische arts. Onder het mixed systeem komt de vraag naar private
zorgverlening van rijke patiënten die bereid zijn te betalen voor (de zekerheid van)
hoge zorgkwaliteit. Deze rijke patiënten zijn vanzelfsprekend beter af onder het
mixed systeem dan onder het collectieve systeem, omdat de mogelijkheid om hoge
zorgkwaliteit te kopen niet bestaat onder het collectieve systeem. Concurrentie
tussen artsen zorgt ervoor dat het salaris voor standaardartsen in de private sector
zodanig is dat zij indifferent zijn tussen werken in de publieke en in de private sector.
Altruïstische artsen daarentegen kiezen ervoor om ook onder het mixed systeem in
de publieke sector te werken. In de private sector kunnen zij het welzijn verhogen
van een patiënt die al hoge zorgkwaliteit ontvangt van een standaardarts. Door in
de publieke sector te werken, kunnen ze het welzijn verhogen van een (relatief arme)
patiënt die anders het minimum aan zorgkwaliteit ontvangt van een standaardarts.
Het laatste geeft zoveel meer bevrediging, dat dit opweegt tegen het hogere salaris dat
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zij kunnen verdienen in de private sector. Voor de patiënten die ook in het publiek-
private systeem ervoor kiezen om in de publieke sector behandeld te worden, betekent
dit dat zij een grotere kans hebben op behandeling door een altruïstische arts onder
het publiek-private systeem dan onder het collectieve systeem. Kortom, onder het
mixed systeem zorgt de keuze van rijkere patiënten om zorg te kopen in de private
sector ervoor dat de armere patiënten een hogere kans hebben op behandeling door
een altruïstische arts dan onder het collectieve systeem. In hoofdstuk 5 bespreken we
ook wat dit betekent voor de effecten van het subsidiëren van private gezondheidszorg
en voor de effecten van het al dan niet toestaan dat artsen zowel in een private kliniek
als in een publieke instelling kunnen werken.
De zoektocht naar een nieuwe baan: waar en waarom
In hoofdstuk 6 en 7 bestuderen we de relatie tussen de mening van werknemers
over hun baan en hun zoek- en mobiliteitsgedrag op de arbeidsmarkt. Hoofdstuk 6
gaat in op het effect van de tevredenheid van werknemers met verschillende aspecten
van hun huidige baan op zowel de beslissing om op zoek te gaan naar een nieuwe
baan als op de keuze wáár te gaan zoeken naar een nieuwe baan. We gebruiken
hiervoor de resultaten van een enquête onder mensen werkzaam in de Nederlandse
publieke sector in 2002. We vinden, in lijn met de resultaten van onder andere
Freeman (1978) en Clark (2001), dat voor zowel tevredenheid met de huidige baan
in het algemeen als voor tevredenheid met vrijwel ieder aspect van de baan geldt
dat hoe minder tevreden een werknemer is, hoe groter de kans dat de werknemer op
zoek is naar een andere baan.
De respondenten die daadwerkelijk op zoek waren naar een andere baan, moesten
aangeven of ze zochten binnen de huidige organisatie, binnen de huidige sector
en/of buiten de huidige sector. Ook moesten ze voor 19 verschillende baanaspecten
aangeven hoe belangrijk dit aspect was bij de beslissing om op zoek te gaan naar
een andere baan. In hoofdstuk 6 laten we zien dat er een intuïtieve relatie is tussen
de reden dat mensen zoeken en waar zij op zoek gaan naar een andere baan. Als
werknemers een probleem hebben met een organisatiespecifiek baanaspect (een as-
pect waarin banen binnen een organisatie relatief weinig verschillen), zoals het ma-
nagement of de reistijd, dan proberen werknemers een baan buiten de organisatie te
184 Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
vinden. De kans dat werknemers binnen de organisatie zoeken naar een andere baan
is groter als de reden dat men zoekt een baanaspect is waarin relatief veel variatie
is onder banen binnen een onderneming, zoals zelfstandigheid. Tenslotte proberen
werknemers een baan te vinden in een andere sector als zij problemen hebben met
een sectorspecifiek baanaspect, zoals de werkdruk en de inhoud van het werk. Deze
resultaten wijzen erop dat mensen in hun zoektocht naar een baan die beter aansluit
bij hun wensen, gebruikmaken van de informatie die zij hebben over hun huidige
baan én over andere banen binnen de organisatie en de sector.
Waar hoofdstuk 6 gebruik maakt van de resultaten van een enquête onder werkne-
mers die niet van baan zijn veranderd in 2002, gebruiken we in hoofdstuk 7 een
vergelijkbare enquête onder werknemers die in 2001 zijn begonnen of vertrokken bij
een organisatie in de Nederlandse publieke sector. De respondenten moesten voor
19 verschillende baanaspecten aangeven hoe belangrijk deze aspecten waren in hun
beslissing om hun vorige baan te verlaten. De inhoud van het werk, het management
en de mate van zelfstandigheid komen naar voren als de belangrijkste vertrekredenen.
Hoofdstuk 7 gaat vervolgens in op de relatie tussen de drijfveren van werknemers
om ontslag te nemen en hun keuze om te gaan werken bij een andere organisatie in
dezelfde sector, in een ander deel van de publieke sector of in de private sector.
We vinden dat de resultaten voor de keuze om binnen de sector te blijven of
naar een andere sector te gaan, grotendeels overeenkomen met de resultaten van
hoofdstuk 6. Werknemers die van baan zijn veranderd vanwege een sectorspecifiek
baanaspect, zoals werkdruk, de inhoud van het werk en de beloning, hebben relatief
vaak de sector verlaten. Daarentegen leiden problemen met bijvoorbeeld het aantal
uren, opleidingsmogelijkheden en reistijd ertoe dat werknemers relatief vaak naar een
andere organisatie binnen de sector vertrekken. De belangrijkste vertrekredenen van
de werknemers die de publieke sector verlaten zijn het salaris en het management.
Daarnaast laat hoofdstuk 7 zien dat de redenen die werknemers hebben om van baan
te veranderen ook effect hebben op het loonverschil tussen de oude en de nieuwe
baan. De loongroei is significant hoger voor werknemers die hun baan verlaten uit
ontevredenheid met het salaris of hun zelfstandigheid, terwijl werknemers die ontslag
nemen vanwege werkdruk of de combinatie tussen werk en het privéleven genoegen
185
nemen met significant lagere loongroei. Tenslotte laten we zien dat het verschil in
(gemiddelde) loongroei tussen werknemers die binnen de sector van baan veranderen
en werknemers die overstappen naar een andere sector volledig verklaard wordt door
verschillen in de vertrekredenen.
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